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USSR Council of Ministers Official on Transport Use

90UN0747A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 90
Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with A. Masterkov, deputy administrator of affairs, USSR Council of Ministers by IZVESTIYA correspondent R. Ignatyev: "A Car for a Member of the Government"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree on measures for bringing into further order the use of passenger vehicles by institutions, enterprises, and organizations. An IZVESTIYA correspondent asked A. Masterkov, deputy administrator of affairs, USSR Council of Ministers to comment upon this document.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Mikhailovich, what caused the appearance of a regular decree? After all, such a document was adopted relatively recently, on 23 January 1988.

[Masterkov] We feel that the measures stipulated in the previous document were insufficient. The situation has changed; society's further democratization is taking place, and thus the statutes in use were ineffective under current conditions. The new document more strictly regulates the utilization of automotive transportation. The expenses for its maintenance have been sharply curtailed.

I want to note that during the preparation of the resolution, the proposals of the first and second Congresses of USSR People's Deputies were taken into consideration, as well as the recommendations of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Examination of Privileges enjoyed by various categories of citizens.

[Correspondent] Has the given decree affected the Government itself?

[Masterkov] Undoubtedly. First of all, the list of staffers for whom official passenger vehicles are constantly furnished has been substantially reduced. Yet they have the right to summon a car. Now, instead of "ZILs", the USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairmen are allocated "Chaykas." And "Volgas," rather than "Chaykas" are used to service USSR ministers, chairmen of USSR state committees, other members of the country's Government, and their equivalents. For this purpose, it is planned that the USSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs will be supplied with 100 GAZ-3102 passenger vehicles. During January and February of 1990, these cars must be re-equipped—outfitted with radio telephone communications. Thus, 66 ministers and committee chairmen will be transferred into more economical motor transportation.

[Correspondent] And where will the cars that have been freed up be used?

[Masterkov] We will transfer 30 "Chaika" automobiles to the palaces of weddings. The sale to the population of

50 "Volga" automobiles in use is proposed. It is planned that such deal will be carried out through auctions held by the USSR Ministry of Trade.

[Correspondent] How do the members of the Government regard the decree?

[Masterkov] The document was considered at a session of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium. N.I. Ryzhkov delivered the report. All members of the Government, without exception, approved the document presented for their judgment. Moreover, certain ministers, in particular N. Konarev, expressed a proposal that all use of motor transportation for personal purposes be made on a paid basis.

In connection with the new decree, the previously widespread practice of allocating supplemental cars to USSR Council of Ministers members for servicing their families is being abolished. Nor will automobiles be furnished for former chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers and other members of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium who have retired. The previously established time limit on use of an on-call passenger vehicle by former USSR ministers while on earned vacation, and other individuals given this right by decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers is being curtailed. We are allowed to grant supplemental paid transportation services to members of the Government, including those who have retired, their families, and officials of the USSR Council of Ministers apparatus.

[Correspondent] Will the personal vehicles for deputy ministers and other individuals remain?

[Masterkov] No. For the official travel of USSR deputy ministers, deputy ministers of USSR state committees, as well as other leading staffers of the central organs of state administration on an equal level, automobiles must be utilized only on a summons basis, with a conveyor system. A certain number of hours per day is established for them.

[Correspondent] How is the new Government decree being applied in other organizations?

[Masterkov] According to USSR Ministry of Finances data, recently at enterprises, associations, and organizations which have gone over to complete economic accountability and self-financing, the number of official automobiles has increased sharply. About 70 percent of the entire fleet of such cars in the country goes to them. Such significant growth is usually associated with gross violations of the established procedure for expenditure of resources on automobile acquisition and maintenance. The organization of verification of correct expenditures of state resources is stipulated by the given decree. This verification must be carried out at all enterprises within one month, and must be done on a regular basis.

The allocation of resources and their expenditure for the acquisition and maintenance of official passenger vehicles must be implemented only with the consideration of the opinion of the councils of labor collectives. They are obligated to exercise strict control, and to stop incidents of use of official motor transportation not directly specified.

A new system of service by passenger vehicles is now being introduced in Moscow, a system based upon

contracts with motor transportation enterprises and operated through dispatcher points. The assignment of automobiles for this or that organization is being abolished. This measure was also stipulated by the previous decree. A partial alteration is introduced by this new document, specifically, ministries, departments, institutions, enterprises (associations), and organizations must go over completely to centralized motor transportation services this year.

Georgia Passes Law on Additions, Amendments to Constitutions

Law on Constitution

90US0316A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
2 Dec 89 pp 1, 3-4

[Law of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (the Basic Law) of the Georgian SSR, Tbilisi, 18 Nov 89]

[Text] In view of the fact that the process of revolutionary transformations, which has begun in the Soviet Union and which touches upon all spheres of public affairs, envisages the necessity of affirming and expanding the sovereignty of the union republics, decisive democratization and improvement of the political institutions and the electoral system and the radical renovation of the Soviet Federation;

taking into consideration the fact that, as a consequence of administrative and command rule, the Soviet Union has, in fact, been converted into a unitary state, as a consequence of which the bases of the GSSR's real sovereignty have proven to be lost;

recognizing as necessary under the new political and socioeconomic conditions, the complete reflection of Georgia's sovereign interests in the new Constitution (the Basic Law);

and also taking into consideration the fact that, even now, during this transition period, it is necessary to insert into the existing constitution amendments and additions which shall ensure the protection and affirmation of the republic's sovereign rights, the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

That the following amendments and additions be inserted into the Constitution (the Basic Law) of the GSSR:

1) Articles 10, 11 and 69 shall be worded as follows:

Article 10. In the GSSR, the forms of property shall be: state (public) property, cooperative property, property of public organizations, individual property and joint property.

Within the limits specified by GSSR legislation, property of the Soviet Union, of union republics, of foreign states, of their legal entities and actual persons and of international organizations may exist in the territory of the GSSR.

Within the GSSR, all forms of property shall serve to increase society's economic and social potential and the comprehensive and free development of social relations and the individual.

Within the GSSR, all forms of property shall be recognized as equal in rights, shall be protected by GSSR legislation and, for each of them, conditions shall be created, which shall facilitate their development.

Article 11. The land, its minerals, waters and forests, within the limits of the GSSR's territory, shall be exclusively state property of the GSSR. The natural resources of the continental shelf adjacent to the Black Sea coastline shall be the GSSR's property.

The GSSR, within the economic zone adjacent to its Black Sea coastline, shall have the rights and bear the obligations specified by the rules of international law.

The basic means of production in industry, construction and agriculture, the means of transportation and communications, the property of commercial and municipal enterprises, of domestic service enterprises and of other enterprises, the basic city housing fund, as well as other property necessary for carrying out the republic's tasks, together with the natural resources, shall be the national property of the GSSR.

Article 69. The GSSR reserves the right to secede freely from the structure of the USSR. This right is sacred and inviolable.

The GSSR's right to secede freely from the structure of the USSR shall not be abrogated or restricted by an act of the supreme body of USSR state power or by any other means.

From the moment of the adoption of a decision to abrogate the GSSR's right to secede freely from the structure of the USSR, the GSSR shall be considered as having seceded from the structure of the USSR.

The same consequences shall ensue in the instance of a refusal to satisfy a request of the GSSR Supreme Soviet for the repeal or amendment of an all-union act which restricts the GSSR's right to secede freely from the structure of the USSR. The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall decide the question of whether or not the GSSR's right to secede freely from the structure of the USSR is being restricted.

2. The second part of Article 74, after the words "to the authority of the USSR," shall have the words "in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies" added to it.

3. Article 77 shall be worded as follows:

Article 77. The laws and lawful acts of the USSR and the GSSR shall be valid in the GSSR's territory.

The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall suspend in the GSSR's territory the enforcement of USSR laws and lawful acts, if it recognizes that they do not conform to the republic's interests, submitting at the same time to the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee and the body which issued the law or lawful act a recommendation to bring these acts into conformity with the republic's interests. In the event that an agreement is not reached, these acts shall not be enforced in the GSSR's territory.

4. Section 10 shall be worded as follows:

Section 10

The System and Principles of the Activities of the Soviets of People's Deputies

Article 85. The soviets of people's deputies—the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR—and the local soviets of people's deputies—the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast's Soviet of People's Deputies, the rayon, city, city rayon, settlement and rural soviets of people's deputies—shall form a unified system of representative bodies of state power.

Article 86. The term of office of the soviets of people's deputies shall be 5 years.

The elections of deputies to the GSSR Supreme Soviet and to the GSSR's local soviets of people's deputies shall be scheduled no later than 4 months prior to the expiration of the term of office of the corresponding bodies of state power.

The time frames and procedure for scheduling the elections of deputies to the Supreme Soviets and to the local soviets of people's deputies of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR shall be determined by the constitutions of these autonomous republics.

Article 87. The most important matters of republic and local importance shall be decided at sessions of the supreme soviets and the local soviets of people's deputies respectively or put to referendums by them.

The supreme soviets shall elect the chairmen of the supreme soviets. Local soviets of people's deputies shall elect the soviets' chairmen. The supreme soviets and the local soviets of people's deputies, with the exceptions of city (cities of rayon subordination), settlement and rural soviets, shall have their own presidiums.

The soviets of people's deputies shall form permanent commissions and establish executive and administrative bodies, as well as other bodies accountable to them.

Officials elected or appointed by the soviets of people's deputies, with the exception of judges, may not hold their positions for more than two terms in succession.

Any official may be removed early from a position held in the event of the improper performance by him of his official duties.

Article 88. The soviets of people's deputies shall form bodies of people's control, which shall combine state control with public control of workers at enterprises and in institutions and organizations.

The people's control bodies, within the limits of their own jurisdiction, shall check on the fulfillment of the requirements of legislation and state programs and tasks; lead the struggles against violations of state discipline, manifestations of parochialism, the departmental approach to matters, mismanagement and waste, and red tape and bureaucratism; coordinate the work of

other control bodies; and facilitate improvement of the structure and work of the state apparatus.

Article 89. The soviets of people's deputies, directly and through the organs established by them, shall supervise in their own territory all the sectors of state, economic, social and cultural construction, adopt decisions, ensure their execution and implement monitoring of the realization of the decisions.

Article 90. The activities of the soviets of people's deputies shall be based on collective, free and business-like discussion and solution of matters, glasnost and the regular reporting to them and to the populace by the executive and administrative bodies and other bodies established by the soviets and the widespread involvement of citizens in their work.

The soviets of people's deputies and the bodies established by them shall take into account public opinion, submit to the citizens for discussion the most important matters of republic and local importance and systematically inform the citizens about their own work and the adopted decisions.

Section 11 shall be worded as follows:

Section 11

The Electoral System

Article 91. Elections of people's deputies shall be held for single-seat electoral districts on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage with a secret ballot.

Article 92. The elections of people's deputies shall be universal: GSSR citizens who have attained the age of 18 shall have the right to vote.

A citizen of the GSSR who has attained the age of 18 may be elected a deputy of a GSSR local soviet of people's deputies, while one who has attained the age of 21 may be elected a GSSR Supreme Soviet Deputy.

A citizen of the GSSR may not simultaneously be a deputy in more than two soviets of people's deputies.

Persons who are members of the GSSR Council of Ministers, the Abkhaz ASSR and Adzhar ASSR Councils of Ministers and the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, with the exception of the chairmen of these bodies and the heads of departments [vedomstvo], departments [otdel] and administrations of local soviets' executive committees, deputies of the above-indicated persons, judges and state arbitrators may not be deputies of the corresponding soviet.

Citizens who are mentally ill or declared incompetent by a court and persons incarcerated, as well as those placed into compulsory treatment centers by a court order, shall not participate in elections.

Article 93. The elections of people's deputies shall be equal: the voter in each electoral district shall have one vote; the voters shall participate in the elections on an equal basis.

Article 94. The elections of people's deputies shall be direct: people's deputies shall be elected directly by the voters.

Article 95. The balloting in elections of people's deputies shall be secret: monitoring of the electorate's expression of will shall not be permitted.

Article 96. Labor collectives, public organizations, collectives of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions and assemblies of voters by place of residence and of military personnel by military units shall have the right to nominate candidates for people's deputies.

The number of candidates for people's deputies shall not be limited. Each participant in a pre-election meeting may submit for consideration any candidacies, including his own as well.

Any number of candidates may be included on the election ballots.

Candidates for people's deputies, from the moment of nomination, shall participate in the election campaign on an equal basis.

Expenditures associated with the preparations for and the holding of elections of people's deputies shall be paid by the appropriate electoral commission from a unified fund established from the assets of the state and enterprises of public and other organizations for the purpose of ensuring equal conditions for each candidate for deputy.

Article 97. The preparations for elections of people's deputies shall be carried out openly and publicly.

The holding of the elections shall be carried out by electoral commissions, which shall be formed from representatives elected by assemblies (conferences) of labor collectives, public organizations, collectives of secondary specialized and higher education institutions and assemblies of voters by place of residence and of military personnel by military units.

GSSR citizens, labor collectives, public organizations and collectives of secondary specialized and higher education institutions shall be guaranteed an opportunity for free and comprehensive discussion of the political, professional and personal qualities of the candidates for people's deputies, as well as the right to campaign for or against a candidate at assemblies, in the press, on television and on radio.

The procedure for holding elections of people's deputies shall be determined by the laws of the GSSR and, in the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhara ASSR, by the laws of these autonomous republics as well.

Article 98. The voters shall give mandates to their own deputies. A people's deputy shall submit the mandates to the appropriate soviet.

The appropriate soviets of people's deputies shall examine the mandates and take them into consideration during the working out of plans for economic and social development and the compilation of the budget, as well as during the preparation of decisions on other matters, organize the implementation of the mandates and inform citizens about their realization.

6. Article 100 shall be worded as follows:

Article 100. A deputy shall exercise his own powers, as a rule, without disruption of production or office activities.

During sessions of supreme soviets or local soviets of people's deputies, as well as in order to exercise deputy powers in other instances specified by law, a deputy shall be released from the performance of production or office duties with reimbursement to him for expenditures associated with deputy activities using the assets of the corresponding state or local budget.

7. The first section of Article 101 shall be worded as follows:

A deputy shall have the right to make an inquiry of appropriate state bodies and officials, who shall be obligated to give a response to an inquiry at a session of a supreme soviet or a local soviet of people's deputies.

8. The first part of Article 103 shall be worded as follows:

Article 103. A deputy shall be obligated to report on his own work and that of a supreme soviet or a local soviet of people's deputies to the voters, collectives and public organizations which nominated him as a candidate for deputy.

9. Section 13 shall be worded as follows:

Section 13

The Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR

Article 104. The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be the highest body of state power of the GSSR.

The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be empowered to accept for its own consideration and to decide any matter pertaining to the authority of the GSSR.

The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall:

1) adopt the GSSR Constitution and insert amendments into it;

2) examine matters associated with the boundaries of the GSSR;

3) adopt decisions on matters of national state structure which pertain to the authority of the GSSR;

- 4) examine matters associated with the secession of the GSSR from the USSR;
 - 5) examine matters associated with the enforcement of USSR laws and legal acts in the territory of the GSSR;
 - 6) form the basic policies for the GSSR's domestic political and foreign-policy activities;
 - 7) approve long-term plans and the most important republic-wide programs for the GSSR's economic and social development and state plans for economic and social development; examine and approve the GSSR State Budget; monitor the course of the execution of the plans and the budget and approve reports about their execution; and introduce, in the necessary instances, changes into the plans and the budget;
 - 8) ensure the unity of legislative regulation throughout the entire territory of the GSSR; exercise, within the limits of the GSSR's authority, legislative regulation of the relations of property, of the organization of management of the economy and social and cultural construction, of the budget and finance system, of the payment for labor and the setting of prices, of the imposition of taxes, of environmental protection and the use of natural resources, and of the procedure for the realization of the constitutional rights, freedoms and obligations of GSSR citizens, as well as of other relations;
 - 9) interpret GSSR laws;
 - 10) establish the procedure for the organization and activities of republic and local bodies of state power and management; and determine the legal status of republic-level public organizations;
 - 11) determine the procedure for deciding matters of the GSSR's administrative and territorial structure; establish and change the boundaries and rayon division of the autonomous oblast; form cities in a rayon and rayons in a city; establish the subordination of cities; and rename rayons, cities, city rayons, settlements and other populated areas;
 - 12) approve changes in the boundaries of the autonomous republics; and form new rayons and cities of republic subordination;
 - 13) approve rayon division, the formation of cities and rayons in cities, a change in the subordination of cities, the naming and renaming of rayons, cities, city rayons, and also the renaming of other populated areas of the autonomous republics;
 - 14) direct the activities of local soviets of people's deputies;
 - 15) adopt decisions regarding holding a public vote (referendum);
 - 16) elect the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet;
 - 17) elect the First Deputy Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet;
 - 18) appoint the Chairman of the GSSR Council of Ministers after a preliminary examination of his program statement;
 - 19) elect the GSSR Committee of People's Control and the GSSR Supreme Court; and appoint the GSSR Chief State Arbitrator;
 - 20) approve the staff of the GSSR State Board of Arbitration and the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Court;
 - 21) elect the GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee;
 - 22) approve on the recommendation of the Chairman of the GSSR Council of Ministers the staff of the GSSR Council of Ministers and introduce changes into it; form and abolish on the motion of the GSSR Council of Ministers the GSSR ministries and state committees;
 - 23) regularly listen to the reports of the bodies formed or elected by it and also of the officials appointed or elected by it; and decide votes of confidence in the GSSR government and individual members of the government;
 - 24) implement monitoring of the observance of the GSSR Constitution and ensure the conformity of the constitutions and laws of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR to the GSSR Constitution and laws;
 - 25) repeal ukases and resolutions of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, orders of the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet and resolutions and orders of the GSSR Council of Ministers;
 - 26) repeal resolutions and orders of the Abkhaz ASSR and Adzhar ASSR Councils of Ministers, as well as decisions of the soviet of people's deputies of the autonomous oblast and of rayon and city (cities of republic subordination) soviets of people's deputies in the event of their nonconformity with the GSSR Constitution and laws;
 - 27) schedule the elections for GSSR People's Deputies and approve the membership of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of GSSR People's Deputies; and schedule the elections for people's deputies of local soviets;
 - 28) ratify and denounce international agreements of the GSSR;
 - 29) institute GSSR state awards;
 - 30) issue bills of amnesty for citizens convicted by GSSR courts;
 - 31) exercise other powers established by the GSSR Constitution and laws.
- The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall adopt the GSSR laws and resolutions.

Article 105. The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall consist of 300 deputies elected by electoral districts with an equal number of voters.

Article 106. A newly elected GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be convened by the Presidium of the former GSSR Supreme Soviet no later than 2 months after the elections.

Article 107. The GSSR Supreme Soviet, on the recommendation of the Credentials Committee elected by it, shall adopt a decision on recognizing the authority of the deputies and, in the event of violation of the election laws, on declaring the elections of individual deputies invalid.

The first sitting of the GSSR Supreme Soviet after the elections shall be opened by the Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of GSSR People's Deputies and conducted by him until the election of the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet and thereafter by the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet or his Deputy.

Article 108. The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be convened annually by the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet in regular—spring and fall—sessions.

Extraordinary sessions shall be convened by the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet on its initiative or on the motion of the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet or no less than one-third of the membership of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, as well as on the motion of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz ASSR or the Adzhar ASSR or the Soviet of People's Deputies of the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast.

Article 109. A session of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall consist of its sittings and also the meetings conducted during the period between them of the GSSR Supreme Soviet's permanent and other commissions.

Article 110. Deputies of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, the GSSR Council of Ministers, the Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR, the Soviet of People's Deputies of the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast, the GSSR Committee of People's Control, the GSSR Supreme Court, the GSSR Chief State Arbitrator, and the GSSR Procurator shall have the right of legislative initiative.

Public organizations, as represented by their republic bodies, and the GSSR Academy of Sciences shall also have the right of legislative initiative.

Article 111. Draft laws and other matters submitted for the consideration of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be discussed at its sittings. Draft laws and other most important matters of state affairs, by a decision of the GSSR Supreme Soviet adopted on its initiative or on the motion of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz ASSR or the Adzhar ASSR, of the Soviet of People's Deputies of

the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast, or of rayon or city (cities of republic subordination) soviets of people's deputies, may be submitted to public discussion.

A law or other act of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be considered adopted if a majority of the total number of GSSR Supreme Soviet Deputies shall have voted for it.

Article 112. The Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be accountable to the GSSR Supreme Soviet as the body which shall ensure the organization of the GSSR Supreme Soviet's work and exercise other powers within the limits specified by the GSSR Constitution and laws.

Included in the membership of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet by virtue of their positions shall be: the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the First Deputy Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, two deputy chairmen of the GSSR Supreme Soviet—the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR, the Chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast, the Chairman of the GSSR Committee of People's Control, and the chairmen of the GSSR Supreme Soviet's permanent commissions.

The Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall head the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet.

Upon the expiration of the term of office of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall retain its own authority right up to the first sitting of the newly elected GSSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 113. The Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall:

- 1) convene the sessions of the GSSR Supreme Soviet;
- 2) organize the preparations for sittings of sessions of the GSSR Supreme Soviet;
- 3) coordinate the activities of the GSSR Supreme Soviet's permanent commissions;
- 4) render assistance to GSSR People's Deputies in the exercising by them of their own authority and provide them with needed information;
- 5) organize and hold elections for people's deputies of the republic's local soviets;
- 6) organize the preparations for and the holding of public votes (referendums), as well as public discussions of GSSR draft laws and other most important matters of state affairs;
- 7) on its own initiative or on the motion of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, adopt a decision on the necessity of declaring martial law or a state of emergency throughout the entire republic or in its individual areas; and decide matters regarding the introduction of a special code of conduct for citizens;
- 8) establish the GSSR's memorial and significant days;

- 9) confer the GSSR's state awards;
- 10) grant GSSR citizenship; and decide matters regarding secession from GSSR citizenship and the granting of asylum to foreigners;
- 11) exercise clemency toward citizens convicted by GSSR courts;
- 12) appoint and recall GSSR diplomatic representatives to foreign states and international organizations;
- 13) accept the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives of foreign states, who are accredited to it;
- 14) publish in the Georgian and Russian languages, and for the autonomous republics and the autonomous oblast—also in the language of the autonomous republic and the language of the population of the autonomous oblast, GSSR laws and other acts adopted by the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet;
- 15) exercise other powers specified by GSSR laws.

The Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall issue ukases and adopt resolutions.

An ukase or resolution shall be considered adopted if a majority of the officials comprising the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall have voted for it.

Article 114. The Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be the highest official of the GSSR and shall represent it within the country and outside its borders.

The Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be elected by the GSSR Supreme Soviet from among the GSSR People's Deputies by a secret ballot for a term of 5 years and for no more than two terms in succession.

The Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be accountable to the GSSR Supreme Soviet.

The Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet may be recalled by the GSSR Supreme Soviet at any time by means of a secret ballot. The matter of a recall shall be put to a vote if this is requested by no less than one-fifth of the total number of GSSR Supreme Soviet Deputies.

In the event of the early dismissal of the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet from his position, the Supreme Soviet shall elect a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet within a 1-month period. Until the election of a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the First Deputy Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall perform the chairman's duties.

In the event of the absence of the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet or it is impossible for him to perform his own duties, the first deputy shall perform his duties, but if, for the above-indicated reasons, the first deputy also can not perform the functions of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, they shall be performed by a temporary

chairman elected by the Supreme Soviet from among the GSSR Supreme Soviet Deputies.

Article 115. The Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall:

- 1) exercise general supervision of the preparation of matters subject to consideration by the GSSR Supreme Soviet; and sign GSSR laws and other acts adopted by the GSSR Supreme Soviet and the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet;
- 2) present to the GSSR Supreme Soviet a nominee for election to the position of First Deputy Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, as well as a proposal regarding the staff of the GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee;
- 3) present to the GSSR Supreme Soviet nominees for appointment or election to the positions of Chairman of the GSSR Council of Ministers, Chairman of the GSSR Committee of People's Control, Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Court and GSSR Chief State Arbitrator;
- 4) present to the GSSR Supreme Soviet reports on the state of the republic and on important matters of domestic and foreign policy;
- 5) conduct negotiations and sign the international agreements of the GSSR.

The Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall issue orders.

Article 116. The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall elect from among the GSSR Supreme Soviet Deputies permanent commissions for the drafting of laws and the preliminary examination and preparation of matters pertaining to the authority of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, as well as for assisting the implementation of GSSR laws and other decisions adopted by the GSSR Supreme Soviet and for monitoring the activities of state bodies and organizations.

The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall establish, when it shall consider it necessary, commissions of inquiry, auditing commissions and others, for any matter.

Article 117. Laws and other decisions of the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall be adopted, as a rule, after preliminary discussion of the drafts by the appropriate permanent commissions of the GSSR Supreme Soviet.

The appointment and election of officials as members of the GSSR Council of Ministers, the GSSR Committee of People's Control and the GSSR Supreme Court, as well as the staff of the GSSR State Board of Arbitration, shall be carried out when the findings of the appropriate permanent commissions of the GSSR Supreme Soviet are available.

All state and public bodies, organizations and officials shall be obligated to fulfill the requests of GSSR Supreme Soviet commissions and to give them necessary materials and documents.

The commissions' recommendations shall be subject to obligatory examination by state and public bodies, institutions and organizations. The commissions should be informed about the results of the examination and adopted measures within the time frame established by them.

Article 118. A GSSR Supreme Soviet Deputy, at GSSR Supreme Soviet sessions, shall have the right to address an inquiry to the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, to the GSSR Council of Ministers and to the heads of other bodies formed or elected by the GSSR Supreme Soviet, as well as to the heads of enterprises, institutions and organizations of union subordination located in the territory of the GSSR, on matters pertaining to the authority of the GSSR. A body or official, to whom an inquiry has been addressed, shall be obligated to give a verbal or written response at the given session of the GSSR Supreme Soviet no later than within a 3-day period.

A GSSR Supreme Soviet Deputy may be excused from the performance of office or production duties for the entire period of his authority.

A GSSR Supreme Soviet Deputy may not have criminal proceedings instituted against him, be arrested or subjected to administrative punishment measures imposed in a judicial proceeding, without the consent of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, or, in the period between its sessions, without the consent of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 119. The GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee shall be elected by the GSSR Supreme Soviet for a term of 10 years from among specialists in the field of politics and law and shall be made up of a chairman, a deputy chairman and seven committee members, including representatives from the Abkhaz ASSR, the Adzhar ASSR and the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast.

Persons elected to the GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee may not simultaneously be members of bodies, the acts of which are subject to oversight by the committee.

Persons elected to the GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, during the performance of their own duties, shall be independent and subordinate only to the GSSR Constitution.

The GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee shall:

1) on its own initiative or on the instructions of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, present to the GSSR Supreme Soviet findings regarding the conformity to the GSSR Constitution of the drafts of acts under consideration by the GSSR Supreme Soviet;

2) monitor the conformity to the GSSR Constitution and laws of the constitution and laws of the autonomous republics, of the resolutions and orders of the GSSR Council of Ministers, of the resolutions and orders of the councils of ministers of the autonomous republics, decisions of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast, and decisions of rayon and city (cities of republic subordination) soviets of people's deputies;

3) on its own initiative or on the instructions of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, on the motions of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, of the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, of the GSSR Supreme Soviet's permanent commissions, of the GSSR Council of Ministers, or of the supreme soviets of the autonomous republics, present findings regarding the conformity to the GSSR Constitution and laws of the acts of other state bodies and public organizations;

4) present findings regarding violations by the republic's highest officials of the GSSR Constitution and laws.

When an act or its individual clauses contradict the GSSR Constitution or laws, the GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee shall send to the body which issued the act its own resolution for eliminating the violation committed. The adoption by the committee of such a resolution shall suspend the implementation of the act or its individual clauses which contradict the GSSR Constitution or laws.

The GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee shall have the right to come with a recommendation to the GSSR Supreme Soviet or the GSSR Council of Ministers regarding repealing acts of bodies or officials accountable to them, which contradict the GSSR Constitution or laws.

The organization of and the procedure for the activities of the GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee shall be determined by the USSR Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR and the GSSR Law on the GSSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

Article 120. The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall exercise control over the activities of all state bodies accountable to it.

The GSSR Supreme Soviet shall direct the activities of the GSSR Committee of People's Control, which shall head up the system of people's control bodies.

The organization of and the procedure for the activities of the people's control bodies shall be determined by law.

Article 121. The procedure for the activities of the GSSR Supreme Soviet and its bodies shall be determined by the Regulations of the GSSR Supreme Soviet and other GSSR laws promulgated on the basis of the GSSR Constitution.

10. Article 124 shall be worded as follows:

Article 124. The GSSR Council of Ministers shall be answerable to the GSSR Supreme Soviet and accountable to it.

The newly formed GSSR Council of Ministers shall submit for the consideration of the GSSR Supreme Soviet a program of its own future activities.

At least once a year, the GSSR Council of Ministers shall give an account of its own work to the GSSR Supreme Soviet.

At the request of the GSSR Council of Ministers, the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall consider giving a vote of confidence to the GSSR Council of Ministers or its individual members. The giving of a vote of confidence shall be considered on the motion of no less than one-fifth of the total number of GSSR Supreme Soviet Deputies.

If the GSSR Supreme Soviet shall give a vote of no confidence or refuse to give a vote of confidence, the GSSR Council of Ministers or its individual member shall submit a letter of resignation.

11. The first part of Article 125 shall be worded as follows:

The GSSR Council of Ministers shall be empowered to decide all matters of state management which pertain to the authority of the GSSR, insofar as they do not, in accordance with the GSSR Constitution, come under the jurisdiction of the GSSR Supreme Soviet or its Presidium or of the Chairman of the GSSR Supreme Soviet.

12. Article 127 shall be worded as follows:

Article 127. The GSSR Council of Ministers, on the basis of and in the execution of USSR laws and other decisions of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, of GSSR laws and other decisions of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, and of resolutions and orders of the USSR Council of Ministers, shall issue resolutions and orders and shall verify their execution. Resolutions and orders of the GSSR Council of Ministers shall be binding for execution throughout the entire territory of the GSSR.

13. In the fourth part of Article 129, the words "on the basis of and in the execution of USSR and GSSR legislative acts" shall be replaced by the words "on the basis of and in the execution of USSR laws and other decisions of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and of GSSR laws and other decisions of the GSSR Supreme Soviet."

14. Articles 131 and 132 shall be worded as follows:

Article 131. The Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR shall be the highest bodies of state power of these autonomous republics.

The Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR shall be empowered to decide all matters

pertaining to the authority of the autonomous republics by the USSR Constitution, the GSSR Constitution and the constitutions of these autonomous republics.

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic shall be accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous republic.

Article 132. The adoption of the constitutions of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR, the insertion into them of amendments, the approval of state plans for economic and social development, of the state budgets of these autonomous republics and of reports about their execution; and the formation of bodies accountable to them, shall be carried out by the Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR.

The powers of the Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic, of its Presidium and of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic shall be determined by the constitution of the autonomous republic.

15. The second part of Article 133 shall be worded as follows:

The Abkhaz ASSR and Adzhar ASSR Councils of Ministers shall be answerable to the Supreme Soviets of these autonomous republics and accountable to them.

16. Article 141 shall be worded as follows:

Article 141. The work of the soviet of people's deputies of the autonomous oblast and of rayon, city and city rayon soviets of people's deputies shall be organized by their presidiums, headed by the chairmen of the soviets, while in city (cities of rayon subordination), settlement and rural soviets, it shall be organized by the chairmen of these soviets.

Local soviets of people's deputies shall be empowered to examine and decide at their sessions any matters pertaining to their authority by the laws of the USSR, the GSSR and the corresponding autonomous republics. A list of matters which shall be decided exclusively at such sessions shall be established by the laws on local soviets of people's deputies.

Sessions of an oblast soviet of people's deputies and of rayon, city (except cities of rayon subordination) and city rayon soviets of people's deputies shall be convened by their presidiums at least four times a year. Sessions of city (cities of rayon subordination), settlement and rural soviets of people's deputies shall be convened by their chairmen at least four times a year.

17. The first part of Article 145 shall be worded as follows:

Article 145. The executive and administrative bodies of local soviets of people's deputies shall be the executive committees elected by them.

18. Articles 164, 165, 167 and 185 shall be worded as follows:

Article 164. All courts in the GSSR shall be formed on the basis of the electivity of the judges and the people's assessors.

The people's judges of the rayon (city) people's courts and the judges of the city courts shall be elected by the corresponding superior soviets of people's deputies.

The judges of the GSSR Supreme Court, the supreme courts of the autonomous republics and the court of the autonomous oblast shall be elected by the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the supreme soviets of the autonomous republics and the autonomous oblast's soviet of people's deputies, respectively.

The judges of all the courts shall be elected for a term of 10 years. The people's assessors of all the courts shall be elected for a term of 5 years.

The people's assessors of rayon (city) people's courts shall be elected at assemblies of citizens by their place of residence or work by an open vote, while people's assessors of superior courts shall be elected by the corresponding soviets of people's deputies.

The judges and people's assessors shall be answerable to the bodies which elected them or to the voters, shall make an accounting to them and may be recalled by them using the procedure established by law.

Article 165. The GSSR Supreme Court shall be the highest judicial body of the GSSR and shall exercise supervision over the judicial activities of the GSSR courts.

The GSSR Supreme Court shall consist of a chairman, his deputy, the members and the people's assessors.

Article 167. The judges and people's assessors shall be independent and subordinate only to the law.

The judges and people's assessors shall be provided with the conditions for the unhindered and effective exercise of their rights and duties. Any kind of interference in the activities of the judges and the people's assessors in the administering of justice shall be impermissible and shall entail accountability according to the law.

The immunity of the judges and people's assessors, as well as other guarantees of their independence, shall be established by the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR and other USSR and GSSR legislative acts.

Article 185. An amendment to the GSSR Constitution shall be made by a decision of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, adopted by a majority of no less than two-thirds of the total number of GSSR People's Deputies.

[signed] G. Gumbaridze, Chairman of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, and V. Kvaratskheliya, Secretary of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet.

Resolution on Implementing Law

90US0316B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
2 Dec 89 p 1

[Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR on the Procedure for Implementing the GSSR Law "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (the Basic Law) of the Georgian SSR," Tbilisi, 18 Nov 89]

[Text] In connection with the adoption of the GSSR law of 18 November, 1989, "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (the Basic Law) of the Georgian SSR," the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

Article 1. The GSSR Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and the Adzhar ASSR and the republic's local soviets of people's deputies shall retain their own authority until the election of the deputies of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, of the Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and Adzhar ASSR and of the republic's local soviets, while the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and Adzhar ASSR and the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies shall do so until the formation of new Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets and executive committees respectively.

Article 2. The Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet is instructed that, after the holding of the elections for deputies to the GSSR Supreme Soviet, it shall convene the GSSR Supreme Soviet and organize the preparations for its sittings and also, if necessary, exercise other powers granted to the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet by Article 113 of the GSSR Constitution in the version of the GSSR law of 18 November, 1989.

Article 3. The 5-year term of office of soviets of people's deputies shall be extended to the republic's local soviets of people's deputies beginning with their new convocation.

Article 4. State bodies and officials accountable to the GSSR Supreme Soviet, to the Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and Adzhar ASSR and to the republic's local soviets of people's deputies shall retain their own authority until the formation and appointment of the corresponding bodies and officials by the GSSR Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviets of the Abkhaz ASSR and Adzhar ASSR and the local soviets of people's deputies.

Article 5. The statutes of Articles 87 and 92 of the GSSR Constitution in the version of the GSSR law of 18 November, 1989, which establish that a citizen of the GSSR may not be simultaneously a people's deputy in more than two soviets of people's deputies and which also do not permit the election by the people's deputies of officials appointed or elected by the soviets and do not permit them to remain in a position for more than two terms in succession, shall be applicable respectively from

the moment of election of the soviets of people's deputies of the new convocation and from the moment of appointment or election of officials by them.

Article 6. Judges and people's assessors shall exercise their own authority until the election of new members of the courts as prescribed by Article 164 of the GSSR Constitution in the version of the GSSR law of 18 November, 1989.

[signed] G. Gumbaridze, Chairman of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet and V. Kvaratskheliya, Secretary of the Presidium of the GSSR Supreme Soviet.

Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Meets on 25 January

Information Report

90US0510A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 26 Jan 90 p 1

[Turkmeninform report: "Information Report on the Sessions Held by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] On 25 January the First Session of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, continued its work in Ashkhabad within the Supreme Soviet's Hall of Sessions.

The morning session, which was chaired by S.N. Muradov, first deputy chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, began with an examination of the matter of forming the Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee. V.S. Chertishchev was elected chairman of this committee. At his suggestion, the Supreme Soviet discussed candidacies and elected the deputy chairman and members of the People's Control Committee.

After a detailed discussion the Supreme Soviet by a majority of votes elected N.M. Yusupov chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court. At his suggestion, the deputy chairman, members, and people's assessors of the Supreme Court were elected. In accordance with a decision by the Supreme Soviet, each of the elected members of the Supreme Court took the oath of a judge in the presence of this republic's people's deputies.

The Supreme Soviet appointed B.K. Nurmukhamedov to be Turkmen SSR chief state arbiter.

At the suggestion of Kh. Atayev, Turkmen SSR minister of justice, the Supreme Soviet elected judges of the oblast courts, the Ashkhabad Municipal Court, as well as rayon and municipal courts for rayons and cities under republic-level administration.

In considering the matter of the Draft Law on Constitutional Supervision in the Turkmen SSR, the Supreme Soviet decided to adopt it in its first reading and to assign to the appropriate committees the task of finishing work on it and introducing it for consideration at the Supreme Soviet's Second Session. This same session will likewise form the Turkmen SSR Committee for

Constitutional Supervision. An analogous decision was also adopted with regard to the Draft Law On the Status of People's Deputies in the Turkmen SSR.

The evening session was chaired by S.A. Niyazov, chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet.

The deputy A.G. Babayev delivered the conclusion of the Supreme Soviet's committees on the draft laws on language and the state program for developing and expanding the functional sphere of the Turkmen language, improving the study of Russian and other languages.

Taking part in the discussion of these matters were the following Turkmen SSR people's deputies: R. Karayev—deputy director of the Turkmen Branch of the Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee; M. Khummedov—board chairman of the Sotsialism Kolkhoz, Ashkhabad Rayon; I. Bayramsakhatov—chairman of the Turkmen SSR State Committee on the Press (an invited guest); USSR people's deputy K.M. Orazov—first secretary of the Mary Party Obkom; S.Ye. Potekhin—first secretary of the Leninskiy Party Raykom, Tashauz Oblast; G. Babyrov—director of School No 2, Bakhardenskiy Rayon; N.M. Novikov—military serviceman; G.M. Shpak—Bezmerinsk Party Gorkom; P. Tangrykuliyeve—director of the Turkmen Branch of the All-Union Stomatologiya Scientific and Production Association; M. Aliyeva—TuSSR minister of public education (an invited guest); Kh. Soyinnov—a deputy from the Dianovski Election Okrug No 48, in the city of Kizyl-Arvat; O. Khodzhaberdyyev—director of Secondary School No 2, Dargan-Atinskiy Rayon; Ch. Arazklychev—board chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Telman, Takhtinskiy Rayon; Kh. Durdyev—secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee.

As a result of discussing this matter, the Supreme Soviet decided to adopt the Draft Law on Language at its first reading, to publish it for nationwide discussion, after which it is to be introduced for consideration by the next regularly scheduled session of the Supreme Soviet. The Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers was assigned the task of introducing a number of amendments and clarifications into the previously published state program on languages so that it too may be introduced at the next session.

The Supreme Soviet then listened to a report by Kh. Akhmedov, chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers, on improving the water supply, gasification, and the electric-power supply of this republic's population centers.

Taking part in the discussion of this report were the following TuSSR people's deputies: R. Arazov—chief geologist of the Kamyshldzhaneft Oil-and-Gas-Extracting Administration, Gasan-Kuliyskiy Rayon; A.G. Babayev—president of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences; O.K. Tacheva—first secretary of the Farabskiy Party Raykom; P. Tangrykuliyeve—

director of the Turkmen Branch of the All-Union Stomatologiya Scientific and Production Association; V.S. Nazemkin—chief, Sovetabad Gas-Industrial Administration, Serakhskiy Rayon; Kh. Khallyyev—director, Secondary School No 5, Khodzhabasskiy Rayon; A.G. Igdyrov—senior scientific associate, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences; Kh. Soyinov—deputy from the Dianovskiy Election Okrug No 48, city of Kizyl-Arvat; P. Meredov—director, Bayram-Aliyskiy Oils-and-Fats Combine; A. Taganov—chief, agro-section, Kolkhoz imeni K. Marx, Kalininskiy Rayon; K.N. Muratov—chief, Construction-and-Installation Administration No 3, Turkmenkhimstroy Trust, Krasnovodskiy Rayon; N.T. Suyunov—general director, Turkmengeologiya Production Association; G. Charynazarov—gas-extraction operator, Sovetabad Industrial Administration, Turkmengazprom Production Association, Murgabskiy Rayon; N. Toydzhanov—chief, Nebit-Dag Office, Mezhgorgaz Gas System; D. Khudayberdiyev—economist, Kolkhoz imeni Makhtumkuli, Khalachskiy Rayon; D. Dovletaliyev—chief agronomist, Pogranichnik Kolkhoz, Bakhardenskiy Rayon.

S.A. Niyazov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet and first secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, delivered a speech at this session.

After taking into account the remarks and suggestions made by the deputies regarding the matter under discussion, the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree and formed a commission of deputies for monitoring its implementation.

L.V. Potapov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, delivered a report regarding the approval of Ukases from the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Following his report, the Supreme Soviet passed the appropriate laws and decrees, which will be published in the press.

With this, the First Session of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, concluded its work.

Elections, Language Issue Discussed

90US0510B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 26 Jan 90 p 1

[Turkmeninform report: "Priority Should Be Given to Constructive Solutions: First Session of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation"]

[Text] On 25 January the First Session of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet continued its work. The presiding officer, S.N. Muradov, proposed that the deputies proceed to consider the matter of electing the Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee. At this point we must depart from setting forth our account of the session's work. The fact of the matter is that Turkmeninform's correspondents were to blame for erroneously stating in a published report from the session that the following posts had been filled by election: the chairman of the Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee, the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court, and that

the Turkmen SSR chief state arbiter had been appointed. But, in reality, what the Supreme Soviet did was to entrust the committees with the task of examining and presenting their own conclusions as to the candidates to be recommended for the leadership posts in the above-indicated organs, as well as their recommendations concerning the candidates nominated to fill out the staff vacancies of these organs.

The first of today's sessions discussed the candidacy of V.S. Chertishchev to the post of chairman of the Turkmen SSR People's Control Committee. And he was elected to this position by a majority of the deputies' votes.

V.S. Chertishchev brought up for the session's consideration the names of staff members for the People's Control Committee, and he briefly characterized each of them. Taking part in the discussion of this matter were the following deputies: Z. Orazova, Sh. Arbadov, V.G. Otchertsov, USSR people's deputy O. Annamukhamedov, and others. In connection with the fact that deputy B.K. Sardzhayev, having been elected to membership in the People's Control Committee, could not become a member of a committee of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet, he withdrew his own nomination. At his suggestion, the deputies elected Ye.A. Bozhenov—deputy chief of the Socioeconomic Department of the Turkmen CP Central Committee—to membership in this republic's People's Control Committee.

The process of forming a state based on the rule of law, of overcoming negative phenomena brought about by violations of socialist legality—violations which also took place in our republic—is a complicated and multifaceted process. This circumstance likewise left an imprint on the discussion of the candidacy of N.M. Yusupov, who was proposed for the post of chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Court. Participating in the discussions were the deputies G.K. Podalinskiy, V.G. Otchertsov, Kh. Soyinov, B. Geldymamedov, N.M. Almamedov, E. Orazova, G. Maliksulyyev, V.M. Vasilyuk, V.V. Rashidov, M.M. Butyrskiy, G.A. Igdyrov, and K. Ilyasov. A majority of the votes were cast to elect N.M. Yusupov chairman of this republic's Supreme Court. In accordance with the USSR Law entitled "On the Status of Judges in the USSR," he took the oath of office in the presence of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet.

Then N.M. Yusupov introduced the proposed staff of this republic's Supreme Court for the consideration of the deputies. After a lengthy discussion, in which the deputies N. Bagyyev, B. Geldymamedov, Kh. Soyinov, A. Tadzhieva, S. Pirmukhamedov, and others took part, the session elected the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court; its members took the oath of office in the deputies' presence.

The presiding officer, S.N. Muradov, informed the session that the candidacy of B.K. Nurmukhamedov had been proposed for the position of chief state arbiter. The deputies unanimously elected him to this post.

A proposal was made to elect the oblast, Ashkhabad municipal, rayon, and municipal people's judges for the rayon and municipal courts under republic-level jurisdiction. Kh. Atayev, Turkmen SSR minister of justice, delivered a report on this matter. He presented the candidacies for election to judgeships for each court, and he characterized them briefly.

By a majority of votes the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree concerning the election of oblast, Ashkhabad municipal, rayon, and municipal judges for courts of those rayons and cities which are under republic-level jurisdiction.

After the break, S.A. Niyazov became the presiding officer, and he introduced for the deputies' consideration the matter of the draft laws on language and the state program to develop and expand the sphere for the functioning of the Turkmen language, as well as to improve the study of Russian and other languages.

Speaking on this matter was the deputy A.G. Babayev, a member of the Commission for Preparing the Draft Law on Language and president of the TuSSR Academy of Sciences.

In characterizing the principal provisions of this draft, the speaker emphasized that it was based on the principles of equal rights of all the languages of the Soviet Union, on the free choice by citizens of the language to be used for instructing and educating their children, regardless of nationality.

Development of the Turkmen language, solving the problems of its use and preservation within the competence of the Turkmen SSR. This law will facilitate the multifaceted growth of the Turkmen people's national awareness and will enable them to accord the Turkmen language the status of the state language on a legal basis. This will create the conditions for the further development of the Turkmen language and culture. According to the Turkmen language the status of the state language will not lead to an infringement on other languages within this republic's territory. Each citizen of the Turkmen SSR has the right to explain himself and address institutions in his native language.

The law also guarantees the possibility of freely explaining oneself in the language of inter-ethnic communication—Russian—as well as in other languages of those peoples living on the republic's territory.

A characteristic trait of the Law on Language is the recognition of the principle of bilingualism and multilingualism. In state institutions and in administrative organs, as well as in public organizations, business can be conducted either in the state language, or in the state language and in Russian, depending upon the wishes of the majority of the participants involved.

After citing the opinion of certain representatives of public opinion to the effect that we should immediately make the transition to the Turkmen language, the deputy

further explained that this matter must be approached very cautiously. At the present time 75 percent of the rural population conducts its business in the Turkmen language. However, life in the cities requires the use of two languages—Turkmen and Russian.

Having reported on certain provisions in the draft, aimed at improving the level on teaching in educational institutions while taking bilingualism into account, the speaker declared that legal experts, linguistic scholars, and specialists in economics and history had worked on this draft. It had been approved by five committees of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet. The proposed draft ought to facilitate the improvement of inter-ethnic relations and the creation of conditions for members of all peoples inhabiting this republic to live and work together in a friendly manner.

In opening the discussion, the deputy R. Karayev noted the extreme importance of the issue to be discussed, its truly historic significance. He emphasized that we must return to the Turkmen language—the language of Makh-tumkuli—its true contents and resonance. Together with this, the speaker declared himself in favor of a well-balanced approach to implementing the provisions of the draft so that, in practice, distortions would not be permitted in the direction of developing any one language. We need to take all measures to facilitate the further affirmation of the Russian language as a means of inter-ethnic communication.

In the opinion of the deputy M. Khummedov, together with the juridical and legal status of the Turkmen language in its importance as the state language, its general humanitarian role is also growing. Genuine prerequisites are being created for assimilating the extremely rich cultural heritage of the people and for affirming the continuity between the culture of the past and that of the present.

Chairman N. Bayramsakhatov provided his fellow-deputies with information concerning what kinds of measures with regard to practical implementation of the draft are being undertaken by the TuSSR State Committee on the Press. The publishing houses have plans to issue literary landmarks and the best examples of Turkmen folklore. Having directed the attention of those present at the session to the complexity of the process of editing and publication, the speaker appealed to the competence of scholars, who must, in his opinion, provide any edition of the literary heritage with serious and painstaking scholarly research. The speaker also focused attention on the problems connected with the weak material and technical base of printing, and he noted the need to strengthen it.

Speaking at the session, USSR people's deputy K.M. Orazov noted the constructive, good balance of this line in the nationality policy, and, in particular, on the matter of language, which this republic's party organization is following, and he noted with satisfaction the continuity in this approach taken by the Turkmen SSR people's

deputies. The speaker expressed the wish that prerogatives be set aside in solving this problem. As the highest organ of state power, the Supreme Soviet should be guided more fully in its activity by the people's opinion.

Also resounding in his speech was the concept that the sphere wherein the Russian language is used must not be infringed upon even to the slightest degree.

The speaker deemed it necessary to note that certain persons calling themselves the "informals" are attempting to create an artificial tension around the language problem. Such actions must be evaluated appropriately. Nothing must hinder this republic in its striving to live and work withing a situation of unity, friendship, and solidarity.

Continuing this idea, S.A. Niyazov introduced for the deputies' consideration a proposal to set up within the Supreme Soviet a public organization which would facilitate perestroyka. All those persons for whom the destiny of this republic is dear, those persons who want to contribute their own bit in deeds rather than just words to the solution of the problems which have accumulated, could be included in such work.

We often refer to the wisdom of our people, S.A. Niyazov continued, and we recall those who are its bearers—[illegible], our respected elders. And we ourselves would act wisely if we were to assemble them together in this hall, and take counsel with them concerning our most vitally urgent problems.

These proposals were met by resounding and animated approval from the auditorium.

Those persons present welcomed as a good sign of internationalism the speech, made in the Turkmen language, by the deputy S.Ye. Potekhin. A Russian by blood, he is proud of the fact that he was born and brought up on Turkmen soil, and that he taught himself the language of its people. This speaker brought out as an undoubted merit of the draft under discussion the factor of voluntarism in studying the various languages involved. This is a mark of culture in the broadest sense of that term, he noted.

The deputy welcomed the creation in the republic's capital of Maktumkuli Prospect, and he characterized this fact as a worthy gesture of recognition for that great humanist and internationalist.

This opinion was also supported by deputy G. Babyrov. Recognition of state status for the Turkmen language is a noble mission, he said. At the same time, this deputy stressed the need to establish a program for developing the Russian language and other languages. The speaker characterized the level of training specialists for all sectors as an extremely acute problem, one which is caused by the language barrier. He introduced a number of proposals directed at improving this process at educational institutions.

As an example of the Turkmen people's internationalism, deputy N.M. Novikov cited the fact that, out of 13,000 voters who cast their votes from him, a military serviceman, more than 10,000 were members of the indigenous nationality. This speaker sees good, long-term prospects of the document under discussion in the fact that it is called upon not merely to facilitate the development of the Turkmen language, but also to acquaint persons of the indigenous nationality with the cultures of other peoples. The speaker shared his experience in studying the Russian language in multinational, military units.

There is no doubt that recognizing the status of Turkmen as the state language is not regarded by members of other nationalities as an infringement upon their own rights, deputy G.M. Shpak said. Along with this, she drew attention to the trend toward "campaigning," which has manifested itself in the fact that fee-charging courses are being started for the study of Turkmen, and such courses are pursuing primarily mercenary interests. The speaker introduced a proposal to place this work on a more unselfish basis, and she expressed confidence that the Turkmen intelligentsia would respond to her challenge.

G.M. Shpak noted the slowness on the part of public-education organs to set up appropriate methodological centers at children's preschool institutions as a shortcoming in the developing work of getting people to learn the Turkmen language.

With the adoption of the Law on Language, deputy P. Tangrykulyev said, we must see to it that the development of the Turkmen and Russian languages proceed in a parallel fashion. This deputy introduced a number of specific proposals. One of them boils down to having those students who have graduated from a Turkmen school, upon enrolling at a VUZ, write dictation in Russian, and conversely, having graduates of Russian schools take the Turkmen variant of dictation.

Deputy Kh. Soyinov, after characterizing the situation in the republic as extremely favorable for the development of all languages, called upon his colleagues in the parliament to adopt the Law on Language and then to channel all their efforts into solving economic problems.

While restoring rights to our language, deputy Kh. Khodzhaberdiev declared, we must approach this not as an end in itself, but rather as an opportunity to revive its true linguistic value. Therein the speaker sees the primacy of culture instead of politics.

And deputy Ch. Arazklychev agreed with his opinion. We will understand each other better if we master the language of the people living alongside of us. This pertains to Russians as well as to Turkmens.

In his speech, deputy Kh. Durdyev emphasized that the main thing aimed at by the Law on Language was the observance of the principle of equality—the fundamental principle of the Leninist nationality policy. The scholarly nature of the draft's provisions, along with its

material and technical buttressing serve as guarantees that in practice too we will follow a balanced and step-by-step course aimed at developing the Turkmen language together with the Russian language, and the languages of the other peoples which inhabit our republic.

At the suggestion of the presiding officer, the Supreme Soviet decided to adopt the drafts in their first reading and to publish them in the press for nationwide discussion.

The account of the evening session will be published in our next issue.

Conduct, Procedures in Local Uzbek Election Campaign Castigated

90US0457 Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 3, 13-20 Jan 90 pp 7-8

[Article by Vladimir Zolotukhin, correspondent of the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN, USSR people's deputy, Tashkent: "Democracy at a Crossroads"]

[Text] Burden of Changes

The present elections in republics are special. They determine, if you will, the very possibility of perestroika in each specific region in the country. The breakthrough on 26 March 1989 is only the beginning of establishing a truly law-governed state, where decisions are made in the presence of the people by deputies elected by the people. However, under conditions when all Union republics strive for greater independence, when we begin to talk about our country as a union of equal sovereign states, apprehensions arise: Will it not happen that the dictate of the Union's capital will now be simply replaced with the same dictate, but now of the capital of a Union republic? And the individual and virtually uncontrolled power of the head of state, with the same individual and uncontrolled power of the head of a republic? In order that this may not happen, the adoption of appropriate laws by the USSR Supreme Soviet is not enough. The Supreme Soviet of a republic and local soviets, leaning on these laws, should be capable of fully realizing their rights and advancing perestroika. This depends on the specific people who will be elected to these soviets. It is important that they possess the proper competence and reflect voters' interests.

A mechanism for nominating candidates for deputies from "below," from the popular mass, did not exist for many years. And only now does the Law on Elections offer such an opportunity and give inhabitants the right to name their candidates at meetings by the place of residence.

However, here too the law stipulates a number of reservations, against which citizens' initiative stumbles each time. Here is a paragraph in the law, which, seemingly, is inoffensive at first glance: Meetings of voters by the place of residence are convened... on the initiative of

public self-administration bodies supported by no less than 100 residents of the electoral district. It turns out that, even if all the residents of the electoral district give their signatures in support of the meeting, but the makhallya (a residential rayon in an Uzbek city—author's remark) does not show such initiative, the meeting will not be set. Residents of the Tashkent Karasu-6 block "stumbled" precisely against this paragraph of the law at the initial stage. And in another block the makhallya committee chairman frankly told voters: Local authorities asked that no one be nominated without their knowledge and, therefore, there will be no initiative on the part of the makhallya committee. Consequently, nor will there be a meeting, if the letter of the law is followed.

In another electoral district in Tashkent's Kuybyshevskiy Rayon the meeting convened on the initiative of the rayon executive committee and the district commission at first was not held, because the number of participants was short of the 300 people determined by the law. A new date was set. However, when it became clear that residents, probably, would prefer to nominate their own candidate, not the one planned "from above," the head of the raykom department invited chairmen of makhallya committees and explained that the meeting was being canceled, "because the candidate for this electoral district had already been nominated."

In connection with misunderstandings of this kind, which arose suspiciously often, I had occasion to associate almost daily with officials responsible for the organization of elections. I could not fail to pay attention to the following phenomenon: I talked with Alla Ivanovna Bulatova, secretary of Tashkent's Kuybyshevskiy Rayon Executive Committee, in connection with one of the "misunderstandings" and I heard as an answer:

"Do you know for whom they will vote?"

I telephoned the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission in connection with the need to clarify the interpretation of the phrase in the law "as a rule" and I encountered the question: "About whom specifically are you talking?" At the Second Congress in Moscow I talked with one of the first people in the republic about the numerous telegrams from residents with demands to punish officials who impeded elections and the answer was the same: "Whom do they want to nominate?"

Whoever they want! This is their legitimate right! And the interpretation of the law in one, or in a totally different, sense depending on specific individuals to whom the law is applied is inadmissible. The principle "what is allowed for Jupiter is not allowed for the bull" is totally unacceptable for a law-governed state, which we are just beginning to build.

Nor could I remain indifferent in the situation when even the start of the election campaign occurred with violations of the Uzbek SSR Constitution and the legislation on elections. For example, elections to local

soviets, despite the fact that the republic's Constitution determines that they should be scheduled no later than 4 months before the expiration of the term of office, were scheduled at an earlier date. And, paradoxical as it may seem, a significant number of district commissions for elections of the republic's Supreme Soviet had been formed even before the meeting of the Central Electoral Commission, which formed the appropriate districts. I published a retort in the republic newspaper PRAVDA VOSTOKA (I was told how much unpleasantness R. A. Safarov, the newspaper's editor, encountered subsequently). After 5 days an answer signed by L. Bekkulbekova, secretary of the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, appeared in the same newspaper. The meaning of the answer boiled down to the following: Everything was done correctly and it would not be a bad thing for the deputy to engage in the solution of specific problems of improving the life of the republic's population...

The realization that it was impossible for me to fulfill my task in the election campaign alone led me to the idea to establish a Committee for Assistance to the USSR People's Deputy. Many workers, journalists, scientists, veterans, and representatives of informal associations responded to the proposal to take part in its work. The appeal to voters in connection with the election campaign that began became the first adopted document. Here it is.

Dear voters!

The most important social and political campaign—elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet and to local soviets of people's deputies—has begun in Uzbekistan.

For many years attempts were made to keep you away from real participation in the formation of soviets. The most insignificant role—to obediently vote for candidacies submitted by someone—was assigned to the people. Soviets formed in such a way—passive and dependent—served as a cover for concealing the real power of the command and administrative system.

Some people again want to hold elections according to a scenario written in advance, determining candidates for deputies for you. This cannot be allowed, because the stake in the pre-election drive is too big. It concerns the fate of perestroika in the rayon, kishlak, city, and republic. Whether it is implemented or not depends to a decisive degree on whose interests the soviets elected for 5 years will express: yours, or those of the command and administrative system. The people will have exactly as much power as they themselves will take in these elections...

Think who exactly will represent the interests of your labor collective, your makhallya, and your microrayon in bodies of power. Demand that meetings for nominating candidates for deputies be held and participate in them actively. Under conditions when the USSR Supreme Soviet will soon adopt the Law on Local Self-Administration, your well-being will decisively depend on your deputies...

Be ready for a serious and persistent fight for your rights.

This appeal reproduced in several thousands of copies began to circulate in the rayon and... evoked an unexpectedly sharp reaction on the part of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan.

Probably, all my life I will remember the few days when I had occasion to uphold my right to the party card and to the deputy mandate. Because previously I knew only through hearsay how powerful the possibilities of the command and administrative machine bringing pressure on an objectionable person were, but now I had occasion to feel all this, as the saying goes, from my own experience.

A telephone from Lt Col A. V. Bondarenko, deputy editor of FRUNZEVETS, the newspaper of the Turkestan Military District, deprived me of my sleep. Andrey Vasilyevich, agitated, told me that A. S. Yefimov, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, asked Lt Gen A. I. Zakharov, chief of the District Political Administration, to examine the question of my party affiliation. A whole package of accusations was presented: The appeal itself and the fact that in one rayon this appeal was circulated together with the leaflet of the "Uzbekistan" Movement. Since this was obviously insufficient to take away my party card, a gossip that I allegedly proclaimed the slogan "For Soviets Without Party Members!" at a meeting with journalists was "added" to this.

The absurdity of the accusations was so obvious that party members in the editorial department did not even consider it necessary to hear me out at a party bureau meeting. However, the Central Committee insisted on having its own way. One evening A. S. Yefimov called Col G. P. Ivanov, editor of FRUNZEVETS, and Col Yu. A. Krasikov, chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Political Administration, "on the carpet." The long talk ended with a "request" to examine the question of "the party affiliation of deputy Zolotukhin." And the next morning party bureau members sat in the editor's office.

I had to sit in front of the closed door for almost 2 hours. I was not admitted to the meeting and, while representatives of the Political Administration were explaining to bureau members for what reason legal proceedings should be instituted against me, it was left for me to guess what information they had received and to look at my watch under the sympathetic glances of my journalist colleagues: After all, I had to fly on a mission to Omsk and only about an hour and a half remained before the airplane's departure. Finally, realizing that I simply would not have time to explain myself, I entered the office and asked that the bureau meeting be suspended until my return.

I spent the 4 days of my mission on pins and needles, telephoning Tashkent several times a day and trying to find out whether some "news" appeared. Upon my

return I learned that the District Political Administration no longer considered it advisable to examine the question of my party affiliation. The argument about "Soviets Without Party Members" burst like a soap bubble (it is interesting whether the secretary of the Central Committee will ever say who slipped this "disinformation" to him). There were no grounds for an investigation. However, in this situation party bureau members, nevertheless, insisted on concluding the meeting interrupted in connection with my departure and asked me to explain my position in the present election campaign.

For about 1 hour I talked about my work and the tasks of the Committee for Assistance to the USSR People's Deputy. I emphasized that I did not intend to part either with the party card, or with the deputy's mandate, the incompatibility of which was inherent in the appeal "Soviets Without Party Members." I would not do this, because both the party and soviets had a great deal of work ahead on bringing their life and activity into conformity with the principles of democracy and elementary common sense.

The decision of the party bureau was unprecedented. It deserves to be presented in full.

1. To take the report by party member V. Zolotukhin into consideration.
2. To consider Comrade V. Zolotukhin's position in the campaign for elections of Uzbek SSR people's deputies and to local soviets of people's deputies a party position meeting the demands of the processes of perestroika.
3. To consider the pressure by party bodies on USSR people's deputies—party members—intolerable and illegitimate, because such practice can tear away voters from party members and they will give their votes to nonparty members and independent candidates.
4. To publish the report on the party bureau meeting in the press.

How naive I was when I assumed that everything would end at this. It turned out that the suppression campaign had just begun. The next day after the party bureau [meeting] I hardly managed to pick the telephone receiver. Voters telephoned and, either introducing themselves, or not mentioning their names, anxiously reported on an action for my recall as a deputy planned for the next day. According to the plan of its organizers, this was to take place at the Tashkent Tractor Plant, where the plant aktiv was supposed to make such a decision in the course of hearing my report and representatives of labor collectives and rayon residents, who were to gather in the Palace of Culture of the Tashkent Tractor Plant 2 hours later, were supposed to support the aktiv's proposal for the recall.

I received the official invitation to the meeting not long before it began. Plant representative V. M. Kramarenko reported that this would be a meeting with workers, who

requested a discussion about the work of the country's Supreme Soviet and the meaning of the laws recently adopted by it. However, instead of workers, representatives of schools and of the Rayon Council of Veterans and other activists were in the meeting hall of the party committee. Workers of the rayon executive committee, an instructor of the city executive committee, (apparently, for the purpose of determining the correctness of the recall procedure), and representatives of the rayon party committee were present there. Involuntarily, I thought: How is it that all these officials were absent from my previous meetings with voters, where the deputy literally drowned under the waves of questions and demands to organize transport operation, to take out the garbage, to repair the leaking roof, to pump out water from the basement, and so forth and so on. After all, this was their work. The voice of O. M. Fedoseyev, deputy chairman of the rayon executive committee, who conducted the meeting, took me out of these thoughts.

"Now the USSR people's deputy will talk about the work on fulfilling mandates, after which you will be able to ask him questions and then we will let everyone, who wishes to speak, speak."

I have nothing to hide and no need to be cunning before my voters. I realize perfectly well that under the presently existing system of centralized planning and lack of rights on the part of local authorities it is impossible to completely fulfill all the mandates received in the course of elections, most of which consist of requests to build a store, a motion picture theater, and a school, to install telephone lines in a rayon, or to lay a new road. Attempts to solve these problems by the old method—going to authorities—showed that I would need about 10 years to coax money, capital, and resources for every project from appropriate authorities. Therefore, I chose another way of realizing mandates: I concentrated on work in the Supreme Soviet and on drafting laws, which would break this system and enable the same rayon soviet to solve on its own all the problems concerning the construction of projects on its territory. The documents being drafted include the law on general principles of local self-administration and local economy, with the adoption of which rayon residents would be able to calmly solve all these problems on their own, without a "go-getter" in the Council of Ministers and the Gosplan. But, again, for this an efficient rayon soviet is needed and, therefore, I ask all rayon residents to get actively involved in the election campaign. Not to wait for someone in Moscow to solve all the rayon's problems for them, but to get actively involved in work themselves.

At a certain moment during the meeting Olga Fedorovna Golovaneva from the Rayon Council of Veterans rose and exclaimed:

"Comrades! In what stupidity we engage when we demand that the USSR people's deputy clean irrigation canals for us. Better, let us make the workers of the rayon executive committee present here responsible for their condition!"

The meeting approved the work of the USSR people's deputy. Instead of the Palace of Culture I was led to one of the plant's remote shops, where for an hour and a half I talked about the laws adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

However, the matter did not end at this either. The next day my assistant—secretary Mamura Khusanovna Usmanova—telephoned me and reported that the place assigned to me for the performance of deputy duties—room No 17 in the building of the Kuybyshev Rayon Executive Committee—on the order of the secretary of the rayon executive committee was turned over to the accounting office of the Rayon Public Health Department and now we had no place to work. It was also not clear where I would receive voters tomorrow (the first Friday of the month—the officially established day of reception—just arrived). At first I did not believe at all that this could be so and told Mamura Khusanovna that the reception of voters, nevertheless, would take place even if on the steps of the rayon executive committee.

Fortunately, it did not come to this. However, on the day of reception the building of the rayon executive committee was surrounded by reinforced militia details. The rayon procurator and the leadership of the Rayon Department for Internal Affairs were present there. On the steps of the rayon executive committee I was met by all deputy chairmen of the executive committee, who were greatly alarmed (the chairman himself was on a mission at that time). For the first time in the 9 months of my service as deputy the leaders of the rayon body of power asked what help the deputy needed from them. O. M. Fedoseyev reported that a two-room office in the center of the city with all the conveniences was being assigned to me and a room in the rayon executive committee, to my assistant—secretary—and that all the problems concerning the organization of the deputy's work would be solved. I was asked to agree to hold the reception in the meeting hall of the rayon executive committee today. And another request—to calm down voters disturbed by the misunderstanding that occurred. It turned out that many rayon residents decided to hold a rally as a sign of protest against the arbitrary actions of the executive committee and in support of the deputy. This forced officials to perform the duties connected with the organization of the deputy's work assigned to them by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

On that day 53 people came to the reception. And, as always, most of the visitors' problems concerned the competence of the rayon executive committee...

How will work proceed further? I don't know. However, one thing is clear: Having delayed unjustifiably the adoption of the Law on the Status of the USSR People's Deputy, we doomed ourselves to conflicts with local bodies of power and officials in various institutions, which no one needed and which hampered normal work. The law has now been adopted. However, in addition to it, all of us must also understand the following question: What is the meaning of the deputy's work?

In the press and other mass information media and, moreover, in the course of the work of the Congress many speakers talked about the passivity of the deputies from Uzbekistan and reproached them for their inactivity. This does not correspond to reality: During the 9 months from the day of election every Uzbekistan deputy did a vast volume of work—hundreds of meetings in ministries and departments and thousands of inquiries to and demands on deputies: To decrease the republic's "cotton nature," to increase funds, to build roads, to close an ecologically harmful plant, to give an apartment to a mother with many children, and to extend the trolley bus route... Assistants—secretaries of people's deputies—work under great stress, hardly managing to send deputies' mail to authorities. However, should USSR people's deputies do all this work?

During the decades of rule of the command and administrative system the opinion that the deputy's main task lay exclusively in procuring something for the rayon, city, and the republic and on the basis of this understanding voters judged the work of their chosen representative became ingrained not only among the leadership, but also among the people. I remember the very first meeting of Tashkent deputies in the city party committee of the capital. Speaking before us, B. F. Satin, first secretary of the city party committee at that time, stressed that we would now have to solve many problems concerning everyday life of city residents. People would turn to us in connection with apartment repairs, telephone installation, and so forth. We could count on constant help in these matters from party and Soviet bodies in the city. However, every case, when residents turn to the USSR people's deputy in connection with these matters, is a serious signal of the unfinished work of city and rayon executive committees and, moreover, of the city party committee itself, which are supposed to solve these problems directly—I frankly said this then under the surprised and not understanding glances of those present. Since that time more than half a year passed and two congresses and two sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet were held, but little has changed in understanding the essence of our work.

However, the enormity of economic problems overshadowed and to some extent pushed to the background political problems. Work as a "go-getter" hardly left me time for a detailed analysis of the laws considered by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and republics. It seems that such a state of affairs completely suits the republic's government, because it has received in the person of USSR people's deputies substantial help in the realization of its economic plans, at the same time, remaining, as during former times, outside control on their part. That is why the economic activity of deputies is encouraged in every possible way and, when there is the slightest attempt by one deputy or another to raise political problems and to evaluate the legality of adoption of one decision or another by the leadership, a sharp cry in the press or at a meeting of deputies follows: "Devote yourselves to a specific matter in the republic's

interests!" In brief, "know your place and don't interfere in someone else's business."

The work of the congress of the USSR Supreme Soviet has shown: It is time for us to arrive at understanding the truth that the people's deputy is primarily a political, not economic, figure and the creation of laws, control over the observance of the USSR Constitution in localities, and a sensitive, prompt, and principled reaction to the slightest deviations from the law should be in the center of his activity. In Uzbekistan, which has lived through decades of lawlessness and abuse of power, there is a lot of work in this direction even today. The events in Kokanda and Fergana, adoption in an unconstitutional manner of the Ukase "On a Ban on Some Types of Cooperative Activity" of the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and the decree "On Measures To Stabilize the Social and Political Situation in the Republic," which have greatly infringed on the citizens' constitutional rights, attest to this. The question of establishing under the republic's Supreme Soviet a working deputy group for legislation, legality, and law and order has long

come to a head. Furthermore, there is a need for legal training for each of the 108 USSR people's deputies and all 500 members of the republic's future Supreme Soviet so that they could make competent decisions and participate in the control over the implementation in their districts of laws and decisions by the Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and their bodies. This will signify the liquidation of the monopoly of power by party apparatchiks. Thousands of Uzbekistan's inhabitants sincerely want this.

A remarkable fact. During present elections the Birlik National Movement and Intersoyuz, which was established in the interest of protecting the Russian-language population, concluded an "amicable agreement." The fight for an accelerated tearing down of the command and administrative system and establishment of a law-governed state was declared the common goal.

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Systematic Crime Analysis Needed in Belorussia
90UN0893A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 9 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by I. Andreyev, director of the NII (Scientific Research Institute) commission of legal experts, candidate of juridical sciences, docent: "Opinion Tribune: Science on the Scales of Justice"]

[Text] For a long period of time we have all been looking through rose-colored glasses. It was felt, for example, that crime in a socialist society has a tendency to go down and is generally easily eliminated. Outside the sphere of analysis factors remained that conditioned the very existence of crime. So it worked out this way: no data—nothing to worry about.

But there was something to worry about. We needed to pay attention at an early stage to the trends in the economic situation in the country, to the process of disintegration among a certain category of people, we needed to make a thorough analysis of the shortcomings in the social sphere, in educational work. These delusions, omissions, and failures affected our evaluation of the nature of crime as well. As a result, today we are dealing with a definite growth in the criminal professionalization of so-called across-the-board crime: criminals are often well armed, possess good technical equipment, are well versed in the elements of operative work, and so on. That is, we have finally admitted that, on the one hand, organizing is on the upswing, and, on the other, criminals are more professional than ever. This is what cannot fail to evoke alarm.

Something else is disturbing, too: despite the many resolutions on the fight against crime, as well as the complex of measures they envisage, the situation, unfortunately, has not improved.

Evidently the measures taken have been insufficient. We could make the laws harsher or more humane, we could reconstruct or postpone legal proceedings and the judicial system, but in order to mount an effective fight against crime, we must first of all recognize crime as a social phenomenon. In short, we need a thorough study, multifaceted scientific analysis of the social, economic, and other factors facilitating the commission of a crime. Only by laying bare the roots of this social evil can we eradicate it.

Having drawn such a conclusion, I do not by any means pretend I've made any great discovery—because all this has happened before. We have only to turn to the history of our republic. It is no accident that people say that the new is the well-forgotten old.

So, the first years of Soviet power. A difficult time, a complicated economic situation, but...on 30 October 1926 the Belorussian government created the Belorussian Office for the Study of Crime and the Criminal, in which the well-known scholars professors V. N. Shirayev, A. K. Lents, and others worked.

1932. The Belorussian State Institute of Criminology, Crime Detection, and Forensics is formed inside the Legal-Forensic Institute of the Belorussian SSR NKYu [People's Commissariat of Justice].

Today our republic does not have a single department or a single scientific institution involved in the scientific analysis of crime. Those small analysis groups we do have in the Belorussian SSR MVD and the Belorussian SSR Public Prosecutor's Office merely process crime statistics. Not to say, of course, that such a statistical approach to the problem is erroneous. It is essential, but it does not allow for any deep penetration into the phenomenon's actual content.

Problems in the study of crime are today the occupation of the All-Union NII [Scientific Research Institute] on the Problems of Strengthening Legality and Law and Order. But each union republic has its own characteristics, after all, which are conditioned by the level of economic and social development and other factors. And that means there are also territorial differences in crime. Thus the particularities of crime need to be studied in place, in the republics.

I believe that right now the idea of creating a Belorussian Scientific Research Institute on Criminology, Crime Detection, and Forensics would be quite timely and correct. It would provide an opportunity for realizing the extradepartmental scientific analysis of crime in the republic, for working out a complex of crime prevention enterprises, for working out the investigative tactics and methods of investigating individual types of crime, for rendering practical assistance to the lawkeeping organs by carrying out its expertise. Finally, on this basis investigators' qualifications could be improved.

In this way we would have a unitary scientific-practical complex for the fight against crime.

Yet another important problem is the increased role of forensics in a socialist law-governed state. The Scientific Research Institute of Forensics of the Belorussian SSR Justice Ministry is the sole scientific institution in the republic working on the theoretical foundations and methods of forensics and on rendering practical assistance to the lawkeeping organs. This is one of the oldest institutes in the country, created in 1929. Over the course of its entire prewar life it enjoyed the attention and support of the republic's party and soviet organs. If we were to compare this relationship with the present day, we would observe a paradoxical situation. The level of crime in the prewar period certainly did not exceed that of the present, nor was the economic situation any better, but nevertheless, considering the complexity of the problems the institute handled, the republic's government then found it possible to finance an institute staff of more than 100. The institute had the most modern equipment for the time, it received a great deal of foreign literature on issues of crime detection and forensics, and it was provided with the necessary hard currency to acquire equipment and reagents abroad.

Nowadays we can only dream of that kind of relationship and understanding.*

The Forensics NII has been given a miserable supply of the most ordinary laboratory equipment a scientific research institution could have. Whereas today experts need special equipment to be developed and produced for crime detection research. The country does not have a specialized technological design office or corresponding enterprises specializing in developing and making equipment for these purposes. This has led us to a point where today [illegible], ballistics, handwriting, document, and autotechnical experts function at an extremely low level, to say the least.

This is why it is essential that we create an SKTB with experimental production in at least one union republic. If this proposal were to find support in the republic's party and soviet organs, then the Belorussian Forensics NII is prepared to take up the initiative in organizing such production. In our view there is no other way to solve the problem. For all attempts in previous years to set up short runs of crime detection technology at production enterprises have suffered defeat. Suffice it to recall the story of the production of the investigation suitcase (from the time it was developed in 1974 until it went into use in the republic's investigatory organs ten years passed).

In the second place, in order to increase the practical assistance of experts to investigators in aggravated crimes, the Forensics NII must be fitted out with specialized mobile crime labs in order to conduct crime detection, autotechnical, and other urgent research at the scene of the crime.

In the third place, in our view, legislation on the criminal legal process, which in many instances hinders rather than helps a multifaceted, full, high-quality investigation of criminal cases, could stand some improvement. It is unlikely, for example, that the extension of expert practical assistance to the organs of preliminary investigation is helped any by point 3a, article 74, of the Belorussian SSR Criminal Code, which prohibits an expert to practice his expertise if he participated in the case as a specialist (say, if he examined the scene of the crime). At the same time an exception is made for the forensic physician. In the legal literature the issue of whether practicing expertise, if only in individual instances, might lead to instigating a criminal case has been discussed more than once. However, it has yet to find procedural regulation.

We would hope that during the preparation of the draft for the corresponding sections of the UPK [Criminal Law Procedure Code] representatives of the expert institutions would be invited or at least asked for their opinion.

In the fourth place, in the current situation it is essential to set up close interaction between the lawkeeping organs and the forensics institutions of the republic. It would seem that such interaction could be set up by means of

creating an interdepartmental forensics coordinating council. This council would include representatives of all interested lawkeeping and expert institutions in the republic. One would think that this would allow us to resolve the problems arising in practice in the fight against crime more efficiently and flexibly. Most important in the present period is that we unite our efforts in the fight against crime, regardless of any departmental differences.

And the final question—cadres. Recently in the pages of the central press, over the radio, and on television there has been very active discussion of the question of the material status of judges, investigators, and other workers in the lawkeeping organs, but Forensics NII associates have somehow been left in the shade. For example, the official pay for a junior research associate is 140 rubles, for a senior research associate (doctoral candidate) 220 rubles, and for a Ph.D. 280 rubles. What hope is there of attracting highly qualified specialists to work in the institute given these conditions?

Certainly we realize that the economic situation in the republic and in the country as a whole is very complicated, and questions abound. But it seems to me that the fight against crime is an important one. People must be confident that they can walk the streets in peace, that the state is capable of protecting their life, health, honor, and dignity against criminal encroachments.

Crime Statistics, Or The Crime of Statistics

18080094A Riga ATMODA in Latvian
No 1, 9 Jan 90 p 11

[Article by I. Upmacis [Upmatsis]: "Crime Statistics, Or The Crime of Statistics"]

[Text] The so-called policy of glasnost, which is called simply freedom of information in the rest of the world, has finally provided a glimpse at the MVD reports that were one of the top state secrets during the entire 50 years of the Soviet system.

During the 10 months from January-October of 1989 1,988,900 crimes were recorded in the USSR, or 34 percent more than during the first 10 months of 1988. For Latvia these figures are 23,800 and 28 percent, respectively. The crime structure is as follows: theft of personal property - 35.5 percent; theft of state and public property - 11.3 percent; robbery and open theft - 5.8 percent; crimes against individuals - 3.9 percent; traffic violations - 6.1 percent; profiteering - 1.8 percent; and hooliganism - 5.7 percent. Of course, these figures, and especially the absolute figures, are depressing. However, the grimmest thoughts prevail when we examine the

table that shows the number of crimes per 100,000 residents:

Crimes Per Hundred Thousand Residents			
	1980	1988	1989(forecast)
USSR	578	657	873
RSFSR	743	834	1116
Latvia	823	865	1102
Lithuania	414	581	886
Estonia	755	775	1350
Ukraine	394	474	635
BeSSR	472	482	660
UzSSR	246	358	421
KaSSR	515	626	836
Georgia	336	315	322
AzSSR	250	203	224
Moldavia	390	768	978
KiSSR	326	453	630
TaSSR	269	276	329
Armenia	249	183	265
TuSSR	286	376	500

A person unfamiliar with "Soviet" statistics may think that there are no more dangerous places in the "beloved" empire than Latvia and Estonia. At the same time, he may have doubts, because he has read so much about the gangs of juveniles in Kazan, brutalities of the Azerbaijani "internationalists", shoot-outs in Moscow streets...

Indeed, what about these figures? They should be approached critically, like any other statistics, which, according to the famous Mark Twain's definition, are the highest degree of lies. There is no sense to compare these data with the crime statistics in the West, because they are practically incomparable. The problem lies in the fact that each country has its own criminal law system and the system for recording crimes. Therefore, to announce that we are doing fine because in the USA they had 5,664 crimes per 100,000 residents (1988) is simply frivolous. Let us begin with the definition of the "statistical" crime. This is a crime that has been officially recorded by the militia. Anything that the militia does not want to consider a crime is not included in this crime count, and it happens also in the cases, when the militia sends out a standard reply informing a person that there are no reasons to start a criminal case. It sounds like a paradox: they steal a wallet from your pocket, but because it contained only 49 rubles, it is considered to be an unimportant case, and the crime disappears as if it was never committed. Such are the laws. However, this is not the most important thing. The most important problem is that still today, the militia sends out a report reflecting its work by means of the "percent of crimes solved", that is, the ratio between the recorded and the solved crimes. And it follows that it is beneficial not to record crimes in order to assure a sufficiently high percent of solved crimes. In 1988, the percent of crimes solved in

Latvia was 70.6 percent, in Estonia - 63.2, and in Lithuania - 75.7. And now let us compare the percent of crimes solved with those parts of the empire, where the crime rate is relatively low: Armenia - 84.0; Georgia - 90.5; Azerbaijan - 83.9; Belorussia - 80.5; and Uzbekistan - 79.2. Taking into account that the level of material security (read: total poverty) by law and order authorities is the same throughout the Soviet Union, there is only one conclusion that can be made, namely, that in some places they cover up crimes more thoroughly than in others, since the militia in the Baltics, in particular, personnel of the criminal investigation system and the investigative system of the procuracy is not made up of the dumbest and laziest people around. However, even this percent of crimes solved is substantially inflated, because in the USA it is 20.7 percent, in West Germany - 45.8, percent, and in Japan - 65.8 percent, and because we should take into account the fact that the most worn out automobile transportation (if such a thing exists) belongs to militia; gasoline rations for these junk cars are ridiculously small; the militia's premises are in much worse condition than during the time of the Tsars; the system of crime records is practically nonexistent; nobody is seriously searching for the wanted criminals, because information exchange does not exist; and the experts use methods, most of which were introduced in the beginning of the century. This list goes on and on. I think that under such conditions an American policeman would not be able to solve a single crime. In addition, taking into consideration the new hard currency rate, our investigators and criminal investigators earn for their work slightly less than \$50 a month compared with an American patrolman's salary of \$2000 a month. Where can one find policemen in Latvia?

We should not be terrified by the growing crime, because we no nothing about its real proportions. Taking into account the dismal financial situation of the empire, we have no reason to believe that anything will change in the work methods of the militia, because the empire is able to find money for the "lack berets", tear and other gases, plastic shields and night sticks, but cannot find money to protect its citizens from criminals, who steal from us and kill and rob us. It seems that the republic itself should start working on this problem, because if we continue to wait for the empire, soon we will not be able to leave our homes.

Gun Ownership Legalized in Rural Estonia

90UN0660A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 4

[Interview with MVD Lieutenant-Colonel S. V. Golitsyn, by N. Maandi; date and place not specified: "Weapons—for All"]

[Text] "No, and once again no!" Lieutenant-Colonel S. Golitsyn, chief of the Estonian SSR MVD Department for the Protection of Public Order, categorically announced when I asked him his recommendations about the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers' decision to allow the sale of guns in Estonia.

Svyatoslav Vasilevich suggested, "Read the document and a lot becomes clear. Here, I quote: 'In view of the

growth in crime in the republic and the need under these conditions to protect rural inhabitants from criminal acts, in coordination with the MVD, it is proposed, upon agreement from local organs of power, to authorize some rural inhabitants who do not belong to hunting societies to acquire smooth bore weapons and ammunition to protect their families and private property..."

[N. Maandi] Really, much of it makes sense. However, let us make it more precise. What does "some rural inhabitants" mean?

[S. Golitsyn] Private farmers living in remote areas. Imagine yourself in their place. It is 2 to 5 kilometers to the nearest neighbor. There are children and old people in your family. How can people resist bandits in case of an attack? There have been such instances in our republic; not many, true, but they have occurred.

[N. Maandi] That is clear. But what about this "upon agreement from local organs of power"?

[S. Golitsyn] The private farmer's application should be approved by the rural soviet. Weapons should not fall into the hands of drunks, previously convicted individuals, or mentally ill, who could misuse them. I repeat, the purpose of these weapons is defense of one's family and property.

[N. Maandi] Svyatoslav Vasilevich, there is a Russian saying "Robbers shoot once a year."

[S. Golitsyn] I agree. Here, in the council of ministers' decision, it states that the authorization to acquire a weapon will be granted only if the private farmer has the appropriate conditions for its storage: in a locked box, or better a metal case (incidentally, they are made by the Teras Plant) and a place to store ammunition that is inaccessible to children. Our people will see that this is done.

[N. Maandi] But these weapons can simply be stolen. Did you read the interesting story in the last LITERATURKA? In the Moscow black market a pistol brings 800 rubles, a Kalashnikov—1,000 to 1,500 and cartridges are a ruble each. The prices are lower in the area around Moscow. The same source also mentioned another interesting case: In only 5 minutes two soldiers from the Kantemirovskaya Division removed a machine gun from a tank and made off with it. A local moonshiner bought it for 380 rubles, 4 bottles of moonshine and 10 of beer. I mention this in such detail in order to justify my next question. Are there such cases in our republic?

[S. Golitsyn] No, we do not trade in weapons yet. I do not recall such cases, but thievery exists. Here is the latest case. On 28 November of this year Ibo Ukkivi had planned to go hunting. At 8 am he brought his gun home (he stored it in the Tallinn Forest Ranger Station, which has a special storage place for weapons belonging to hunting society members). He went to work and when he returned at 11:30, his weapon, vehicle and many other valuables had been stolen. Out of humanitarianism, of

course, one sympathizes with him. However, he was scandalously careless and for that will be punished.

[N. Maandi] Consequently people who purchase weapons to protect their families and property also assume a big responsibility?

[S. Golitsyn] Yes, of course. Also, don't think that tomorrow we will start granting authorizations left and right. We assume that initially about 100 to 150 and no more will obtain them. That amounts to 10 to 15 private farmers in each rayon in the republic.

[N. Maandi] What other categories of the population can count upon such authorization?

For example, members of gardening cooperatives in order to protect their plots and small houses. This is also due to the need, and this is no secret, that gardening cooperatives are more frequently vandalized. If a cooperative has a pensioner, for example, and he is a strong and healthy person, who lives permanently there in a dacha, why not give him an authorization to purchase a gun?

[N. Maandi] Everything you say explains this decision by the council of ministers. However this does not reassure me. Tell me Svyatoslav Vasilevich, won't the official sale of weapons complicate an already difficult crime situation in the republic?

[S. Golitsyn] No, I am confident that it will not.

[N. Maandi] Well, your words are good to hear. Thank you for the interview.

Deputy Procurator on Progress of Fergana Unrest Investigation

90US0524A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
4 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by A.V. Frolov, assistant general procurator, head of the Union procurator investigative group: "Punishment Is Inevitable"]

[Text]Fergana (Uzbek Wire Service)—The Fergana Oblast Court, under the chairmanship of K. Talipov and with the participation of people's assessors M. Inazarov and M. Abdurakhmanova, has finished hearing the case involving a murder, committed out of hooligan motives, by R. Ismailov, born 1963 in the town of Kuvasai. He has been sentenced to 13 years' deprivation of freedom, with the first three years to be served in prison and the remainder in a strict-regime corrective labor colony.

The trial attracted heightened attention from Fergana Oblast residents. As is clear from the materials of the preliminary investigation and from the court's findings, R. Ismailov's lawless acts in Kuvasai, which subsequently resulted in the murder of I. Abdurakhmanov, served as the spark that ignited national enmity and resulted in the bloody drama of June. Eye-witnesses who testified in court confirmed that R. Ismailov had taken

an active part in the hooligan actions and had violated public order. Witnesses' testimony made possible a complete reconstruction of the crime committed by him at about 11 p.m. on May 24.

The public trial in the Fergana Oblast Court lasted more than two weeks. Investigative agencies presented the court with incontrovertible proof of the crime that was committed, thereby simplifying the judicial collegium's work. The trials of cases involving active participants in the mass disturbances are continuing in the oblast and rayon courts.

USSR Deputy Procurator A.V. Frolov, head of the group that conducted the investigation on behalf of the Union Procurator's Office, comments on the wire-service report:

"We recently summed up the results of the past six months' work. We invited the procurators from every rayon in Fergana Oblast to participate. That is important, because they have authority over many questions having to do with the observance of the law and the sanctioning of arrests and searches. I think the discussion proved to be thorough, serious and useful for all concerned.

"The idea that the USSR Procurator's investigative group has been dealing with matters of secondary importance—with superficial matters, as they say—has been expressed in certain of the mass media. That is a mistaken notion. At present, 121 criminal cases have been turned over to the courts—cases concerning 188 of the active participants in the Fergana events, including participants whom we regard as organizers of those events.

"The bulk of our work was aimed precisely at identifying them. Indeed, in June and July we turned over to the courts cases having to do with theft and with illegal possession of firearms and narcotics. As materials were gathered, another group was exposed—direct participants in robberies, cases of arson and murders. We turned over to the courts eight cases having to do with the aggravated murder of 20 persons, and 50 cases against 85 persons accused of arson and robbery. As of today, 105 persons who were active participants in the June disturbances have been arrested, and charges have been brought against an additional 160 persons in those cases. Such are the statistics.

"The completed cases involving the fanning of dissension among nationalities belong in a separate group. There are five of them involving seven people. There is every reason to consider these people the organizers of the mass disturbances. Let me give you an example. The charges filed with the court name a certain Yakubov as having been particularly active in this regard. Both the materials gathered in the preliminary investigation, and the court proceedings established the fact that he was one of the organizers of the events in Kuvasai that resulted in bodily injuries to 57 police officers.

"The work is proceeding. As you can well understand, we are not entitled to make mistakes in this work. At the same time, it must be admitted that mutual understanding and cooperation between the judicial bodies and ourselves have not always been what they should be. Some courts have been a long time in trying cases—sometimes intentionally, in our view. Cases that we turned over to the courts back in September have yet to make any progress. Seven criminal cases having to do with participants in the mass disorders lay untouched in the Buvaidinskiy Rayon Court until November, at which point the judge took a leave of absence and turned the materials over to the oblast court. I consider such practices to be inadmissible. Certain officials don't fully appreciate the public and political significance of the trials, and that spawns harmful and unnecessary rumors. People must know that the guilty will receive their just deserts, that nothing is being allowed to slide, and that none of the active participants in the mass disturbances will evade responsibility.

"At present we are encountering outright instances of witnesses being worked over. Because of the delays in bringing cases to trial, people who gave testimony several months ago are retracting their statements. That was manifestly the case in Tashlakskiy Rayon. No one is insisting how the courts blindly conform to the materials of the preliminary investigation. But the fact is that, for all practical purposes, all of the cases turned over to the courts by our groups were quite well prepared. Of 120 cases, just two have been returned for further investigation.

"At present, we are busy investigating the most complicated cases involving aggravated murder. There are 20-25 such cases. We're planning to completely wrap up our work in January-February. That will complete the mission of the USSR Procurator's investigative group. That does not mean, however, that investigation of the Fergana events will end. We came to the oblast to give assistance to our colleagues. They will conduct the subsequent work on their own.

"At gatherings, I'm often asked why the investigations are taking so long. I can't agree that that's the case. After all, we need to single out the active participants in the events from among 5,000 to 7,000 people, as was the case, for example, in Kokand and in Uzbekistanskiy and Tashlakskiy Rayons. Let me assure you: The innocent will not suffer. What's more, in a number of cases, the law permitting, we will terminate criminal proceedings and turn the materials over to comrades' courts and juvenile-affairs commissions. And there are many such examples.

"The accused and witnesses were interrogated in the Uzbek language in about a third of the cases, and all documentation concerning those cases was likewise compiled in Uzbek. They were handled by investigators of indigenous nationality. This made it possible to avoid the widespread method of muddling the investigation,

whereby people under arrest cite their poor command of Russian as grounds for refusing to make a given deposition.

"And one more thing. Everywhere I go in Ferganskaya Oblast people ask me: Is a repeat of the June tragedy possible? My opinion is unequivocal: No, it is not possible.

"I won't attempt to analyze the problems that underlie the tragedy. But, coming back to the events in Kuvasai, there's no denying the fact that the Meskhetian Turks helped to raise tensions there. The murder committed by R. Ismailov on May 24, a murder that was not immediately given the principled, public assessment that it merited, spawned the most improbable of rumors, which ultimately gave rise to the bloody drama."

**Former Uzbek CP Secretary Abdullayeva
Recounts Investigation of Charges Against Her**

*90US0524B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 4, 22-28
Jan 90 p 16*

[Interview with R.Kh. Abdullayeva by Yu. Soltys, TASS Correspondent, Moscow: "History of a Certain Arrest—A Former Defendant Tells Her Story"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the USSR Supreme Court has finished trying the case of R.Kh. Abdullayeva, former secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee. The court acquitted her for lack of a criminal offense. Rano Khabibovna had been under arrest for the more than two years that the investigation took and was released from custody in the courtroom. The highest tribunal declared her innocent. The verdict is final and is not subject to appeal. Now no one can call her a bribe-taker. She is clean in the eyes of the law.

But how did it happen than an honest person—a woman who had been engaged in Komsomol and party work for more than 30 years, had held high posts in the republic and was a deputy to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet—landed in the dock? How had the investigation been conducted? Why had Abdullayeva, who had previously admitted receiving bribes, categorically denied the charges lodged against her? Was she left feeling aggrieved? A Tass correspondent put these questions to R. Abdullayeva two days after her release from custody. We understand that certain of the facts cited and events recounted by the former defendant cannot be verified, but judge for yourself—"It's difficult to say where it all began," says Rano Khabibovna. "No doubt in 1984, when it was proposed that I switch from the post of vice-chairman of the republic Council of Ministers for culture to that of Uzbekistan CP CC secretary for ideology.

"I felt that a great deal of trust had been placed in me, particularly since I had witnessed serious distortions in that area of work. But my performance in the new job was not to some people's liking. I increasingly had to argue and prove my case, and differences arose with the

republic's current party leadership. As a result, I was relieved of my post in April 1987 for serious work shortcomings.

"On Oct. 29, 1987, I was arrested and brought to the old KGB building, where T. Gdlyan's group was located. After a brief prelude, Gdlyan openly called me a bribe-taker. I was accused of bribery, told the names of people I had allegedly given bribes to and received bribes from, and was shown some documents or other. The letters swam before my eyes. I didn't see anything but four words: 'Abdullayeva is a bribe-taker.' I asked to see their proofs, but they were intent on just one thing—a confession. That marked the beginning of my moral execution.

"The day before I was arrested I had participated in a session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet. And that very day, it seems, was the day that a session of the Presidium had given its consent for criminal charges to be brought against me, but there were no corroborating documents. Consequently, Article 33 of the USSR Law on the Status of Deputies was grossly violated where I was concerned.

"I can't possibly convey to you the kinds of things that Gdlyan pulled. He tried a great variety of approaches: first charm, then blackmail, then threats in his efforts to obtain a confession. At the same time, the bribes grew in size, and new names and episodes made their appearance. Interrogations were conducted almost daily. The last day before I was transferred to Moscow, Gdlyan promised he'd see me in Kolyma and make me out to be Uzbekistan's most debauched and wealthiest woman. As he put it, I was a nobody, while he was Gdlyan—a man who would put millions on the desk of the General Secretary of the CPSU CC!

"In Moscow, the face-to-face confrontations with former heads and secretaries of obkoms and raykoms began, and all of them calmly recounted how I had given them bribes or accepted bribes from them. The pyramid grew daily. Investigators came and went, but they all had the same advice—that I confess my guilt. It was awful. I tried to resist: I cited proofs, I argued, I wrote to the chairman of the USSR KGB and to the USSR General Procurator—all to no avail.

"On Nov. 21, investigator N. Ivanov decided 'to make a clean breast of things.' He described my present situation in very clear terms and advised me to assent to 'Gdlyan's ceiling,' by which he meant my having received 200,000 rubles in bribes from 25 different people. No proofs would be required—the investigation would take care of that. I would be shown my partners in crime and told their names, and the only thing to be agreed upon would be the place where, and method by which, the bribes were given. Why is it that I have no such money? It's because I took it and then 'passed it along' to higher-ups. To whom? I would be told that too. If I would do what he and Gdlyan told me, they would guarantee me a light sentence and possibly even my freedom. So that everything would appear to be well-substantiated and would arouse no suspicions, Ivanov proposed to me that I

become Rashidov's 'mistress'! The investigators were not the least concerned over the fact that such a confession would be tantamount to suicide for me.

"Several days went by, and I continued defending my stand. Then the threats began—threats to plant gold and diamonds on my daughter and husband and to link my son with drug dealers, while concurrently charging him with rape (a suitable girl would be found).

"The first 'confession' took place on Nov. 25, 1987. I signed the lie that Ivanov demanded of me but did everything possible to muddle the investigation: I had taken the bribe, it's true, but 2,000 rubles not 5,000, and in June, not May, etc. In the fable concocted by Gdlyan and Ivanov and their assistants (such as Reveka), I had to recall in which of my travels on official business I had been together with the 'bribe-givers' and in what offices we had met—at which point the word 'bribe' was simply introduced and the entire technology explained in great detail.

"From official record to official record, the false testimony gave the appearance of an active investigation. The results of expert testimony and of witnesses' depositions were ignored. For example, K.K. Kamalov, the former First Secretary of the Uzbekistan CP's Karakalpakskiy Obkom, testified that in 1983 he had given me a set of diamond jewelry—earrings and a ring—worth 3,500 rubles, and that he personally had removed the price tags. I corroborated that fact and presented, for purposes of identification, my ring and the earrings that my relatives had given me for my 50th birthday. Kamalov indicated that they were the jewelry in question. As he later admitted, he did so at Reveka's prompting. In September 1988 expert testimony showed that the jewelry in question was not a set but separate pieces—the earrings of 1983- and the ring of 1970-vintage. And their combined value did not match the sum that Kamalov had named.

"Finally, we 'put together' the 200,000 rubles. Then we had to 'spread it around.' And here again Ivanov came to our assistance. He named me names of people on the CPSU Central Committee. The amounts depended on their positions. At the same time, he told me who should not be touched. But there was a problem: I had never met with the people in questions, at least never one-on-one.

"The fact that the case was fabricated is also confirmed by the more than 50 time-discrepancies that the defense lawyer found. Interrogations that lasted for several hours had resulted in records consisting of one or two paragraphs.

"I asked the court to name the specific parties guilty of the injustice, but that never happened. I don't understand such half-measures and therefore cannot say that justice was done. Tragic as my situation was, I never equated Gdlyan and Ivanov with the USSR Procurator's Office, or the party with the band of intriguers and careerists who had risen to high party posts. For me, the party had remained Leninist.

"I don't know what shape my life will take from this point on. For now, I have to get myself together.

Legal Battle of Arrested Former Sarmarkand Obkom First Secretary Radzhabov Detailed

90US0485A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 90
Second Edition p 4

[Article by V. Artemenko, PRAVDA correspondent, Tashkent-Moscow: "'Not Guilty...' This Was Recently Communicated to the Former Obkom First Secretary from the USSR Procuracy"]

[Text] On a gloomy October day in 1988, on one of the central streets of Tashkent, three men walked up to N. Radzhabov, the first secretary of the Samarkand Obkom of the party, and rapped out authoritatively: "Let's go!" In the car they put handcuffs on him. He did not return home anymore. By special transport Radzhabov was taken to Moscow. He was accused of corruption. The Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro dismissed Nazir Radzhabovich from his post, and the Central Committee Plenum of the republic's communist party expelled him from the ranks of the CPSU. Radzhabov spent one day short of 10 months in two Moscow prisons. Here he spent his 50th birthday. And only at the very end of the past year, justice was restored—the USSR Procuracy dropped the criminal case for lack of the elements of a crime.

...About the arrest of N. Radzhabov I learned from a local radio report. Somehow I did not believe the voice of the announcer. And here is why. I came to Uzbekistan at a difficult time for the republic. Three and a half years ago, here just like everywhere, the struggle against negative phenomena got under way. Every day there was a report about the arrest of one bribe-taker or another. There were personnel changes everywhere.

It was difficult for a journalist to grasp the life of this region during these times. On all sides, a compound "negative" was passed around. What is more, objectively the situation took shape so that in the freshly-turned-up Rashidov nest everywhere samples of clearly expressed hypocrisy and dissimulation, bribe-taking and servility, fraud and embezzlement of state funds were discovered. But something else is striking, which was a cause of joy, reassurance, and inspiration. There were people, simple toilers, who even during the difficult years of stagnation and loyalty, worked honestly. And it is on them that the new local leaders tried to model themselves.

Yes, the people of Uzbekistan did not injure its honor and dignity. And it wanted as quickly as possible to find a way out of the blind alley, to cleanse itself from the filth with which it was showered by the "fathers of the nation." It noted that the workers of Namangan Oblast, faster than in other regions, started to succeed in this. Every now and then, almost at every republic conference, in the miserly mention of "positive examples" (oh, what a shortage there was of them at that time!), Namangan was always put in first place.

More than once I had the occasion to listen to the then obkom first secretary N. Radzhabov. He did not boast. Usually he posed the problem and shared his views on how to solve it. The speaker did not pass his own ideas off as the truth of the last instance; he, as it were, invited the audience to discussion. He said, judge us, people, suggest your own "recipes" for overcoming these or those obstacles in the path of restructuring. In short, he gave the impression of a sober-minded, broad-scale person, who was genuinely concerned with the fates of people.

Naturally, I wanted to see with my own eyes the first shoots of the reforms on Uzbek soil. During our meeting, N. Radzhabov showed me a stack of letters. The sincere lines of the war veteran A. Ortikov, stuck in my mind: "Thanks to the obkom for starting to be more concerned about people."

"Lately we have received quite a few such letters," said Nazir Radzhabovich. "And they convince us that the oblast party organization is on the correct path. Warm and benevolent testimonials are especially pleasant since the first successes, I will say openly, have not come very easily."

Having come to the oblast, Radzhabov unburdened himself to the utmost, but he convinced the party activists that we are faced with a serious task—to break down the stagnation and routine that have stood their ground, to reach the minds and hearts of the people, and to raise them for the struggle for radical changes. And the communists supported the new secretary.

That time I had the occasion to travel through almost the entire oblast. He was met simply—people greeted each other, and at once started to talk about business matters. I don't remember that they did not know the "first" [secretary] by sight anywhere. One sensed he had already been more than once in every place. And not with inspection controls, but with participation, with first-hand experience, and with assistance. He treated people simply, as equals.

Then I became convinced: With practically the same material resources and in difficult weather conditions, the people of Namangan succeeded in attaining stability of work and an appreciable improvement of the economic indicators. For two years in succession, the oblast was the victor in the All-Union Competition. Positive changes were noted in industry and construction, in trade and consumer services. There were excellent harvests of all crops, including cotton. There was an increase in the purchases of livestock products.

And how can one not remember the decision of the people of Namangan not to involve pupils and students in the harvest of cotton, a decision which literally stunned the entire republic. Not a single republic decided to take such a step at that time.

They took up consumer and medical services. Concern for the living conditions of people not in words, but in

deeds, went from the rank of secondary into the category of first and foremost. They built quite a few houses of consumer services, hospitals, and stores, and they transferred many administrative buildings to medical use. I would like to note especially: Everything that was done here in the social sphere did not require any additional means and funds, any assistance from the outside. Everything at the expense of internal reserves—with their own hands and from local building materials.

I am omitting other good things. I will only say: Radzhabov had great plans for the further transformation of the oblast. But it proved impossible to carry them out. Once they called him into the republic's CP Central Committee and told him: "We want to recommend you for work in the Samarkand Oblast party organization."

I remember: A little earlier, as a member of a CPSU Central Committee brigade, I became acquainted with the state of affairs in the this oblast. At that time we came to the bitter conclusion: The region, as they say, was coming apart at the seams. The Central Committee Buro was forced to dismiss the previous first secretary from the post he held—he, in fact, was not master of the situation. Decisive and cardinal measures were needed. The Oblast party organization had to be headed by an energetic, competent and thinking person. In the Central Committee they searched for a long time for such a nomination. And all members of the Buro unanimously agreed on Radzhabov.

He felt sorry about leaving the "old" place. But what was to be done: There was the request of the Central Committee, moreover the communists of Samarkand Oblast, who had heard about the good deeds of the people of Namangan, confirmed Radzhabov and at the obkom plenum elected him as first secretary.

He expected everything, but what he saw..He was, as they say, back to square one. He did not lose his head. You see, it was not the first time for Nazir Radzhabov to find himself in such a situation. He always had "luck": Having received a more than 3-year long tempering in the virgin lands of Kazakhstan, he then led both a plant and a trust, as well as two ministries out of the impasse. And he came to Namangan, I will observe incidentally, at times that were far from the best for it. So that, clenching his teeth, he rolled up his sleeves.

A messed-up economy. And in addition...The workers told the new first secretary with pain about the indifference and estrangement of many top-level officials from the people, about their unwillingness to think about people, even to simply hear a person out. And further—about the inability to combine words with practical deeds. People were filled with indignation about the infringements of social justice that were widespread in the oblast. And Radzhabov quickly perceived: He had little time left to change the situation. Such was the reality. It is from this that Radzhabov began to proceed in his work.

There were other standards here, a different composition of the population, and a very complex psychological climate. But Radzhabov followed a well-trodden path—to people. And they suggested a great deal, they began to be his helpers. First of all, Nazir Radzhabovich proposed to repeat what had already been done in Namangan Oblast. In enterprises, in kolkhozes and sovkhozes, democratic forms of management made broad strides. The brigade and family contract began to be introduced thoroughly.

During the first days, people came rushing to Radzhabov with complaints about the law enforcement organs. He dug more deeply and was horrified: The militia had grown together with the local mafia. It was necessary to scatter this beehive quickly. In the republic they did not support his cherished dreams. Then Radzhabov went to Moscow. To the country's Ministry of Internal Affairs. He asked that a brigade of skilled specialists be sent to the oblast. The head of the department responded, and the ministry envoys soon turned the closely-interlaced network of the local guardians of "order" inside out. And the new first secretary acquired many dangerous enemies. Anonymous telephone calls and threats began... But he had not gotten used to this. He came to Namangan, by the way, at the time of the still thriving Adylov. And it was precisely Radzhabov who exerted considerable effort to have criminal proceedings instituted against him. Then, at the 21st Congress of the republic communist party, he pointedly advocated that the Central Committee take the most decisive measures to accelerate the investigation of the operations of the criminal Adylov gang.

And here is the first "sign": At one of the republic conferences, they now hold up as an example to all already Samarkand Oblast, where cooperatives have developed their activity with great efficiency. I had also heard about improvements along other directions. I travelled to the oblast. And I again saw the same Radzhabov—purposeful, enthusiastic, searching. And again he was surrounded by like-minded people, innovators, fighters. This is one of his most noteworthy qualities—he has the ability to attract and to unite people. They follow him, they work gladly, many giving their all.

No, I do not at all want to idealize Radzhabov. Of course, he also had shortcomings. And his comrades at work, communists, people, repeatedly corrected him. He tried to take into account their advice. But today, after everything Radzhabov has endured, I wanted to recall only what clearly predominated in his nature, in his style of work.

And during the last of our meetings he shared his immediate concrete plans. And again he did not have to carry them out. Having worked in Samarkand for a year and 16 days, Radzhabov was arrested...

But now we turn to the documents with which I became acquainted in the USSR Procuracy. After the arrest of

Radzhabov, he repeated again and again for 10 days to the investigators that he did not receive bribes from anyone and did not give them to anyone. But such a turn in no way suited the guardians of the law. Indeed they received from T. Gdlyan a "special task"—to collect in every conceivable way "arizy" (confession of guilt—in Uzbek). And then the investigators tightened the "noose": "If you will talk and confess everything, don't be afraid, we will fix it so that you will receive the minimum term of punishment. But if you will keep silent and refuse, you will get the whole works."

Already quite a lot has been written about the illegal actions and methods of investigation of T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov. What is more, this was repeatedly discussed from the platform of the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies. A number of the details concerning how they interrogated Radzhabov were discussed, for example, on May 25 of the past year in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, by senior investigator, Major of Justice D. Panfilov: "T. Kh. Gdlyan, invited to the interrogation, promised N. R. Radzhabov literally that he will destroy him..."

Yes, the investigators had resort to threats. They categorically warned Radzhabov: "If you continue to be silent, tomorrow you will hear the squeals of your wife and children behind the wall of your cell. We will also imprison your aged father here..."

This is how the investigation was conducted from the outset. The interrogations were conducted according to a method whose essence reduced itself to obtaining statements of guilt, which were registered not by protocol, but by a statement about the confessions of guilt. According to this method, the arrested were divided into "good" and "bad." In order to fall among the former, they indicated to Radzhabov the number of bribe-givers and the necessary sum which he allegedly received. They gave him "homework": To think of and to name 10 people from Namangan Oblast and 15 persons from Tashkent and Bukhara oblasts each.

In order to make it "easier" for Radzhabov to think, they imprisoned a "helper" in his cell with him—I. Nukhman, an inveterate speculator in foreign currency. At first, the latter advised his neighbor not to be obstinate, to have his say, to save himself from prison. They say the investigators will take into account a "sincere" confession and give him his freedom. Not having attained the consent of Radzhabov, he then went over to direct threats and demanded that Radzhabov name among the thieves and bribe-takers officials of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. Nukhman time and again warned: "They say, in the case of "disobedience" a premature execution of the sentence awaits his fellow-cellmate. What is interesting: Nukhman spoke the same language as the investigators.

Coercion, promises, threats and blackmail poured forth as if from a horn of plenty. The investigators needed only the sum of the bribes "received" and "given", they needed a large volume of "receipts" (receipt of bribes)

and "expenditure" (giving of bribes). They demanded of Radzhabov to acknowledge the receipt of bribes and to make compensation for a large sum—2 million rubles. But then they compromised: You deposit only 1 million if you testify that you gave Ligachev 100,000 rubles, and Smirnov—50,000. In short, a real haggle went on. Again—refusal, and again—a terrible warning: If you will conduct yourself well, that is if you agree with what the investigators say, they will "give" you little. In the contrary case, execution threatens..."

Under the psychological pressure of the investigators and fearing a tragic outcome for the members of his family—Radzhabov yielded. Not wanting to mention innocent people, he intentionally wrote down the names of those who had died, pointing to them as bribe-givers. But soon the investigators "saw through" this trick and, filled with indignation, they began to try to get their ward to write statements about the bribes allegedly received and taken from living responsible workers. This was done very simply: They dictated to Radzhabov the text of statements, in which he had to write the surnames of those who were free and those who were already under guard. The names of these people were dictated by Lashkhiya and Reveko.

I am reading one of the interrogation protocols. At the beginning of December 1988, the investigators Lashkhiya and Reveko began to persuade Radzhabov: Give testimony that you gave bribes to the first secretary of Fergana Obkom, Umarov. Under their dictation, he wrote a statement about giving bribes to the latter. He completely invented the time, place, and circumstances. Another deliberate lie of Radzhabov burst like a soap-bubble—the lie about his countless riches. He named quite a few false addresses, where fabulous sums were supposedly kept. But during searches neither money nor valuables were discovered. Radzhabov and the members of his family did not have large deposits and precious metals. In the only savings account book there turned out to be 6,700 rubles.

Dozens of other testimonies were beaten out with such methods. Radzhabov wrote false statements about non-existing bribes on the basis of the conditions of the game which the investigation imposed on him from the very beginning. He "played" in accordance with a scenario composed and dictated to him previously, hoping, however, that the real truth would be revealed only in court.

But the case did not reach the court. At the beginning of May of last year, T. Gdlyan and part of the investigators from his group, as is well known, were dismissed from the investigation of the so-called "Uzbek case." Those who originally, at it turned out, under the pressure of investigators who committed outrages, said that they gave bribes to Radzhabov, then repudiated this lie. But the investigation again and again returned to the available material and in the most careful manner re-verified them. And only then came to the firm conclusion—they simply slandered him. And he himself was forced to

confess what they demanded of him, he went for self-slander. For a number of months, experienced lawyers "sank their teeth" into the volume of the previously collected materials, again and again re-checked everything. Not in a single episode of Radzhabov's Odyssey did both ends even come close. The case was fabricated. And then the final and just verdict was pronounced: "Not guilty!" Justification: There is no evidence of any kind of his participation in bribery.

A load off his mind? Yes, but who will compensate Radzhabov for moral losses which they inflicted on him during the horrible year? More precisely, a year and 70 days. His health was fundamentally shaken. His family was noticeably fractured. The father did not endure the horror that happened with his son...

According to the paper which Radzhabov received from the USSR Procuracy and according to the law, all of his previous rights must be restored. Nazir Radzhabov wrote an application to the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro requesting his reinstatement in the party. He was excluded, I repeat, by the republic's CP Central Committee. Here, in the Central Committee, they told me: It turns out, the plenum must also restore the trampled justice. But the next plenum is not to be held until March. As though everything is correct. Meanwhile a man simply needs to return more quickly to action. He is not used to sitting around without having things to do. For him, an experienced party and economic official, winner of the State Prizes of the USSR and the Uzbek SSR, holder of the Order of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, and the "Badge of Honor," work that is worthy of his experience and knowledge should be found more quickly. I am convinced: He "will make a go of" any extremely difficult sector. People know his character, will, and persistence.

In October of the past year, I happened to be present at the Samarkand Obkom Plenum. The "relief worker" Radzhabov, not having worked for a year, has been forced to go into retirement. An interesting situation developed at the plenum: They dismissed one first secretary and elected another, but almost everyone who spoke remembered Radzhabov and his good with warm words. The man did not work in the oblast for a long time, but he succeeded in leaving an outstanding trail.

And the last news. The collective of one of the construction trusts in Bukhara Oblast, which Radzhabov headed a long time ago, recently nominated him as a candidate for people's deputy of the republic.

Ukrainian SSR KGB Press Conference on Combating Contraband

90UN0713A Kiev *SILSKI VISTI* in Ukrainian
31 Dec 89 p 4

[Report on press conference by Ivan Hres: "Contraband: Notes From a Press Conference at the Ukrainian SSR KGB"]

[Text] How quickly times change. Several years ago I prepared an article on the Odessa customs house dealing with combating smuggling and contraband. My article never saw the light of day: the Main Administration of Customs Service at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade refused to permit its publication. Today not only has censorship been removed from this one classified topic, but they are even encouraging journalists actively to cooperate.

Also attesting to this is a discussion held at the republic Committee for State Security. It was held by Maj Gen Yu.V. Petrov, deputy chairman of Ukrainian SSR KGB, with the participation of: L.M. Borishpolets, head of the Ukrainian Customs Department; V.P. Terpylo, chairman of the board of the Ukrainian Foreign Economic Bank; V.I. Prystayko, chief of the Department of Investigation, Ukrainian SSR KGB; V.T. Poskrebyshch, Ukrainian SSR KGB directorate deputy chief; M.A. Korobchuk, Ukrainian SSR MVD directorate deputy chief; and S.H. Didenko, chief of customs at Borispol [Kiev's principal civil airport].

First I shall give a few figures.

At the present time there are 68 border crossing points in this republic, 26 of which have a fairly simplified border check procedure. Soviet and foreign citizens as well as freight shipments pass through these border crossing points. The customs service as well as the KGB are charged with the job of combating smuggling, contraband, and violations of currency regulations.

In the past five years Ukrainian KGB personnel, together with other administrative agencies, have seized more than 28 million rubles worth of contraband. Between 1984 and 1988 65 criminals were brought to justice for criminal activities investigated by republic KGB personnel; these criminals included 22 foreigners. In addition, materials pertaining to 317 thieves, bribe-takers, and illegal profiteers were turned over to investigative agencies of the public prosecutor's office and the police.

In the first 11 months of this year 11 million persons, including 4.7 foreign nationals, passed through this republic's border crossing points. During this same period a total of 9.8 million rubles worth of jewelry, Soviet and foreign currency, and high-demand manufactured goods were seized from smugglers and violators of currency regulations and added to state coffers (the total for the first 11 months of last year was 5.5 million rubles), and a total of 343 firearms and other weapons as well as more than 20,000 rounds of ammunition were seized.

Combating contraband and violations of currency regulations is viewed as an important task of state security agencies pertaining to protecting our country's economic

system. This effort is being conducted in close cooperation with the customs service, border guards, the MVD and the public prosecutor's office.

What does the word "kontrabanda" mean? The dictionary defines it as follows: 1) the unlawful conveyance of goods or other valuable items across a country's borders as well as the goods or items proper; 2) in a figurative sense: that which is prohibited, something transported in a surreptitious or stealthy manner. Of course those attending the press conference asked how contraband enters our country and what is taken out of our country.

[Yu.V. Petrov] Gold, platinum, diamonds, and objects of historic and cultural value. Each year the customs service seizes 10 million rubles worth of such items. Soviet currency is also taken out of the country illegally. According to approximate figures, at the present time the total amount of Soviet currency abroad is approximately 5 billion rubles.

The various channels for conveying contraband include Soviet tourists, travel abroad for whom has been greatly simplified, foreigners enrolled at Soviet higher educational institutions, as well as certain members of diplomatic services and missions. External economic relations are expanding, and these are also being utilized for smuggling goods. A certain Italian company, for example, was planning to spirit out from Transcarpathia 52 tons of bronze and copper in shipments marked as scrap metal.

Large quantities of transit goods pass through our country. Large amounts of narcotics sometimes accompany such shipments. Recently the USSR KGB established contacts with the U.S. CIA for the purpose of working together to combat drug smuggling.

[V.T. Poskrebyshch] I would like to state specifically that we are guided in our activities by Article 70 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code, which deals with unlawful movement of goods or other items of value across our country's border. I shall cite several examples. Two Syrian businessmen brought 500,000 rubles worth of pearls into this country. They were able to sell 25 kilograms of pearls and to take 75,000 U.S. dollars out of the USSR. This operation was directed by a special group in Syria.

A student from Bangladesh was able to obtain in this country 33,189 dollars for 152,120 rubles. Another young man, who was studying in Kharkov, over a period of three years received from abroad 127 parcels containing short-supply goods, which he sold primarily for hard currency.

Contraband is brought in by sea, by rail, and particularly frequently by motor vehicle....

[L.M. Boryshpolets] As well as by mail. Packages, parcels, and letters frequently contain prohibited items, that is, items either subject to duty or prohibited from entry. Here are just a few examples.

Following appearance of a newspaper article about popular American [sic] singer Paul McCartney, a young man from Kirovograd bought 60 records featuring concerts by this performer and attempted to ship them abroad. A certain young lady from Kharkov attempted to mail overseas a package filled with French perfumes.

Many parcels are sent to the United States. Our fellow countrymen send to wealthy America bed linen, silverware, and even haberdashery. Our imaginative literature is in great demand in the United States, West Germany, and Israel. A total of 36,500 parcels containing books were mailed abroad in 1988, while the figure has exceeded 81,000 for the first nine months of this year.

[S.H. Didenko] From 1981 through 1988 Borispol customs seized 76 million rubles worth of contraband, including 6.5 tons of caviar. I must stress that smuggling activities are growing. Smuggling is becoming more highly organized and well-financed. Attempts are made to get any competitive item out to the foreign market. We seize not only precious metals, currency, paintings, etc, but also raw materials for drugs which are manufactured according to the practices of Tibetan medicine, as well as postage stamps, which are highly prized by philatelists, and many other items.

Of course we lack experience in combating such contraband. Nor are we always empowered to confiscate a given item. And many of this republic's border crossing points are not equipped with technical means of inspection.

Incidentally, the customs operation at Borispol Airport has limited processing and inspection capability: we process from three to four passenger aircraft per hour. We are presently unable to introduce so-called green and red corridors. It is obviously high time to concern ourselves with properly equipping customs operations with technical devices and to provide them with modern facilities. After all, we make a considerable contribution to the state's coffers.

[Yu.V. Petrov] I would like to add that at the present time customs is intercepting only approximately one tenth of total contraband. When we conducted an experiment—performing more thorough customs inspection of travelers for a period of two hours—the result was striking. As a rule 30,000 rubles worth of contraband is found on persons passing through the Chop border crossing point during a two-hour period. More detailed inspection revealed 125,000 rubles worth of contraband....

* * *

We were later shown a video film taken at the border crossing point on the Tisza River. Every day 17,000 citizens cross the border. The line of motor vehicles stretched out 3-5 kilometers. We watched customs officers inspecting luggage. It contained all kinds of items: cheese, sausage, cooking oil, groats, canned fish

and meat. Manufactured goods include dishes, household appliances, and matches.... The vehicles in this mechanized caravan wait on the highway as long as three days for their turn to go through customs. And there are also children in some of the cars.

V.P. Terpylo explained this tourist boom. Regulations pertaining to sale of foreign currency will change effective 1 January 1990. This is why everybody is trying to exchange currency before the first of the year. Currency exchange is a complicated business at the present time. First of all, there has been an increase in the number of persons wishing to travel abroad. In 1987 the Ukrainian Foreign Economic Bank exchanged currency for 103,000 citizens, for 450,000 in 1988, and for 890,000 persons in the first 11 months of 1989!

In addition, there have been regular interruptions in the supply of currency from the socialist countries.

Journalists addressed questions to the press conference participants: "Why do people take money abroad?" "Is the customs service not violating the law on privacy of correspondence?" "How is the campaign against ideological contraband going?" "What can cooperatives export abroad?"

Detailed answers were given to these and many other questions. Of course this brief article covers only some of the facts presented. In 1990 we shall publish a series of articles on the activities of the customs service in the Ukraine.

Contraband Goods Sold In Greek Markets

90UN0801A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 25 Jan 90 p 3

[Article: "Contraband 'Made In USSR'"]

[Text] Athens—*On Sundays at the foot of the ancient Acropolis in the Monastiraki district of Athens there is a lively and noisy market. Dense crowds of shoppers fill the labyrinth of narrow streets to capacity where merchants display their colorful goods on improvised counters or more often than not simply on the ground. This is the report filed by TASS correspondent Vladimir Malyshev at the request of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.*

They have everything here! You can buy anything here: from an American soldier's used uniform and an ancient Greek coin, green with age, to an ultramodern Japanese tape recorder and an Italian typewriter with an electronic memory.

However, this will only slightly surprise the casual visitor to the Athens flea market from the Soviet Union. He will be shocked by something else. In the furthest corner of the market between huge piles of garbage (garbage collectors are on strike now in Athens) and the thundering surface line of the metro he will discover some familiar but quickly forgotten items. Right there on the ground are huge stacks of linen sheets and Turkish towels with a

"Made in USSR" label, dishes from our china factories, cans of caviar, "Zenit" cameras with powerful lenses, "Zarya" watches, tubes of "Cheburashka" tooth paste, bottles of "Sasha" men's cologne, "Buran" vacuum cleaners, electric teapots and much, much more of the type of goods which, unfortunately, we rarely see now on the shelves of Soviet stores.

Some of the merchants selling Soviet "deficit" goods speak only Russian but the majority speak fluent Greek as well. From our questioning it turns out that these are Pontic Greeks, former citizens of the USSR who came here to live. According to information in the local press there are approximately 400,000 Pontic Greeks living in the Soviet Union. Previously, they populated areas on the shores of the Black Sea (Pontus Euxinus in Greek). However, during Stalin's dictatorship they were forcibly relocated to other areas of the country. In recent years because of the relaxing of regulations governing travel abroad the stream of Pontic Greeks from the USSR has increased dramatically. With the increase in the numbers of arriving "Pontics" (the Greek authorities gladly give them citizenship), the number of "Russian" rows at the Monastiraki market has increased rapidly. The locals eagerly buy our goods; after all the prices for them are considerably lower than for analogous goods of western manufacture and the quality of some of them, as it turns out, is no worse. But where did these lively peddlers at the foot of the Acropolis get these goods in such quantities?

The duty policeman at the market just shrugs his shoulders indifferently. "We have freedom of trade here, gentlemen! Everyone here sells what he wants to." The merchants are not inclined to reveal their secrets but some of them assure us that at the market they only sell their personal belongings which they brought with them in order to make ends meet. It is not a simple matter to get a job right away in Greece. A quick glance is enough, however, to realize that we are not talking at all about goods that were brought for "personal use." At the feet of the enterprising "Pontics" lie mountains of new linen sheets whose Soviet price tags have not even been removed. The price tags are on almost all of the other items and this is a sure sign that they were brought in specifically to sell.

So they transported them, but how did they get them across the border? Officials of the Soviet Consulate in Greece say that the export from the USSR of many types of consumer goods, especially those that are in short supply, is limited now.

"Do the 'Pontic Greeks' who leave the USSR take deficit goods with them for their subsequent sale in Greece?" This is the question I asked one of the stewards on the direct "Moscow-Athens" train.

"Of course they do," he answered without hesitation although he asked that I not use his name. "Just take a

look!" and he pointed off to the side to the passengers who were busily unloading mountains of packages and suitcases from the Moscow train car. One of the passengers told me that there are people who constantly make "shuttle trips" from Athens to Moscow and back. Into the USSR they carry goods which are profitable for them to sell here: jeans, women's blouses, cosmetics, hose, etc. On the way back they take things that are profitable to sell in Athens: sheets, natural fabrics, fur hats, cameras, watches. In separate shipments they bring out and later sell large-sized items which are also profitable to market in Greece: grand pianos, smaller pianos and furniture.

They say that the largest dealers in musical instruments in Athens have begun to protest in regard to the competition which the "Pontics" give them with their pianos brought from the USSR disguised as "personal property." They also sell our things briskly in the port of Piraeus.

Therefore, there is every reason to suppose the existence of a large channel of deficit goods being exported illegally from our country as contraband. For the time being we are not talking about gold or antiques, which customs officials so avidly look for, but about what would seem to be the simplest kinds of things. But it is precisely these things which are in short supply on store shelves. After all, we cannot go to Piraeus or the Monastiraki market to buy them, can we?

In addition, other questions arise: what about caviar, crabs and cameras? One only has to take a closer look and it becomes clear that we are talking about the export and sale of these items in large shipments.

"There are no obstacles for me in taking goods out of the USSR," said one merchant complacently. So, perhaps the competent Soviet organs at least will explain why it is that Soviet products which are impossible to purchase in our own stores can be found in such abundance at a flea market in Athens?

FROM THE EDITORIAL STAFF

In search of an answer we turned to probably the most competent organization for this particular matter - the Main Directorate of State Customs Control. The conversation with the head of the press service, you could say, was somewhat discouraging:

"In general we don't give official comments over the telephone...but then, I wouldn't know what to say about that at all..."

Then we wondered how Deputy Chief of the Organizational-Inspection Department A. Feofanov would answer? However, Aleksandr Nikolayevich politely told us about the regulations dealing with the transportation of baggage belonging to individuals emigrating to live in another country, offered a number of ideas concerning the possible ways that contraband could be taken out of the country and thanked RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA for calling his attention to the matter.

Chief of the Directorate of Customs Control Organization N. Lyutov also answered us eagerly and without any reference to "military secrets". Since complete information regarding the Pontic Greeks was unavailable, Nikolay Alekseyevich suggested that he would be ready to meet with a

correspondent from RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA for a detailed discussion in the very near future, as soon as he is able to completely clarify the situation. And not only about the market in Athens and the ways that Soviet deficit products turn up there but about many other topics as well.

**CPSU Central Committee Official Shakhnazarov
on Draft Press Law**

*90US0439A Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 1,
Jan 90 pp 8-11*

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Georgiy Shakhnazarov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and assistant to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by N. Vaynonen: "The Indisputable and the Controversial"; place and date not given]

[Text] The USSR draft law on "The Press and Other Mass Media," which passed in its first reading in the USSR Supreme Soviet, is being discussed by the society. A report on the draft was delivered at the session on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet committees which prepared it by USSR People's Deputy Georgiy Shakhnazarov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, assistant to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and deputy chairman of the Committee for Legislation, Legality, and the Rule of Law.

Our correspondent N. Vaynonen asked him to answer a few questions.

[Vaynonen] Dear Georgiy Khosroyevich! Describe, please, the basic principles of the press law. How does it correlate to our past experience and world practice?

[Shakhnazarov] The main thing in the law is undoubtedly Article 1, which proclaims the abolition of censorship. For the development of glasnost and freedom of the press this is, it may be said, a revolutionary, pivotal clause. I believe that Article 1 may be evaluated also not only on a restructural but broad historical scale. There have in the past two centuries been in our fatherland only a few quit short periods when there has been even a slight possibility of free speech making it through to the light of day. The rest of the time its fate has been darkened by an enervating, at times mortally dangerous struggle against censorship, a struggle which was conducted by foremost thinkers both in the 19th century and within our memory. When one thinks what a tremendous number of outstanding works by our compatriots has been concealed from people owing to the prohibitions of censorship of all kinds, one is simply horrified. After all, it is only now, in the past three or four years, that we have been able to read openly many works of genius by Bulgakov, Platonov, and Zamyatin, and that the extensive publication of Solzhenitsyn and other authors has begun. Only now does one understand the scale of the losses sustained by our culture and our spiritual life as the result of censorship. Not to mention political life and human rights. Article 1 is also exceptionally important both for the press itself, which, having become uncensored, will finally discover genuine, civic responsibility—not to a government official but to society—and for the maturing of the civil society, which has itself to become the "inspector" of the press via democratic institutions of public opinion and law.

I would then say that the basic elements of the law and its supporting structures constitute a number of ordinances such as we have never had before. Among these primarily is the right to create their own mass media accorded a very wide range of organizations and citizens of the USSR. We are talking not only about the party, state authorities, and public organizations but also about the cooperatives, industrial outfits, religious communities, and all citizens' associations, with just one limitation—that these associations be formed in accordance with the law.

The question of whether to allow the possibility of individuals creating their own mass media or not has, it is true, remained open here. The draft law which has been published has, as you know, only two articles with an alternative option—six and 42. The main option of Article 6 provides for such a right for individuals, in the alternative option it is absent. I would then dwell on this specially.

It is of fundamental importance that the law determines the registration, and not licensing, method of the creation of mass media. It will now be possible to establish a publication, having answered only the six questions, strictly determined in the law, minimally necessary for official statistics and bibliography, for the protection of society against the abuses of a free press, and for confirmation of the material and financial solvency of the founder. And, furthermore, broadly interpreting the questions stipulated by the law or asking some others is prohibited.

The law provides for the judicial-legal solution of all conflicts arising in connection with the activity of the mass media. There is surely no need to say that administrative arbitrariness reigned (and persists to a large extent) here. Replacing it with exclusively a lawsuit in all arising disputes and contradictions, which are intensifying particularly now, will, of course, be difficult, but there is simply no alternative to the command-bureaucratic methods (as also anarchy, incidentally).

With the commissioning of the press law all social relationships connected with the functioning of the mass media will be organized exclusively on a legal basis. Unfortunately, it is difficult in this case speaking of some use of inherent positive experience. As distinct from other spheres of the life of society, in which there are grounds for the preservation and development of what has been achieved, in the sphere of legal regulation of information relations our past does not sparkle with great achievements, to put it mildly. It has to be a question here almost exclusively of a decisive break with all that was negative which was to be found there and which, as we all hope, has remained part of this past forever. As far as world practice is concerned, I may with every justification and with a certain amount of pride even say that we have adopted in its first reading a most progressive legislative instrument on the press. Thereby having fulfilled to a certain extent (more precisely, having begun to fulfill) V.I. Lenin's well-known behest

expressed in the "Decree on the Press" published with his signature on day three of the revolution, 27 October (10 November) 1917: "As soon as the new order is consolidated, all administrative pressures on the press will terminate and complete freedom will be determined for it within the limits of responsibility before a court of law, in accordance with the broadest and most progressive law in this respect."

[Vaynonen] What difficulties were encountered when the draft press law was being drawn up? What were the main disagreements in conceptual approach? Could you not in this connection make a comparative evaluation of the different versions of the law which were discussed in the process of preparation, specifically, the resourceful draft submitted by Yu. Baturin, V. Entin, and M. Fedotov?

[Shakhnazarov] Putting together a law is a complex business, of course. But we had a good foundation. We placed several drafts before ourselves and tried to take what was best and most progressive from each. A draft which had been prepared by the departments was examined first. It was reworked repeatedly and came in for very harsh criticism. Although I have to say that the Union of Journalists also had at one time examined and approved it, but the atmosphere in this union at that time, evidently, was one that admitted for further work far from democratic versions of the bill.

Then three young scholars—Yu. Baturin, V. Entin, and M. Fedotov—drew up their draft. They were at that time, incidentally, working with me in the political science division (it is now the center for political studies) of our Institute of State and Law.

We placed before ourselves also an Estonian draft and several foreign laws—Italian, French—that is, we tried to broaden the basis of our work as much as possible and take account of the most varied approaches and traditions. And I would not say that any irreconcilable differences arose in this phase. Arguments there were, of course, but constructive, as a rule, so we worked quite amicably. As you know, the working group of our committees which prepared the draft invited representatives of all the main media, all the state authorities involved the matter, and the CPSU Central Committee Ideology Department, and several hours-long discussions of the draft were conducted. As a participant in the working group, you will surely remember how all this was.

[Vaynonen] Yes, the debate was aggressive and fruitful. I would like to add that the Journalists Union Board sent out the draft to the localities and collated the proposals which were received and also the numerous letters addressed to ZHURNALIST and passed them on to the working group. It is important to mention this, I believe, lest the impression be created that only "apical" opinions were considered in the preliminary phase. Nonetheless, I have to say that virtually every letter contained the puzzled question: Why is the draft not published in our journalist publications for discussion in the professional

environment? As of the fall of 1988 through the start of the last session ZHURNALIST attempted this on several occasions, but on each occasion ran into insuperable obstacles, despite the support even of the working group. How would you comment on this fact?

[Shakhnazarov] Such really was our wish—publishing the preliminary, working version of the draft right away to obtain journalists' comments. But inasmuch as the work was being performed within the framework of the Supreme Soviet, it was necessary to observe the rule that has been adopted therein: publishing any law only after its first reading. How intelligent this is is another matter. I believe that preliminary versions of bills, alternative versions included, should be published at a certain stage of readiness. The journal NARODNYY DEPUTAT, for example, would be very suitable for this. We even had a discussion as to whether the said rule meant that draft laws could not be published prior to first reading by professionals—after all, such publications would benefit matters. But we were unable to determine for ourselves how a professional discussion differed from a nonprofessional one. It is difficult to say in our case also, incidentally. There is evidently no need for nationwide discussion of the press law. This is not a law on land or property. But, nonetheless, nor should its discussion be narrowly professional. Nonspecialists—readers, viewers, listeners—will express their opinion and proposals also. Listening to them most closely will, of course, be very important—the press exists for them, after all—and the press law itself is not a law for the press but a law for society, for the people.

[Vaynonen] How would you describe the amendments and additions to the draft submitted during the first reading at the USSR Supreme Soviet session? Many voters are interested, specifically, in the motives and mechanism of the appearance of the version of the draft which was not officially approved by the corresponding committees.

[Shakhnazarov] As regards the motives and mechanism of the appearance of the version not signed by the committees, I have already spoken in the Supreme Soviet and I do not consider it necessary to go into this question in detail. But speaking about the substance of the matter is, indeed, very important. It is primarily a question of something we have already touched on—the two versions of Article 6 determining who may found mass media. May this right be accorded individuals or not? In the Supreme Soviet opinions were, as you know, divided. The opponents of this right believe that, having recognized it, we would find ourselves, even prior to the enactment of the law on property, faced with the fait accompli of the emergence of private ownership of the mass media. Private owners, of a kind, of public opinion manipulating people's sentiments and consciousness and major monopolists in the news field of the Murdoch, Springer, or Hearst type could emerge, which, naturally, in no way ties in with socialist principles. The danger is not at all mythical if it is considered that underground millionaires and even billionaires, it is said, have now

emerged in our society. Finally, there is also the argument that the public consciousness is simply not prepared to give a positive or even neutral greeting to private-entrepreneurial activity in the sphere of the press and that, having authorized it, the Supreme Soviet would find itself under the fire of criticism.

Those, on the other hand, who defend individuals' right to found mass media believe that, not having recognized this right, which exists in this form or the other in the majority of contemporary civilized countries, we would be in violation of our commitments ensuing from the final document of the Vienna meeting which our country signed and the international agreements summarized therein which say that individuals have the right to obtain, possess, reproduce, and disseminate information. I would not at this point want to comment on these arguments and attempt to incline the parties to the discussion of the bill one way or another. I would recall only what I have already said in the Supreme Soviet: The verbatim incorporation in the law of the Vienna formula would do no good since it could be interpreted in dual fashion and would not replace Article 6. So there is still some hard thinking to be done here.

[Vaynonen] I shall permit myself once again to violate the rules of interviewing and express my opinion. The law is quite strict in determining the rights of the founder since there can be no question, it seems to me, of any individual, private ownership. In addition, smart operators and rogues from the press have no need of the right to personal publication. If there is no such right, they will easily get around the ban, operating in the guise of some cooperative or association. They could only be dealt with provided that individual activity in the sphere of the production and dissemination of mass information was open and legal and was, consequently, regulated by the law. We recall that all that is in any way worthwhile in art, in science, in ideology, and in politics has always been created only by individuals. And it is by no means for the sake of mercenary gain that progressive people have dreamed of their own journal, their own newspaper. The possibility of publishing in one's own name is a powerful stimulus to an upsurge of spiritual life. And the founder's name on the cover puts him under the strict supervision of public opinion.

[Shakhnazarov] Neither you nor I, I believe, have exhausted all the arguments "for" and "against". Both versions of Article 6 have been published, let us wait and see how public opinion itself, to which we all so much like to appeal, responds to this.

The second question which during discussion of the law in its first reading took up most time, perhaps, was the question concerning the correlation of the role and rights of the founder and publisher on the one hand and the editorial office on the other. There was literally a demarcation here depending on the adherence of those who spoke to this side or the other. Conditionally speaking, the journalist side defended its independence against the control of the founder, and the founder side, at least

some possibility of influencing the work of the journalist teams. I myself, as a journalist, may say that I have many times experienced this burden, when each letter needs to be agreed. But, on the other hand, throughout the world the founder of a mass medium exerts thereon decisive influence and pursues his policy via it, otherwise why has he founded it? Our draft provides for rules and procedures affording the founder the possibility of influencing the work of the editorial office, but many people have deemed them insufficient, and in order to somehow compensate for this a supplement to Article 42, truly not very felicitously worded, from which it followed that the founder and the publisher even could on legal grounds demand that material be agreed with them in advance, was proposed. This, of course, will not do. The editorial office must pursue the founder's program on the basis of complete professional independence, as determined in Article 13. But, on the other hand, Article 42 without the supplement clearly infringes the right of the founder. After all, this latter could be not only party committees, whose interference, frequently incompetent, so infuriates journalists, but also societies, cooperatives, and so forth, whose right to found a publication could prove an empty formality if each attempt to directly influence the putting together of an issue, its content, and so forth is accompanied by the publication in a prominent location of the name of the person who effected the interference. Compromise evidently needs to be sought here. After all, according to our law, the founder has the right to halt a publication, to which, naturally, no one has taken exception—the more so in that it is illogical to deprive him of the right to influence the work of the editorial office. It is only necessary, evidently, to direct it into a strict channel to ensure that he may not harass the editorial office and that his person not revive the prior ideological censorship rejected by the law.

Finally, it should be considered that the relations of the founder and the editorial office depend not only on the law but on the democratization of the organizations themselves, including the party organizations, which publish the mass media. Currently, say, the question of the editor of PRAVDA being elected at the party congress is being raised. If this is the case, the editor and the editorial office will, naturally, acquire a wholly different degree of freedom. The same thing applies to the trade union and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] authorities and so forth.

I understand that the question of the editorial offices' relations with the founders is perceived particularly sensitively at this time since it is superimposed on top of a number of conflict situations which have arisen in the press precisely in this connection: was the criticism "from above" or the removal of this editor or the other even legitimate? Such questions are understandable. But the law is the law. It cannot be geared to some one, albeit typical, even less, exceptional, situation but must encompass the whole diversity thereof and should be oriented in principle toward the future.

I will not speak in detail about other comments on the draft. A great deal of work is already being done on consideration of the proposals received in the course of the discussion. There is much that is sensible, but quite a large part thereof is suitable not for the law but for commentary thereon or some auxiliary set of instructions. We will, of course, consider all this most closely and will, perhaps, provide on behalf of the committees political and legal commentary on the law. This document will not, of course, be of a rigid nature, its mission will be to explain the most typical questions and help the law become a part of practice.

[Vaynonen] What conditions are needed, in your view, for the press law to become an actual legal document?

[Shakhnazarov] At least two conditions are needed. One pertains to the sphere of law, the other, to the sphere of morality, traditional and political culture. The press law will not function in isolation but in interaction with many other legal enactments such as the property law, the law on public organizations, and so forth, many of which still have to be adopted. Articles must appear in the criminal and civil legislation of the union republics clearly and precisely indicating how violations of the press law are punished. Such proposals have been elaborated as an appendix to the draft, but could not have been examined in the USSR Supreme Soviet since the corresponding types of legislation are within the jurisdiction of the union republics. The press law itself contains just one article of direct operation stipulating as compensation for moral damage to a citizen a fine of up to 50,000 rubles [R]. This is new for us, and some journalists are horrified. Needlessly, I believe, since awarding R50,000 is not compulsory, five rubles could be awarded, it all depends on the circumstances, but the article should cool off many unduly spirited pens.

I would note, incidentally, that in France, for example, leading personalities of the state quite often bring suit against the press for moral damage which has been caused them. But demand as compensation just one franc. They hereby emphasize that what is important for them is the moral aspect. It would be a good thing to propagandize something similar in our country also so that officials at least would not be thirsting for large fines. There must be ethical standards here. It is not, after all, a question of necessarily severely punishing the journalist but of defending one's honor and one's good name—this is the main thing. And honor does not have a price. It is priceless. Although, of course, many citizens could seek compensation in the direct, material sense also. There will also be authors who would themselves prefer to incur only moral, but not monetary, loss.

There will be many problems with the printing plants and with paper. Not to mention the fact that gaining access to broadcasting is not that easy.

The question of the correlation of the law and practice is altogether exceptionally complex. We observe at every step how laws which have already been enacted, even

good ones, are or are not operating adequately. And it does not always mean that it is necessary to be in a hurry to change something or other in them. Society itself is changing rapidly, and the law should forestall and anticipate these changes and provide in good time a legal instrument which helps master the new situations, their negative aspects included.

Even now, when the press law is not yet in effect, and all restrictions in this sphere which existed previously have virtually been lifted, several hundred or even a thousand publications, which appear freely and at the same time semilegally, have appeared. These publications are not only political. Examples of a real yellow press—low-grade, avowedly commercial—may be encountered also. If we wish, as is now said, to inscribe ourselves in the world legal space, there is absolutely no point doing this by the back door, where the slop pails are put out. A task of the press law is subordinating this chaos to firm legal regulation in the interests of society, erecting a barrier to all kinds of trash, and legalizing and supporting all that is valuable in order via equal dialogue to assist the consolidation of healthy public forces.

Relations of the party and the press are being put on a legal footing, and this is an important condition for the growth of the authority and quality of the party press, and of all the rest of the press also. So that it not be like it was within the framework of the command-administrative system, when virtually all the mass media were controlled from a single center and the entire wealth of opinions and ideas was thereby squeezed into the framework of "instructions". Many party committees have not rid themselves of this even now. And the press law should help the restructuring and democratization of relations between the party and the mass media.

A big workload will lie on the courts and the entire law enforcement system. When the law appears, there will be a heap of complaints showered both on the press and from it connected with the editorial offices' relations with the citizens and organizations. And, I will tell you straight, we are wondering about this with alarm. The Ministry of Justice does, as far as I know, have a corresponding plan of action, but this is not, of course, something that can be done in just a single year. The court will have to study things which it has previously never had to deal with, including decisions on political questions to such a certain extent as, for example, whether such and such a statement is propaganda of racism and so forth. This will be difficult. We have no experience in this. The court will have to invite in experts and specialists and pay particular attention to the discussion of such problems in sittings of the court.

The experience of Britain, where there are comparatively few statutes and justice is supported basically on precedent, could help us here. About 20 years ago an English court of law examined an action brought by the Moral Protection League, which was demanding the withdrawal from circulation of a book put out by a publisher

entitled "Lady Chatterley's Lovers". This was an erotic 18th century novel. The trial lasted six months. Authorities in the sphere of ethics, philosophy, and literature were called. The court made a wise ruling: to find publication of the novel an offense against public morality, the bulk of the edition to be destroyed, but, considering that the novel was of historical value as evidence of the morals and a phenomenon of the literature of that time, "X" number of copies to be transferred to libraries, authorizing access thereto to specialists.

Imagine now a lawsuit involving some citizen or other's action against some newspaper or other, which is recognized as a model, is extensively publicized and is disseminated by the Ministry of Justice to ensure that each judge might in similar instances be guided by this example, not reinventing the wheel and not performing immense intellectual work from scratch.

In a word, it will take a long time for this mechanism to adjust itself and for all its parts to begin to operate synchronously. And the press itself could certainly accelerate this process to some extent were it to pay it constant attention.

[Vaynonen] When will the press law finally be enacted?

[Shakhnazarov] At the coming spring session of the Supreme Soviet, evidently. I would not want it delayed. It is, I believe, in terms of its importance, together with the law on property, the most important law, perhaps. Both are in the category of so-called constitutional legislative enactments determining the foundations of the social arrangement. There are two basic freedoms. Freedom of labor, which means that a person is free to choose where, how, and to what to apply his efforts and capabilities in order to realize his capacity in full and be of the greatest benefit to others. This freedom is connected with a diversity of the forms of ownership. And the second of man's two basic freedoms is the freedom of his spiritual ego, freedom to hold, express, and disseminate his views, opinions, and beliefs. Both these freedoms—economic and political—support one another, and one without the other is incomplete and inferior. What began the gloomy times of our post-October history? The stopping of the mouths of the press. And had it been able, like Herzen's KOLOKOL [The Bell], to sound the alarm in time, our history would, perhaps, have been different. So granted all the diversity of political freedoms, freedom of the press is, I believe, the main guarantor of the constitutionality of the democratic system and the irreversibility of perestroika.

[Vaynonen] Many thanks for the interview. We invite ZHURNALIST readers to take part in discussion of the draft law.

Gosteleradio Chairman Nenashev Views TV Changes, Proposes Broadcasting Law

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[Article by M. Nenashev, USSR Gosteleradio chairman: "Television: A Time of Changes. Thoughts On a Current Theme"]

[Text] This appeal to PRAVDA readers is prompted by the fact that television workers today, more than yesterday, feel the need to seek advice and to compare their activity with those processes which are taking place in real life.

Democratization and glasnost have made television more open, more frank, and more critical. It is also obvious that our stormy times, filled with acuteness and dramatism of events, have increased the influence of television on a grand scale. Television has brought the Soviet people closer to previously inaccessible spheres of socio-political life and has put the broadest strata of the population in touch with various spheres of state and party activity. Thanks to television, millions of people have become direct participants in the work of the Congresses of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions, the meetings of the country's Council of Ministers, the Committee for Party Control under the CPSU Central Committee, and the Committee for People's Control. They have been able to see with their own eyes how intensely and with what difficulty the practical realization of the ideas of people's power is taking place, and in what acute contradictions, conflicts and clashes of opinions the society of renewed socialism is being born.

The press, radio and television are at the cutting edge of changes in our life, and today no one can refute the fact that it is specifically the means of mass information which were the first to explode that stifling atmosphere in which our society had remained for such a long time. It is they who have disturbed the sleep and brought many people out of their state of carefree self-complacency and mindless obedience. All this is undoubtedly irrefutable.

Also doubtless is the fact that television itself, actively participating in perestroika, has changed noticeably. Many new broadcasts and video channels have appeared, which combine social acuteness and entertainment. Such programs, for example, as "7 Days", "120 Minutes", "Good Evening, Moscow!", and "View". All of them are perceived differently, and this is natural. Yet it is specifically these programs which reflect the traits of current television. We may speak in detail about the positive changes which are taking place today on the television screen. However, since this has already been achieved and is well known to the television viewers, I believe it would be beneficial to talk about the fact that, conversely, against a background of television's increased great social influence, its shortcomings have also become apparent.

One of the most significant of these shortcomings, in our opinion, is the low professional level of many, primarily socio-political, broadcasts. This occurs most often because, unlike the newspapers and journals, television still has an inadequate professional level of journalists, editors, and producers specializing in the sphere of politics and economics. This is specifically why, as observations show, television acts in this field most often in the role of a technical medium, and does not have the necessary thematic independence. A serious shortcoming of television is the fact that it, having a central status, by its content largely remains merely Moscow-oriented. Often the circle of problems and the make-up of authors and participants in the broadcasts is limited merely to Moscow's Sadovoye koltso.

We also cannot overlook the fact that the activity of editorial staffs of Central, as well as republic and oblast television, has recently manifested a certain unclearness of social positions, a confusion in views, and a subjective, group approach in evaluations of the complex processes taking place in the country. We constantly stress that today all of our creative activity proceeds under the sign of pluralism. However, if we make an unbiased analysis of some of our broadcasts, especially those which are distinguished by high socio-political acuteness, we come to the conclusion that they most often lack difference of opinion. Many things are subordinated to subjective notions and prejudices of the announcers. These broadcasts also need real polemics, a variation of views and opinions of the participants.

When we express alarmed concern regarding the unclarity of the social position of certain television broadcasts and the manifestations of obvious one-sidedness in evaluations of journalists and announcers, the efforts to categorically impose one's own opinion about everything and everyone, as was specifically the case with the announcer of one of the recent broadcasts of "7 Days", we are motivated not by editorial zeal and not by managerial arrogance. That is not the case at all. We cannot overlook the real state of our society today, the significant intensification, especially in recent times, of the processes of destabilization associated with acute economic and social problems of society and intensification of contradictions in the sphere of national relations.

Under these complex conditions, those who have been granted the great privilege of holding a dialogue with millions of people cannot help but be faced with the full responsibility of the question of what goals, what intentions a certain broadcast or a certain appeal to the people pursues. Does it help in constructive measures of stabilizing society or, on the contrary, does it facilitate the processes of destabilization? We cannot help but see that ideological pluralism has already grown into an open political struggle for power between various social forces and groups. We believe that this is a regular occurrence, as pluralism is not a sphere of pure polemics, but rather a sphere of politics, where sooner or later the question of social interests and goals of the polemic participants

must arise. And if we are seriously concerned with the need for stabilizing social forces and intend to direct them toward the path of constructive decisions and measures, then today we should awaken primary interest of public opinion toward constructive matters. We must help affirm in the Soviet people the feeling of being masters of their own country and overcome their alienation from the results of their labor, from the active and real participation in managing society.

We admit that among the many pressing tasks which we deal with every day on television, this concern has not yet become the primary one for us. Evidently this is because we are still not concerned enough about the many years of mass dependency. As before, there remain in the country the old stereotypes of passive waiting for all benefits to come from above, from the wise leaders, the energetic government, and the all-powerful Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless, it is becoming ever more clear that nothing in our existence will change if there are no changes in the main sphere of human activity—in labor. It is there that these changes are as yet least noticeable.

We admit that we, the workers of the mass information media, have basically stayed too long at the stage of destructive criticism, while in society the weariness with critical verbosity has become ever more apparent. Perhaps this is why the people are beginning to have less trust and hope in their attitude toward newspapers, journals, radio and television broadcasts. Evidently, the reasons for the decline in newspaper circulations and the dwindling audiences of listeners and television viewers are concealed in this.

Our understanding of the goals and tasks of television and its philosophy depends on how correctly we evaluate the current economic and political situation in the country. If we try to think about television's current philosophy, then evidently we should isolate the following principle positions.

The first of these is that television cannot be effective and efficient and enjoy the authority and trust of the people if it does not truthfully reflect those real processes which are taking place in the life of society. It cannot be more attractive than life itself. And when we are today criticized for talking too much about the negative and showing it too much, this occurs more because today's reality itself presents too many negative facts. Moreover, when we are criticized for too many errors, absurdities, and sometimes even foolishness in our broadcasts, our only consolation is that in real life today there are even more of them.

The second position is reduced to the fact that television may expect to succeed only if it rests on dialogue, on direct ties with and feedback from the audience, on the multiplicity of opinions and evaluations existing in society. Moreover, the specifics of television are such that we cannot limit ourselves to ties alone. We must speak of a certain co-participation of the television viewers in a certain broadcast.

Finally, the third principle position which characterizes the current philosophy of television is the fact that television broadcasting, in its desire to be effective and efficient, must proceed from two basic principles inherent in man: the rational and the emotional. If we look back, we must admit that our propaganda and information were for a long time ineffective largely because they were too rational. Yet we know that if a certain idea enters a person's consciousness, that is only half the battle. It is no less, and perhaps more, important for this idea to take hold of the feelings, the heart.

We understand that the question of ignoring the emotional principle is no accident. Under the conditions of rigid administrative-directive mechanisms which controlled society, we were not too concerned about the spiritual content and moral health of our people. Today, however, we are becoming more and more convinced that many of our contradictions and vices in the sphere of economics, in social and national relations are merely a consequence, and that the reasons for them are concealed in the serious deformations of the moral and spiritual ecology of society.

Today, when the situation in our country is extremely complex, when we are forced to simultaneously solve a huge number of difficult problems, we must not only influence the consciousness of the people and convince them, but at the same time we must strive to introduce a certain equilibrium into the moral atmosphere of society. We must be, if you will, the confessors, we must console people and maintain in them optimism and faith.

If the readers agree with our notions about the current philosophy of television, then it is evident that the continued development of its content, the heightened social influence, must follow the path of development and enrichment of three basic functions: To inform, to convince, and to console. In naming these functions we, obviously, are defining only certain, most important, ones.

In speaking of the need for change, we understand that first of all it must concern the main weapon and the main genre of television—information. The importance of information under conditions of glasnost is particularly great. We know that on the whole the changes which we have implemented here in recent times have been perceived with approval and interest. We are referring to the introduction of the informational program "Vremya" [Time], airing three times a day, whose goal is to realize the idea of continuous information. The television viewers could not help but note that the volume of commentaries had increased in the programming content, and that there was a corresponding rise in their current nature.

At the same time, we understand that we have still not quite caught up with the increased demands of the times and their acceleration. What is the reason for this? Why

does our program "Vremya", as well as other informational programs, not always satisfy the viewers? In our opinion, it is because the acceleration of many social processes and the recent early multiplicity of their manifestations sometimes put the editors and commentators at a loss. Arising from this is our sluggishness, a certain timidity in the face of the growing might of the informational flow, in which those who do not have clear orientators really can drown.

Of course, it is easiest of all to simply swim with the current, but in that case one does not know where one will come ashore. The torrent of informational flow may be contraposed only to a system of planning and prediction of informational work on television. Well ordered prospective and current planning will make it possible, it seems, to overcome the improvisation which exists here. It will allow us not to scatter our attention over minor, specific problems and events which may be reflected on the screen, or may remain unnoticed. The most important thing in this planning is to know how to define the main informational priorities for the future. Under this condition we may not only reflect certain events, but also try to predict them. On the basis of these predictions and a correct definition of the priorities, that very informational policy is ultimately formulated, without which information would be unable to meet the demands of the times.

A reflection of our current search for developing information has become the introduction of an entire series of new headings and new informational broadcasts—such as "Political Tribune", "Current Interview", "According to the Reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs". We do not overestimate what we have found, and understand that these broadcasts still have some inherent serious shortcomings. However, the very direction of the search, according to our conviction, corresponds to the current content and rhythm of life. We also see certain remaining weaknesses and shortcomings in the information—its often subjective character, its problematic and regional limitation.

Television is called upon not only to inform, but also to convince, to formulate optimism and trust in party and state policy. This function is one of the most complex. Its effectiveness depends on many factors—the level of professionalism, competency, creative skill and social position of the journalists.

In order for our broadcasts to be convincing and for people to believe them, they must maximally reflect the most current, most acute topics which stand today at the center of public opinion and which worry and concern the people. Here we must frankly admit that many current and vital topics are still rather incompletely reflected on television.

Primary among these we must place the topic of the party. Only serious underestimation and, evidently, creative inconsistency can explain the rather passive attitude of television journalists to this most acute topic of

the day. In practice, the underestimation of this topic is certainly not harmless. We believe that specifically this circumstance has a definite effect on the fact that recently there has emerged, most most frankly speaking, a certain tendency toward slippage of television from the positions of party loyalty, both in the center and locally. Of course, this cannot help but evoke serious concern and alarm.

We understand that the topic of the party is closed to criticism. However, more than any other topic, it needs an honest analysis, a matter-of-fact penetration into practical application. It demands an understanding of all the circumstances on which our current situation depends. Obviously, for direct attacks on the party, for attempts to discredit it in the eyes of the people, to cause antagonism toward the party worker, we need neither studies, nor searches, nor arguments. All this is needed so that we may present the topic of the party in a constructive and analytical plane. Today this is the weakest point in our broadcasts.

The party committees and local organizations are conducting a difficult search for principally new forms of operation. There are many new, interesting and thinking people who have emerged among party leaders. It is specifically they who must bring a new vision to party thematics and enrich the television broadcasts devoted to party life, to processes of perestroika, and to renovation within the party. An acute need has arisen for a critical re-interpretation of our traditional forms of broadcasts devoted to the interrelations of the party and the Soviet, their place and role in the life of society under the new conditions. In many cases today the broadcasts on these topics bear a declarative, didactic character, and even more often are reduced merely to tiring and boring discussions held in the studio.

The third important, and perhaps the most complex, function of television today is to console. It is ever more apparent that, by engaging in the reflection of political and economic problems by means of television, we must concern ourselves with the mood and spiritual equilibrium of the Soviet people. We must lighten the burden of difficulties so acutely experienced by man. Under the conditions of perestroika, when there is an on-going re-evaluation of many values, the task of moral and spiritual protection of man and society is current as never before.

The difficulty here is that, evidently, television has never yet been faced with the need to formulate its task in such a way. This path for us is still professionally unexplored and untrodden. Evidently, this explains our efforts, at attracting psychologists such as Kashpirovskiy to television, efforts which are not always successful. We do not overestimate this television experiment. Yet it has convinced us even more of how important it is for television to begin a dialogue on those questions which man himself continually poses to himself, to invite him to think about the eternal truths: Good and evil, honor and conscience, charity and cruelty, i.e., those truths without

whose recognition his life would be simply meaningless. We thought about this when we began our weekly broadcast "Sunday Moral Sermon". We will say outright that the interest in this endeavor by television, despite the as yet obvious weaknesses and shortcomings, is so broad, and the evaluation primarily favorable, that we intend to continue it.

For the sake of objectivity we will note that television has great potential capacities for formulating the spiritual face and influencing the attitude of man, and society as a whole, and that it still utilizes these capacities very poorly. Both the morning broadcast "120 Minutes", which has aired for a long time now, and the possible broadcast "30 Minutes Before Sleep" (which might have been called, for example, "Good Night, Adults") could with talented preparation have been usefully made to serve the end of consoling a person, of helping him to withstand the stormy sea of social and psychological passions.

Obviously, in a number of television broadcasts which most actively influence the attitude of the people, an important place belongs to musical programs. If we judge by the responses and letters which we receive today, this is one of the most vulnerable aspects in the work of television, which is rather negatively evaluated by many of our viewers and listeners. They criticize us mercilessly because television has been unable to withstand the wave of rock which is overwhelming it, and because in recent years there have been fewer and fewer folk songs and less national music resounding from the television screens.

We understand that here we cannot command and impose upon the listener only that which we like. We see our task as that of attracting to musical broadcasting the best domestic efforts of professionals and amateurs in music and, based on them, of striving to protect and preserve our national culture and musical art from bad fashion and bad taste.

The solution to many of the acute problems which have accumulated in television and which we are discussing depends largely on the system of management of the creative process and its organization. As evidenced by practical application, the time has come for serious change in the mechanism of work by the television programming directorship—the television chief secretariat. By implementing measures on developing creative activity and independence of the main editorial offices, and in our system of central radio and television alone there are 42 of them, we must see that they develop a better system of interrelations with programming directorship. Much is still incomplete in these mutual relations today: There is no established practice in planning creative work for the long-term future; there are no interesting programs presented on a competitive basis during holidays (how many irate letters we received for our one unsuccessful New Year's program alone!), and during school and student vacations; work on the preparation of television serials is wretchedly poor. Everything we are doing here today, as a rule, is prepared in

standard fashion, hurriedly, often through the efforts of a very narrow circle of people who allow no outside participation. Therefore, for the most part, the quality of these television programs and films leaves much to be desired.

The plans for broadcasting in the current form represent something rather conservative, subject to almost no changes. These plans almost entirely exclude work with artistic staffs under contract conditions, and do not allow for the possibility of preparing alternative broadcasts. They exclude competitiveness and a choice of variants. Over a period of many years, the situation has arisen where program directors in essence do not control broadcasting, but only mechanically, at the suggestions of the editorial staffs, fill the slots in the inflexible weekly broadcasting schedule.

Such a system of planning and organization of the creative process creates favorable conditions for strengthening the staff monopolies on the air and hinders the creative search for new and original forms, genres, and formats of broadcasting and the emergence of talented new announcers. The monopoly here is evident and, as we know, it inevitably leads to stagnation.

In speaking of a monopoly, we must mention for the sake of objectivity the fact that many of our difficulties, problems, and imperfections in the mechanism of managing the creative process are due to our efforts to combine and reconcile within the framework of unified state television the different social positions, views and approaches currently existing under conditions of democracy and pluralism in society.

It is characteristic of the current situation that he who bears the difficult task of managing radio and television during this challenging time experiences ever-increasing pressure from various social forces, often representing entirely opposing positions, opinions and evaluations which, even with the most professional and loyal approach, cannot be reconciled on television. You must agree, how can we perceive and correctly react, for example, to the categorical judgement expressed in the pre-electoral announcement of a group of organizations published in *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*—"all the union television channels are all-national, and it is time to stop making fools of the people". And furthermore—"to limit union broadcasting on Russian territory, leaving it only time for informational news broadcasts". Yet at the same time next to this there is the no less categorical demand appearing in the journal *OGONEK*—not to interfere in the content of the creative process of the television staff, to eliminate any dependence by it on USSR Gosteleradio.

Under such conditions, in our opinion, the question arises as to the need for preparing a separate law on radio and television, in which we might try to overcome these existing contradictions and opt for the creation of an alternative television operating side by side with state television and reflecting the views and evaluations of

various social organizations and groups. In this case it would be clear who wants what and where they are calling us to go. The position of USSR Gosteleradio would become more strict and understandable. A detailed discussion of this question has already begun on television.

Certainly, all these questions have been raised not to somehow justify our shortcomings and miscalculations or to evoke a feeling of compassion in the reader. We want only one thing—for the reader to realistically understand the conditions in which we work, to be enlightened about our intentions, and to be aware of our positions.

Proposals for Non-Government Television Broadcasting Debated

Diversity Within Current System Suggested

90US0481A Moscow *ZHURNALIST* in Russian No 11,
Nov 89 pp 35-37

[Article by Boris Olenin: "Alternative TV? Pluralism Within the Framework of Monopoly—A Fruitful Path"]

[Text] To criticize television has become, . . . I would almost say, "a good tradition". From force of habit. No, of course. In part this has become the fashion, but it was always a necessity. In the recent past, as a rule, only complimentary voices were heard. As far as the voices of the exasperated are concerned, they were successfully muffled by methods far from democracy. And here, several years ago, with the beginning of restructuring, as if the dam had burst—the dissatisfaction that had accumulated for years through the practice of Central Television was splashed out in the pages of the press. Today, as should be expected, everything has entered into channels: TV shows, the critics scold from time to time, but in a more balanced manner, not both the shortcomings and the merits of the television programs. And everything would be OK if it were not for the preservation of the general tone of dissatisfaction with the present level of television broadcasting.

Moreover, having become convinced that you cannot take the bastions of Central Television with a frontal attack, somebody among the critics supported the idea of the creation, in our country, of "alternative TV," an idea expressed already previously by some professional TV-men. There is no denying—a decisive idea, completely in the spirit of the time, only is it indeed a good one? Let us give it some thought.

On the eve of the new year, the newspaper *SOVETSKAYA KULTURA* published an interview with the secretary of the party committee of Central Television, V. Shmakov. To the idea of how he regards the idea of the creation of "alternative", or public, television, V. Shmakov replied that he, personally, is for it, but considers this unrealistic for material and technical difficulties. You see, the present system of TV and radio has taken shape for decades and it costs many

billions. The technical basis to guarantee realistically any kind of "second TV" simply does not exist today.

Immediately after, the critic L. Polskaya spoke in the pages of OGONEK about "second TV," and recently the same journal published a dialogue of the political observers of Central Television, V. Pozner and V. Tsvetov, on the same subject. It must be acknowledged that in the theoretical part of their statements there is a kernel of truth. They assert that the monopoly situation of state television in the air contradicts the pluralism of views, which is taking shape today in the mass media and in all of our public life.

There is no argument, the present Central Television is a monopoly, and every monopoly inevitably leads to stagnation. The question is something else: Can and must competing broadcasting necessarily be something external with respect to Central Television, independent? And, incidentally, independent from what? From the state? From society? Oh, no! The "Second Television" is precisely supposed to be societal [obshchestvennyi]. Then, it turns out, be independent from the bureaucrats of the stagnation years who have become entrenched in Central Television? If that is so, I am also—for it. But for this there is no need to fight "right up to the department", about which I will talk below.

When the interlocutors go over to the practical aspect of the matter, then, in my view, they manifest "an unusual lightness of thought." We read: "Let us agree that 50 million people will constitute the audience of Second Television. . . . Let us suppose the cost of renting of the decoding equipment comes to 40 rubles a year. This is 2 billion rubles. A sufficient sum for the existence of Second TV. . . ."

Let us agree, let us suppose. . . . Figures, it goes without saying, taken "out of thin air," but this is not the point. For the existence of "second" or "alternative TV" it is indeed sufficient. But the initial investment is by no means 2 billion? From where will they take the construction, production, and energy capacities given our deficit of all and everything? As if by magic there arises an enormous infrastructure of TV: Transmitters, studio equipment, radio relay lines, space communication systems, etc.? Especially if it is taken into account that for the most part all of this is by no means obtained for rubles. It seems that V. Shmakov, who has already been mentioned, is right in his sober considerations.

But a mistake of a fundamental character is also rooted in the idea of "alternative TV." We have already agreed that television in our country is state television; I would add that it is also national—for all and for everyone. It is an element of our daily life, socio-political, consumer, and artistic culture. By the way, at the Congress of People's Deputies Central Television was subjected to attacks from both the "right" and the "left". So whose interests does it express? Yes, yours and mine, general ones. Everyone, as an individual, can take (and takes!) his own from it. But for this, TV itself must contain in

itself the diversity of private interests and reflect their entire spectrum. In short, it is our mirror and yours.

Alas, not always has it been clear and geometrically correct. Its deformations depended on the deformations of society itself, it suffered from the same maladies, it "vacillated with the line." And it could not have been different, like in school theorems, "on condition." And to reproach it with this is as senseless as to blame the mirror, if. . . . you yourself know what.

Another matter—can and should TV be limited to a mirror reflection of life? It does not have the right. In one of his notes, V. I. Lenin touched on the works of Demyan Bedny. A good poet, he remarked, but a pity that he is marching behind the readers, when what is needed is to be a bit ahead. . . . A fleeting thought, but a precise and profound one in the Leninist manner, which has not become obsolete to this day.

Today to be "a little bit ahead" means, without being cut off from the interests of one's audience (otherwise there is distrust, the loss of mutual understanding), to help the cause of restructuring, to which again there is no alternative even if because of the fact that to continue going along the old rut simply leads nowhere.

Let us ask one more question. If today we are beginning so painfully to break away from the principle of unanimity that has penetrated our blood, if in reality we are learning to admit a pluralism of views, then must TV—a national platform, as we have agreed—be pluralistic? The answer, as it were, suggests itself, but the case here is not so simple. The demand for the creation of "alternative TV" tacitly presupposes that the system of USSR State Television that has taken shape is a certain all-round semi-official organ and inert structure, not capable of self-development. In mathematics, this is called a closed linear system. But, you see, such systems exist only in the form of mathematical abstractions convenient for calculations, in reality they do not occur. TV is a living organism, whatever the chronic ailments from which it might suffer. TV can be and must be pluralistic in itself, within its own unified and at the same time many-sided, diverse structure. Moreover, in our days any attempts to return to the ostentatious unity, to "directive broadcasting," would end sadly for television, as well as for any other mass media.

Let us remember that the sisters of the muse of TV, in whose families appeals for alternativeness are also heard, as a rule, do not agree to a divorce with their lawful spouses. And here the alternative forms arise, can exist and strive to consolidate themselves in every conceivable way inside the organizational structures of "official art." Avantguardists filled the exhibition halls of the Union of Artists. The cinema went for a sharp delimitation between the films, let us assume, of A. Sokurov or K. Muratova, and the same "Thieves in the Law" Etc. Etc.

Most likely, the time will come when any voluntary association of citizens cannot only publish its own

printed organ, as this is done today, but also manage its own television channel. In principle, I repeat, this is possible, and sooner or later we will come to this. But sooner later, for, besides organizational-technical reasons, our TV historically has taken shape precisely as general television, as a means of information, propaganda and culture, which belongs to the entire people.

It is impossible not to see that in the last few years the centrifugal tendencies in our society have been manifested very clearly and painfully. And here both positions are equally dangerous: The petty-authoritarian [unterprishibeyevskoye = from Chekhov's character Unterprishibeyev] "hold and not let go" and the anarchist "scatter where your eyes look."

It is clear that it is necessary to change the system of television broadcasting that has developed, that it must become a distinctive alliance of television channels, administratively and financially independent, friendly, but competing among themselves in the struggle for their viewer, for their popularity, and effectiveness, not similar to one another and at the same time supplementing one another. Here I am in full agreement with the ideas advanced in the pages of OGONEK by L. Polska.

Lately articles have frequently appeared in which the authors, having analyzed momentary problems say near the end what they would like to dream. Well, I, too, would like to dream. And I imagine the following scheme of Central Television broadcasting, for example.

Four all-union programs. (True, six such programs have been promised to us by 1995, but somehow this is hard to believe). Four—by the end of the century—I believe, is a more realistic figure.

The first—by tradition and necessity, the "state" [program]. Basic domestic and foreign policy information. Commentaries of political observers and other specialists. "Round-tables" on the most important national problems. Premieres of the most significant productions of the cinema, theater, fine arts, and in general outstanding phenomena of culture. Transmission of the most important nationally popular sports events. Everything "superlative". . . .

Incidentally, in a democratic structure of television, the program "Vremya" should run on only one channel. Its present duplication by practically all programs of Central Television is an obvious relic, which does not have any relationship to democracy. And it is also a matter of the honor of its authors to keep their audience not through administrative, but creative efforts.

The second is a channel of inter-nationality communication. Such a channel has already begun to be created, but not even half a year had passed when they began to quietly let the idea drop. And to no purpose. Of course, the former "representation" of the republics and oblasts in the second program of Central Television has not justified itself. These broadcasts have always reminded me of the exhibits in the pavilions of the Exhibition of

Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR or the lines I have remembered since childhood: "And we have gas in our apartment. But you?" It is precisely communication, dialogue, and if necessary, discussion that is needed. The forms may differ. Let us say, "telebridges" between republics on the problems of cultural, economic, and inter-nationality relations, including the most acute. I think, if Central Television had in time thrown up such "bridges" between the same Armenia and Azerbaijan, perhaps we not today have to remember the—in the fifth decade of the postwar years outrageous-sounding words—"refugees," "curfew" And also—on the questions of ecology. And also—the exchange of broadcasting of local television studios, the collection of an all-union "gold fund" of national cultures and a great deal more.

The third is a channel of public opinion. Strictly speaking, a possible style of such a channel and prototype already exist. To some degree, these are the programs "Dobryy vecher, Moskva!" [Good Evening, Moscow!] and "Vzglyad" [View], these are many programs of Leningrad TV ("Obshchestvennoye mneniye" [Public Opinion] and "Otkrytaya dver" [Open Door], "Srok otveta—segodnya" [Deadline for Answer—Today], and "Pyatoye koleso" [The Fifth Wheel]). When you see them, it is as if you breathe completely different air—not better and not worse, not more palatable even, but indeed different, a kind of free air—and you actually feel yourself as a participant and co-author of the television operation.

The participants in the public opinion channel are the creative unions, voluntary societies, and informal associations. The genres are the most diverse—from reporting, monologues (of the type "Proshu slova!" [I am Asking for the Floor], public discussions to (it is terrible to think!) distinctive television referenda on the scale of the entire country. And, of course, there must time for sociologists, for television surveys. And also—for amateur art activities.

The fourth is scholarly cultural-cognitive and (in the evening) entertaining broadcasts. Here everything is clear.

Incidentally, the profiling of television programs is not quite the discovery of America. Ideas on this account have been advanced a long time ago and by many, and as if no one had objected, they, like into cotton-wool, slipped into the hollow wall of the rigidly centralized, command-bureaucratic style of leadership that took shape in television during the past quarter of a century. It is impossible to go on like this. And it is unimportant in what forms the diverse image of the TV of tomorrow will arise. As one of the heroes of V. Katayev said: "Let there be dynamite, if only the wall is undermined. . . ." And to undermine it is necessary.

There is no argument, great changes have taken place in television. The viewers have noticed them, and criticism has supported them. But we admit to ourselves: To

discern the appearance of the television broadcasting of tomorrow is still difficult for the present. Here voices about "alternative TV" are heard. But it can only be a single, but many-sided, lively, changing organism, which has a thousand eyes and every one—its own expression, its own blink, its own point of view. A sensitive organism—like society itself, dynamic—like the difficult, but inevitable cause of restructuring.

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Sequenced Demonopolization of State Television Proposed

90US0481B Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 11, Nov 89 pp 37-39

[Article by Rudolf Boretskiy, doctor of philosophy, professor of the Department of Television and Radio of the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University: "And the Japanese Are Satisfied. . . Diversity on the Screen—An Historical Inevitability"]

[Text] I confess, the very concept of "alternative TV" is not to my liking: Indeed, in terms of the meaning of ALTERNATIVE, this is the situation of a choice of mutually exclusive phenomena. What is more, the emotional coloring here is clearly negative: They search for an alternative in circumstances of dissatisfaction, as they search for a way out of an impasse. But no matter how much we rail against our TV, today its long-awaited leap from the world of silence and socio-political blindness to the difficult peripeteia of brisk and vigorous life has already become apparent. And the essence of the problem, it seems, does not lie in the fact that the discussions about the necessity or desirability of "another" TV, which have appeared lately in the pages of the press, are a reaction to dissatisfaction with what we have. It goes deeper and is more serious. The essence lies in historical inevitability. But about this later.

To begin with, we turn to the article of B. Olenin, which produced a dual attitude. On the one hand, I share a great deal, and above all, the whole idea that, in the concrete situation for all of us who have accepted restructuring intelligently and with conviction, the main thing is consolidation. But then the general thesis of the author, that our television "can. . . only be unified," that is a function and prerogative of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio, calls forth, I suppose, justified doubts. In expressing that sort of an idea, which sums up a series of discussions, the author, it seems to me, was not able to go beyond the limits of tactical momentariness, and what is more departmental at that. Moreover, such a position seems to me to be non-historical, a position which does not take into account worldwide processes and the regularities of the development of mass information. Such is the most general impression. And now—about some details.

There is a need, it seems to me, for comments on the author's thesis that, in the case of the beginning of public

television, it must "be independent from the bureaucrats of the stagnation years, who have entrenched themselves in Central Television." And although here B. Olenin expresses his solidarity with L. Polska, in what follows he completely repudiates all forms of "other" TV. But, apart from the obvious inconsistency, this separately taken idea also does not call forth agreement. We will be fair: You see, TV has already more than once demonstrated both civil courage and independence—in the best productions of "Vzglyad", in the flights of "Pyatoye koleso," and in the finds of "Do i posle polunochi" [Before and After Midnight]. The examples could be multiplied. And with the "bureaucrats of the stagnation years" it is also not quite so simple. Well, first of all, it is not they who now determine the character of our television in its main manifestations. Moreover, many have become different—some making up for what has been overlooked and rehabilitating, and some, perhaps, realizing the freedom of creative search. What is more, the arrival of a new manager makes it possible for a new rise of screen art and journalism (it is worth remembering that in the worst years of the dull time he succeeded in creating one of the most widely read newspapers of that time).

So that the development of our single and up to now alternativeless TV, although not always consistent and frequently lagging behind the best models of the periodical press, nevertheless does not call forth in me special misgivings or doubts. But again, if we mean its individual manifestations—the new headings, the stylistic peculiarities, the restored direct air, etc. And I absolutely share the position of B. Olenin with respect to the general structure of Central Television, the content and direction of each one of the programs and the interaction between them. Here, of course, "variants are possible." And as soon as TV in our house that is undergoing renovation is more and more actively recognized as a societal phenomenon, then to elect the optimal, the best variant among them is not up to offices in Pyatnitskaya [Ulitsa] [i. e., the address of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio] or in Ostankino, but to society itself. . . .

Everything that has been said above could be attributed exclusively to our present and to our domestic concerns. But, you see, the world today is different! One of the main distinctive features of contemporary development in general and mass information in particular is the interdependence, the interconditionality of the processes that are occurring in the world. The recognition of these realities has become one of the general ideas of the new political thinking, which after April 1985 has determined the revolutionary renewal of our domestic and foreign policy.

For the problems that interest us we can select such a concept as the globalization of mass information processes. From the beginning short wave radio broadcasting easily overcame state boundaries. Now, already

in our time, increasingly active trans-national TV, which disseminates programs through satellite-relay stations to ever new regions.

But in the development of screen information other trends, alternative to globalization, have been discovered. At first video, which already has been spread to the entire world through its "expansion." Then such a variety of it as diverse and entertaining television games. Next the swiftly-multiplying systems of cable TV, as a rule, specialized, selectively oriented to the interests and demands of the viewer. And what is no less important, utilizing the experience, developed by centuries, of the relations of newspaper-journal publications with readers: The individual order, subscription mechanisms, advertising, etc. Finally, the combination of video resources with cable delivery to the consumer and an unlimited range of the spread of satellites and space relay stations. If we add to this multiformity also the communication possibilities that are beyond the limits of mass information—audiovisual communication with data banks, libraries, archives, different consultation stations, etc.—then, along with the global "world vision," one receives an impressive picture of specialized information, tailored to the most diverse individual needs.

Why do I talk about this so insistently and already not for the first time (see, for example, *ZHURNALIST*, No 5, 1988)? And what relationship do globalization and specialization have to our unified and indivisible state television? I suggest the most direct. Even if only because all of these currents aspire in the not distant future to our home screens. Such is the historical inevitability which I mentioned at the very outset.

Behind it, behind this complex, and for us unprecedented problem, stands a great deal. But the main thing can be defined by a single word: Competitiveness of programmed, state television. As a completely determined reality, the problem of competition for our traditional television appeared long ago—about 15 years ago. It arose in the border regions—in the Baltic, the Western Ukraine and Belorussia, in the Caucasus, and in the Far East, where the free reception of the television of contiguous states became possible. And common sense suggested: Here is a splendid investigation area for the study of various program interrelations, interests, and demands of the audience, and its distribution among the television channels. And what of it in practice?

First of all, the management of State Television in the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's "closed the subject"—for researchers as well as for critics. Secondly, extended "diverting" blocks of broadcasts began to be quickly introduced, in rough-and-ready fashion and unsystematically selected from the archives. Let us say, for the remote regions of the country, the announcer pronounces the traditional "Good night!", but in the border oblasts for another 2 hours there is a decrepit concert program and a film from among those which are run on the second all-union channel, that is multiple

repetition. That kind of competition! And this "achievement" of the peak of the stagnation years happily lives on until now. . . .

Thus, competitiveness in this case means the ability to keep the steady interest of the mass audience in the programs of what is of central importance for the country—our state TV as one of the most important means and methods of consolidation so fundamental in the epoch of restructuring.

But is a state monopoly capable of securing this interest? Today—yes. If only because (let us except the up to now small number of videorecorders) there is no choice. But tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow?

Television, and this is obvious, cannot be regarded either in isolation from social development, especially in a time of the awakening of social consciousness, or from world progress. And for this reason to regard it "from within," situationally is possible only for particularly professional purposes. To what monopolism and isolation both in industry and agriculture, in management as well as in all spheres of our life, have led—of this we have already become sufficiently convinced.

But there is still another aspect about which it is not accepted in our country to speak at all. Why do we pay money, and by no means a little money, for newspapers and magazines? Why, when we approach to the ticket office of the movie theater do we reach for our purse? But television—we flick on the switch—a film, hockey, a play: All free! Meanwhile throughout the world, including also the socialist countries, the use of television, as a rule, requires payment, which, by the way, creates a different psychology of the relations between the creators of programs and their consumers.

But psychology is a special subject. Let us dwell on the material aspect. In many present-day societies, TV is the most profitable activity. The multi-million investments of the television studios make it possible for them to incur enormous production expenditures, to attract the flower of the creative potential, and to pay high royalties. And this considerable working capital is composed also of easily done subscription payments, receipts from advertisers, public organizations (including political parties and trade unions), independent patrons of the arts, etc. Television is indeed a really social phenomenon—for all and for everyone. And this cannot but signify mutuality in the relations of screen and viewer. And one-sidedness here is inappropriate and pernicious—both in rights and in obligations.

Mankind, for this reason, evidently, has developed a variety of forms and methods to implement such relations, forming diverse statuses of TV in various societies and countries. Beginning with private shareholder studio firms, their associations into networks, public or state systems—right up to made to order and "subscription" channels, similar to the press. In the world there are or almost have not remained hardened canons: A search is under way for the optimal systems for the society, but

there is also a struggle going on, sharp competition, in the center of which is the viewer, but, as a rule, profit remains the final goal. For example, the wise Japanese, who within a short time from students turned into legislators of progress, introducing in their country at first as an experiment for survival only a little at a time—both American and European models of TV, and thus retained them: And society, evidently, was satisfied with the diversity of the programs, and the profits, probably, were sufficient.

Competition, of course, is tough (and cruel) by its nature. But—and this is also a natural quality of it—it selects and strengthens the best, in any case, as long as it is in demand. Until recently it was thought that entertainment was and remains the main trump card in television competition. That it is precisely entertainment programs which are capable of collecting the most massive audience.

But here the improbable even for the experts from TV happened. When the American multi-millionaire Ted Turner conceived the idea of creating an independent channel of information television, what is more around-the-clock and "subscription-based", that is paid for by the viewers, there was no limit to the consternation. This plan, in the best case, was assessed as the whim of a very rich man.

But from year to year the audience of CNN grew like an avalanche. The program of an uninterrupted flow of news has gone beyond the boundaries of the United States, becoming transnational. And soon, perhaps, it will even become worldwide, signifying the basis of the very world vision about which we began to talk timidly already at the turn of the 1960's-1970's, calling if only on our research services to be prepared. This example also indicates the politicization of mass consciousness as a universal quality. Let us recall, for example, the interest, existing everywhere, in the television relay of the Congress of People's Deputies.

Thus, world civilization has already taken note of the transition to a new information era—from the forced one-sidedness of the monologue to dialogue communication and the satisfaction of individual needs, from national and state reserve—to worldwide communication. Such is historical necessity. And for us—I repeat again—this means the creation of a competitive TV of the USSR so inevitable in the infinite ethereal sea. It is obvious that this is possible only on the condition of the constant creative competitiveness of the program channels, where the financial aspect would play a definite—and not the last—role. And for the viewer—the creation of a situation of broad and free selection, the increasingly active and bold transformation of the audience from an "object of propaganda" into a subject of screen dialogue. Especially as some shoots of it are already forcing their way through to the light—both in the direct transmission of the pre-election debates (especially successful, it seems to me, on Leningrad TV) and in some headings of the program "Dobryy vecher, Moskva!", and still earlier—in

the discussions of L. Voznesensky. But all of these, it goes without saying, are only additions, tests what is more with archaic technical means. The future promises so much that is new and unexpected that only boldness and creative inventiveness would be sufficient.

In short, if we attempt to take into account all circumstances in the complex, in their interrelationship, I see such a sequence of transformations.

In the first stage, and without delay, to carry out an internal restructuring of the programs of Central Television—their substantial filling, orientation, and inter-program cooperation. Above all, it is necessary to create a new program conception. Indeed, the present one is a recurrence of the stagnation times, and precisely of the years 1970-1972. And having acknowledged that TV is a national [obshchenarodnyy] phenomenon, it would be reasonable to discuss competitive projects, variants of such conceptions in the pages of the press, on radio and television.

Then, in the second stage, the courage will be found for the de-monopolization of Central Television. In the beginning through the creation of creatively and financially independent program channels with independent managements and an artistic governing body. I remember that under the pressure of the public TV France took such a step already at the beginning of the 1970's: The state monopoly of ORTF [Organization for Radio Broadcasting and Television of France] was divided into such independent program organizations.

In the last and third stage, the origin of the parallel, paid programs, independent from the state (and perhaps, channels as well) of public TV. Let us say, the AUCCTU will become the "publisher" of one channel or multi-hour program block, the Union of Journalists—of another, the Children's Fund—of a third, etc., etc. Only on one condition—no common briefings and instructions common for all from above. You see, LIT[ERATURNAYA] GAZETA and LESNAYA PROMY-SHLENNOST are not preparing for a common briefing. I repeat: Absolute creative independence of parallel program blocks—but in the beginning, taking into account our technical poverty—on the material base of State Television.

The Creation of Competitive Television in the USSR Is Possible Only on the Condition of Constant Creative Competitiveness

Finally, in the fourth stage, but possibly sooner, the necessity arises of creating foreign television broadcasts—programs about the diverse life of our country for foreign audiences.

In general, the situation, both in our country and in the world, is such that to lean on the existing TV that we now have is the same as not to have another perspective on agriculture than the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system. We will not stop the progress of human thought. And it will be

sufficient, most likely, to trail along. It will be sufficient pluck at the head and catch up, catch up, catch up. . . .

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NIKA TV Chief Lutsenko Explains Plans

90US0481C Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 1,
Jan 90 pp 19-20

[Interview with N. Lutsenko, candidate of history, director of NIKA TV, by ZHURNALIST correspondent R. Zaynetdinov: "Competitor?"; date and place not specified; first two paragraphs are ZHURNALIST introduction]

[Text] At the end of the past year, ZHURNALIST (No 11) published the polemical articles of B. Olenin "Alternative TV?" and R. Boretskiy "And the Japanese Are Satisfied..." In them, the authors set forth different conceptions of the reorganization of the now existing structure of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio, and expressed their points of view on the possibility of the creation of alternative, or public, television. We continue the discussion of this problem.

Not long ago, reports appeared in the press about the impending airing of programs of the public television company NIKA TV. Our correspondent met with its director, candidate of history, Nikolay Lutsenko.

[Correspondent] When did the idea of the creation of a system of public television arise?

[Answer] In real earnest I approached this idea in the last 2 years of my work in the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio when I was teaching in the All-Union Institute for the Improvement of Qualifications of Workers in Television and Radio Broadcasting. My personal dissatisfaction with television was superimposed on what I heard from local journalists. One day in May 1988, when I was directing studies in a group of editors of youth broadcasting, I expressed to them the idea of the creation of public TV. Soon a group of lads with initiative was selected, who began to make the rounds to all the authorities and to punch through our idea. It took approximately a year for us to attain the registration of the television association NIKA TV (independent information channel of television) as a juridical person. In October 1988 this happened. Since that time we exist with our own bank account, a seal and other attributes needed by an independent organization.

[Correspondent] What is your conception of alternative television?

[Answer] There exists the view that alternative TV is sex at night and Solzhenitsyn and Yeltsin during the day. Nothing of the sort. . . . We are planning religious and ecological broadcasts, we are planning to introduce a permanent series of programs with the up to now conditional name "Parlamentskaya demokratiya" [Parliamentary Democracy] (we have already conducted surveys in

the American Congress). Another series of broadcasts will illuminate the work of the new Soviets of People's Deputies. We intend to run the subject "Charity and Social Protection" on a constant basis. We are planning to make the air waves available to different informal associations. In order for public TV to become what we conceived it to be, it must be the mouthpiece of the interests of the public. I see the following division: State television in the person of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio concerns itself with global questions and serves as the mouthpiece of official propaganda, and all groups of the public find in the person of public TV the mouthpiece of their interests.

[Correspondent] How independent will your television company be economically and politically?

[Answer] There are no completely independent television companies in the world. But the degree of independence can be different. If you submit to one person or one structure, you are fully dependent. If you depend on several (and the meaning of public television is precisely that there exists a council of founders and sponsors), you can be "pressed" only on the basis of a consensus.

[Correspondent] Is the following situation possible, in your view: You put out information on the air waves which differs from the official opinion of the government or the party circles, and this is followed by punitive sanctions?

[Answer] Punctive sanctions are possible only for anti-constitutional statements, but this does not enter into our plans. But, of course, not excluded are conflicts with individual bureaucrats, I would say, of an ideological character.

[Correspondent] What will the television company undertake in such cases?

[Answer] And what should it undertake? Such conflicts are the natural reaction of the bureaucracy, this is what is called "part of the game," and we are ready for this. NIKA TV must have the right to express an opinion, even if it differs in something from the official view, this right is embedded in the principle of the activity of our television company.

[Correspondent] But will the end result not be that subsequently NIKA TV will be forced to propagate the official point of view, even if it disagrees with the interests of the people?

[Answer] What does official point of view mean? This is the point of view of the government. The government has the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio. The public will also have NIKA TV. Thus we will arrive at a real pluralism of opinions. You see, previously we thought: If some kind of opinion was expressed in the newspaper or expressed on radio or television, then this is the opinion of the Kremlin. And in the West they also perceived it this way because they very well

understood that no material of any kind appears in the press or in the air without a multitude of official stamps.

[Correspondent] What could you already today put on the air?

[Answer] We filmed the trial of Churbanov, we are now preparing a film based on these materials jointly with the Central Studio for Documentary Films. They filmed something in Lithuania through our Lithuanian office. In November "Muzykalnyy ring" [Musical Ring] was aired, which was prepared by staff members of the Leningrad Branch of NIKA TV, jointly with Leningrad Television. There are some other works, but for the time being we are not putting them on the screen because this will be a one-time shot, but we have to get ready for daily work. Even if we would receive constant access to the air waves, for the time being there is nothing realistically with which to fill it. A great deal of organizational and technical work still needs to be done before we can go on the air on a regular basis. This will take some time, but such work is necessary, and in the future it will pay off.

[Correspondent] Through what channels are you planning to bring information to the viewer?

[Answer] This will, without a doubt, be television transmitted through the air [efirnoye], free of charge, as well as state television. But along with it, there will be cable TV, its possibilities are much broader: From the showing of films to the discussion of acute social questions, the creation and showing of entertainment programs. Possible is the variant that the State Committee for Television and Radio will begin to make available time on the night-time air waves to us, 2 hours or so would be sufficient for the beginning. We are conducting negotiations with the State Committee for Television and Radio.

[Correspondent] How do you intend to go on the air, not having your own broadcasting base?

[Answer] The State Committee for Television and Radio, too, does not have its own broadcasting base, it leases it from the Ministry of Communications. We could lease a satellite already now, but we are thinking about a satellite of our own, this is our strategic task. A number of departments have satellites which they do not need very much. By mutual agreement, they could transfer them from balance-sheet to balance-sheet. Incidentally, the American CNN Television Company has offered us free access to the air waves on its channels. This is practically the worldwide ether, but it would be vexing to broadcast to the entire world, in so doing depriving our own audience of its own share.

The main problem now does not lie in this. What we need is production. What we need is a film and montage base.

[Correspondent] And what is it now?

[Answer] We have an arrangement about the purchase of equipment, there are sponsors who are prepared to

provide money, but until we have purchased equipment have conducted only preliminary negotiations. The equipment we have used up to now was leased from a number of studios and other organizations.

[Correspondent] Your sponsors—these are Soviet or foreign organizations?

[Answer] Mainly they are Soviet [organizations], although foreign sponsorship is not excluded. Recently I spent 6 weeks in the United States, and many were actively interested in our project. In particular, we signed an agreement on the creation of a joint enterprise with the Mercury Films firm, whose goal it is to acquaint the Soviet audience with the best samples of American cinema. Moreover, the firm agreed to accept its share of profit in rubles. At present we have already concluded a contract according to which "Mercury Films" will supply 5,000 films to us. It will purchase the copyrights for them and turn over these films for our use. We are planning our base structure as a non-commercial one. Further, in proportion to what capital-forming links will appear in our enterprise.

[Correspondent] And more concretely?

[Answer] The same cable television—already a commercial enterprise. At the expense of subscription payment. Or the hire of advertising, the organization of shows, concerts, in general everything that will make money.

[Correspondent] Incidentally, at the expense of what funds was your starting capital formed?

[Answer] We earned the money ourselves, in part we received help from the Evrika Center for Scientific-Technical Creative Work of Young People, which assisted us with the registration. We carried out an order of the Association of Young Enterprise Managers, filmed their founding conference, and, moreover, we opened, within the framework of NIKA TV, an office for the organization of concert activity.

[Correspondent] You made mention of a Lithuanian office. Will NIKA TV have branches throughout the country?

[Answer] Yes, we have branches in Alma-Ata, Leningrad, Dnepropetrovsk, and Perm. At present the legal registration of another 15 branches is in preparation.

[Correspondent] And the last question, which interests readers most of all: When will you go on the air?

[Answer] We are expecting that this will be during the current year.

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Competition Seen as Impetus for State TV Improvement

90US0481D Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 1, Jan 90 pp 20-22

[Article by Vladimir Ostrogorskiy: "The Air Waves and the Department"]

[Text] For every sphere of material and spiritual activity in our country there exists its own ministry. Only for newspapers and magazines there is no ministry. During past times there repeatedly arose rumors to the effect that this annoying defect in the well-proportioned building of the administrative hierarchy will be filled and the press will receive its place under its roof, alongside or even together with air wave broadcasting. The opposite variant, which would envisage the release of TV and radio from departmental tutelage, was not discussed in editorial smoking-rooms.

Meanwhile it is worthwhile to remember that regular broadcasting, which arose in our country in 1924, during the first years was conducted by the Radiopredacha Joint-Stock Company, as well as trade unions and other public organizations. This was not an accidental oversight of the authorities, but a reflection of Leninist conception of the role of radio in the life of the country. If a "newspaper without paper and without distances", then why put it under departmental control, of which the press is free? If a "meeting of the millions," then why enclose it with a departmental palisade? The extra-departmental existence of our radio was inscribed into the spiritual life of the country of those years, much more free and pluralistic than during the subsequent times. During the mid-1920's, our radio broadcasting was considered almost the most courageous and avantguard in Europe. Peculiar to it was the aspiration to broadest possible reflection of life, experimentation, and the search for its specific character. They put it in the same rank with our revolutionary cinema.

However, this period in the history of radio in our country did not continue for long. Already at the end of the first decade of its existence, the entire activity on the air waves was monopolized by the All-Union Committee for Radio Installation and Radio Broadcasting. The lively work turned out to be laced into the departmental corset.

The bureaucracy put a low value on the natural qualities of radio—omnipresence, effectiveness, and emotionality. Its capability for instant and uncontrolled circulation of speech aroused the bureaucracy's suspiciousness. A harmful newspaper or book can be removed even after its appearance, a film can be banished from rental, and play can be removed from the repertoire. But the word in the air is truly not a sparrow—once it has fluttered out, you don't retrieve it. For this reason, it was incumbent to construct an especially reliable cage.

The 1930's are marked in the history of radio by a multitude of public and secret prohibitions. It was permitted to transmit important information on the air only after the newspapers. Lively and unfixed speech was expelled from the air. Information, commentaries, reporting, talks, and even discussions—only according to text, according to paper. It was precisely at that time that the aphorism arose: "First get the stamp of approval, and then improvise." What is more, a stilted and pompous style of reading at the microphone struck root. The "newspaper without paper" increasingly became reminiscent of the newspaper on paper, only it was a little worse, a bit more clumsy, second-rate, as it were, by comparison with the big press. This status was also acquired by TV, which appeared after the war, at least by the journalism on TV, which, in contrast, let us say, to the sports broadcasts, did not attract the favorable attention of high-rank television viewers.

In the West, broadcasting developed in the opposite direction. To say nothing of the United States, where the activity in the air from the outset was built on a commercial basis, the administrative regulation of radio broadcasting, and then television as well, gradually also came to naught in Western Europe. After new technology made it possible to offer the audience a choice of several dozens of programs simultaneously, the air waves in the West came to remind one of a newspaper stand, covered with countless printed publications in colorful covers. On the radio and on the TV channels, broadcasts for every taste and of all possible genres are run. In the latest issue of the West German weekly [radio and TV] guide, HOER ZU, for one Saturday alone, the television viewer is offered an assortment of 15 fiction films. We have a long way to go to get to this point. But the very fact of the stormy development of TV and radio in the West after the abolition of state (in France) or semi-state (in the FRG) monopoly in the air deserves attention.

For the sake of fairness I will note: The broadcasts of our TV and radio have also greatly changed in recent times. On the air, the lively word, the bold idea, and the truthful presentation are being strengthened. There has been an rise in the intellectual level of the broadcasts, which previously was deliberately calculated, above all, in the expression of one of the former bosses of the State Committee for Television and Radio, only "for aunt Masha."

And nevertheless, the question of the extent to which the departmental form of existence of our television and radio organizations meet the needs of present-day society is becoming increasingly acute on the agenda. Why do the large and even the not very large public organizations in our country have their printed organs, newspapers, or journals, but do not have direct access to the air? How legitimate is this situation? How justified is the existence of a union-republic ministry which monopolizes the air, which is what the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio is? Why must the ministry be the final authority deciding what television and radio broadcasts should be, the ministry which possesses,

perhaps, enormous administrative talent, but by no means always becomes famous through its acts in the social, scientific, literary or other field of spiritual life?

Along with a multitude of other inconveniences, such a situation, as it were, excludes the air from a genuine and full-scale pluralism of opinions. For it is completely natural that a top-level official manages his department in accordance with his own political and aesthetic views, giving scope to what is consonant with these views, and holding back at the threshold what is not consonant. Incidentally, is this not why A. Bovin, E. Ryazanov, and some other journalists and artists, who are well known through their appearances on other channels of communication and who enjoy enormous popularity among television viewers, have been excommunicated from our broadcasting for more or less long periods of time?

True, in the resolution on glasnost, adopted by the 19th Party Conference it is stated that "the points of view of all sides to a controversy should be reflected in the mass media impartially and without distortions." But is it realistic to demand the fulfillment of this precept of every editor? It is important for "the points of view of all sides to a controversy" to be "without distortions" represented in our press as a whole, but an individual organ of it can hardly be reproached on the grounds that one of another point of view is closer to it than others. If every newspaper of ours and every journal, with equal assiduity or indifference reproduces the whole spectrum of opinions existing in society, the press will prove to be unified.

It is worthwhile to remember these common truths in order to show the difficult position of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio. Its management, even if it very much wanted to do so, could not secure pluralism in the air, even if only on the level already attained by our press. Attained precisely for the reason that we do not have a ministry of the press, like there is a ministry of TV and radio.

The monopoly of the department in the air, in its own way justified during the times when one and the same immutable truths were proclaimed, have run into contradiction with the new role of the mass media in our society. This monopoly is irreconcilable with genuine freedom of discussion, with glasnost uncurtailed on the basis of bureaucratic considerations, with the competitiveness of various conceptions of socialist policy and ethical ideals.

A number of variants for overcoming the departmental monopolism in our air are being discussed. B. Olenin, for example, in the article "Alternative TV?" (ZHURNALIST, No 11, 1989), in trying to persuade readers that "television can and must be pluralistic within its own unified... structure," proposes, as it were, to break it up. According to this model, there should exist self-dependent television and radio channels, which are independent of one another. Let them compete among

themselves. But the State Committee for Television and Television should remain the common boss for all.

This competition would be strange. It is normal when several teams take part in the races at a racecourse. But a test in strength and speed between racers harnessed to one vehicle is difficult to imagine.

Another variant, which proposes not the breaking up of the block, but its circumvention, was shared in a press interview by the director of the All-Union NIKA TV Creative Production Association, N. Lutsenko. Considering that "the monopolism of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio, its complex and cumbersome organizational structure, and its backward technical base do not make it possible to react effectively and flexibly to the changes taking place in the world and in our society," he and the people who share his views decided "to create a television company independent of the State Committee for Television and Radio under the aegis of public organizations, a company which is autonomous in material and technical respect." The same idea was continued by N. Lutsenko in an interview with the correspondent of the journal ZHURNALIST, R. Zaynedinov: "I see the following division: State TV in the person of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio takes up global questions and serves as the mouthpiece of official propaganda, and all groups of the public find in the person of public TV the mouthpiece of their interests." An intention worthy of respect, but why should departmental structure of our TV and radio, which developed during the past decades and which in many respects is already archaic, remain inviolable? However backward the technology of the State Committee for Television and Radio by comparison with the world level, a comparable technical potential will hardly appear in NIKA TV or any other alternative television company by the beginning of the third millennium of our era. What is more, the journalistic collective in the State Committee for Radio and Television is powerful, although it was formed, as N. Lutsenko said, during the period of stagnation. Is it reasonable to leave all this potential under the authority of the department in the future? These are not tables and chairs with unnameable plates. Not the property of the State Committee for Television and Radio.

For the time being, the departmental monopolism is holding back the development even of those reserves which are within easy reach. For example, the development of the ultra-shortwave radio broadcasting range. In any European country, not to mention the United States and Canada, dozens of radio stations are operating on FM. Some broadcast only news and advertising, others—music and advertising, still others discuss with their audience political, ecological, or religious subjects. . . . The comparatively low cost of broadcasting on FM and the enormous capacity of the FM range make it possible to obtain a place in the chorus of other "voices" not only for businessmen, but also for citizen initiatives, speaking in terms of our situation, for informal associations,

which is conducive to the democratization of society and the development of glasnost.

In our country, the FM-range is practically empty. But why not examine the possibility of a directly outlet to the air on FM of trade union and Komsomol organizations, creative unions, and large informal associations? As a supplement to the existing printed publications? Incidentally, in the United States and in the West European countries, FM radio stations frequently exist precisely in conjunction with the editorial boards of newspapers and periodicals. What contribution to the public and artistic life of our country, and what increase of pluralism the use of this experience in our country would turn into!

However, pluralism has increased today in our domestic ether. Of late, dozens of foreign radio voices are being received without interference. The repudiation of jamming, which corresponds to the demands of the new thinking, has opened up for the Soviet audience free access to the sources not simply of different, but alternative information about events in the world.

But that is not the only point. The broadcasts of foreign radio voices reflect the high level of Western broadcasting as a whole, which has developed not in the hothouse conditions of departmental monopoly in the air, like ours, but in a sharp competitive struggle. In this struggle, in the West, as is well known, he is victorious who relates what is happening more quickly, more accurately, and in a more interesting manner, comes up with more convincing and original commentary, and who attracts to the microphone brilliant people. You do not succeed here by playing it safe, by demonstrating your readiness to carry out instructions "from above" unquestioningly.

In our press, and especially on TV and on radio, it seems to me, the pretense is made that nothing special has happened. Alas, this is not so! The repudiation of jamming has changed the information situation in the country. That which our sources pass over in silence or do not express fully now instantly comes from the West. And those who listen to the "voices" frequently prove to be in an advantageous position compared to the audience which remains loyal to domestic sources.

For the time being, it is only the "voices" from the outside which are undermining the departmental monopoly in the air. But on the horizon a new invasion army is already forming, about which Professor R. Boretskiy has frequently warned in the pages of ZHURNALIST (ZHURNALIST, No 5, 1988, No 11, 1989). Direct television broadcasting from space, which does not require support points in the West, has covered Western and touched the edge of Eastern Europe. No one can predict confidently whether Western direct television will occupy the kind of place on our television screen which the "voices" occupied on the dial of our radio receivers. But it is necessary to make preparations for the most difficult variant. And this, in particular, means that we should seriously think about the fate of

the departmental monopoly in the air, which prevents television and radio from rising to the level of the demands of the time.

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NIKA TV Plans Central Asian Regional Bureau in Tashkent

Director Explains Goals

90US0442 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
8 Dec 89 p 4

[Report on interview with O.Ye. Volovik, director of representative bureau, by A. Bezverkhov, UzTAG correspondent: "'Second' TV in Uzbekistan"; date and place not given]

[Text] "NIKA TV means a new information television channel," O.Ye. Volovik uncodes the abbreviation. "But we do not intend to compete with Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of the USSR Council of Ministers]; rather, to cooperate and supplement it."

The demand for current, meaningful, socially acute, and simply interesting and unconventional materials is growing.

The television company NIKA TV was born under these conditions. It was established by a number of public organizations. The Association for Parliamentary Democracy, the USSR Union of Cinematographers, the All-Union Znaniye Society, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, its organ, the Novosti Press Agency, the editorial staff of the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI newspaper, and the Ecological Union of Associations and Enterprises are among its founders... Many USSR people's deputies have also manifested their interest in the new television company. Representatives of our republic are also among them. They actively support the idea of establishing a public television channel. The Uzbek Republic Department of the Soviet Mercy and Health Fund, other public organizations, and some of Uzbekistan's industrial enterprises also assist in this enterprise.

"Our representative bureau was established as an office of correspondents of the NIKA TV Company. Its task is to prepare materials on events in and history of the region for showing in the country and abroad," O. Ye. Volovik says. "Nevertheless, we set the organization of a public television channel in the republic as our main task. We want to offer it to USSR and Uzbek SSR people's deputies so that they might reach a wide audience. Here we count on the help of the republic's government, workers of the Ministry of Communications, and, of course, the people's deputies themselves. Then it will also be possible to realize another very important task of the representative bureau—release of television programs of the national cultural centers that

are being opened. Such broadcasts will be in the languages of the people living in the region. The third most important direction: assistance for a calm and weighed resolution of ecological problems."

It should be stressed that the representative bureau in Tashkent is precisely a regional, not republic, office. The zone of its correspondents also includes "proximal border" oblasts of neighboring republics: Leninabad, Osh, Chardzhou, and Chimkent. This is determined by the fact that dozens of ties—family, friendship, and business—connect their inhabitants with those of Uzbekistan. Consequently, it is necessary to strengthen and enrich them. Plans are also made to establish offices of correspondents in the centers of these oblasts.

Today, however, television must not be limited to ether alone. It should also include video films, educational programs, and advertisement. The NIKA TV Company also intends to use all this. The first orders have already been received from industrial enterprises for the development of video materials on technological processes and on new equipment. A number of educational institutions request that a film on drug abuse be made.

The journalists of the representative bureau have been on missions and are already preparing programs on the history of Central Asian nations.

Cable television opens up the widest prospects in the saturation with information. The representative bureau believes that currently existing channels in hotels, residential complexes, and so forth cannot meet present demands. They are limited technically and often are uncontrolled ideologically.

"We offer a fundamentally new approach," the director of the regional representative bureau continues. "It is a matter of establishing a multifunctional cable television network in the region. By means of it subscribers will be able to obtain different reference information, to order airplane tickets, and in emergency to summon, for example, a physician or the militia. And, to be sure, to watch informative, musical, and motion picture programs. We should begin with remote rural regions in the zone of unreliable reception of a television signal. Settlement inhabitants will hear the news and receive broadcasts especially formed for them. We intend to assign part of the profit from the operation of these channels for the social development of rural areas."

This work has begun. Workers at the representative bureau are already planning a cable broadcasting system for the residential microrayon of the Shakhrisabz Silk-Winding Factory, but with due regard for the subsequent expansion throughout the city and settlements adjoining it.

The development of educational programs is another direction. Video equipment has now appeared in many higher educational institutions, *tekhnikums*, and schools. But the films needed are very few. NIKA TV is going to make them quickly and relatively inexpensively.

Incidentally, a method of obtaining foreign currency has also been devised. What kind is it? For now it is a commercial secret. However, a "trial balloon" has already been launched. One of the publishing houses in the United States has agreed to spend several tens of thousands of dollars on an advertisement proposed by the NIKA TV Company in a number of countries. Money is not thrown there for nothing...

"However, all this is not the chief thing in our plans," O.Ye. Volovik shares his views. "NIKA TV is conceived as a noncommercial public enterprise. We do not chase after superprofits. However, nor do we have to count on someone's help either. After all, we need equipment for shooting and editing, other equipment, and transport. And so, from the first day we are working on cost-accounting and self-financing principles. This applies both to the entire television company and to our representative bureau. It is independent in all respects—legal, financial, and creative. We are searching for ways of earning money and, at the same time, for new topics, interesting people, and business proposals."

And so, if you have an idea, the representative bureau is waiting for you. In Tashkent it is located not far from the Khamid Alimdzhan subway station: 1-y Ulyanovskiy Pereulok [Lane], house No 3. The new public television channel is developing the first programs.

Financing, Purposes Questioned

90US0442 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
12 Dec 89 p 4

[Report on interview with Naim Yavkachevich Gaibov, chairman of Uzbek SSR Gosteleradio, by Ye. Yefimov, UzTAG commentator: "This Thoughtless NIKA"]

[Text] There are various reactions to published matter. People agree or do not agree with the press, take steps, or enter into polemics. But the following has not yet happened... Khalima Melikuziyevna Usmanova, chairman of the executive committee of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet, telephoned UzTAG:

"Thank you! I finally found the address of our partners."

The reference was to the article "Second TV in Uzbekistan" (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 8 December), which appeared the day before in Tashkent newspapers. The address of the local representative bureau of the NIKA TV Association—1-y Ulyanovskiy pereulok, house No 3—was given in the last paragraph. But workers of the rayon executive committee searched in vain for their partners according to the address announced by them—4 Navoi Street.

NIKA TV (which means "New Information Television Channel") did not simply move to another rayon. As a matter of fact, having first registered itself, it parted with its partner—the rayon executive committee. Yes, this also happens in life. Registration was probably the main

reason for the appearance of the representative bureau in Oktyabrskiy Rayon. No one else agreed to make contact with NIKA any longer.

With what did it charm the workers of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Executive Committee? As usual, with promises. A total of 35 percent of the income will go to the rayon budget! The Oktyabrskiy Department of Zhilsotsbank [the Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development] was supposed to perform this operation. However, NIKA did not open an account in the rayon department. It preferred the Operations Administration of the Tashkent Oblast Administration of Zhilsotsbank. And now the rayon executive committee does not know: Did NIKA have income?

It also promised to build cable television in the Kalininskiy residential block and to organize training in the fundamentals of information science for schoolchildren. But it did not build and did not organize...

Moreover, the representative bureau interprets the very act of registration in its own way. The decision of the rayon executive committee to exclude from this document the points on international actions and publishing functions of the Tashkent representative bureau was not taken into account. It sensibly considered that these aspects of activity exceeded the competence of the rayon soviet.

It is appropriate to reflect on who, in general, must examine the organization program, which is to operate in a vast region including the territory of Uzbekistan and adjacent oblasts of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Tajikistan? Should there be no concern for their interests?

We received one of the answers directly in the "first television." Naim Yavkachevich Gaibov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Gosteleradio, discussed its real actions and plans.

[Gaibov] The republic's inhabitants view four programs—central and republic ones. The programs of the Dushanbe, Frunze, and Alma-Ata television centers are broadcast regularly. Moreover, the capital of Karakalpakiya and Urgench send out their own broadcasts. Every year they become more accessible to the widest audience. For example, 97.1 percent of Uzbekistan's population views the first central program and 96.1 percent, the first republic program.

[Correspondent] You mention tenths of a percent...

[Gaibov] It is especially difficult for us to get these last fractions. At times we have to lay a relay line through a desert, or to place a retransmitter on a mountain ridge so that a shepherd on a distant pasture might see a "picture" from Moscow and Tashkent and so that a television signal might reach a settlement hidden by a mountain range.

However, we follow the principle: Every citizen has the right to information! The state does not spare money on this. I am glad to report that during the next five-year

period 99.9 percent of Uzbekistan's population will be in the zone of reliable reception of the first programs by central and republic television. The coverage of Karakalpakiya's population by the Nukus Television Center will increase from 73.2 to 98.2 percent.

Radio broadcasting is developing similarly and not only territorially, but also qualitatively.

[Correspondent] Obviously, it is a matter of the number of programs and of their content?

[Gaibov] Of course, we strive to meet the most varied interests. This is precisely how broadcasts on political, economic, and cultural topics are prepared... Here, however, I would like to stress especially the concern for meeting the interests of all nationalities living in Uzbekistan. Along with broadcasts in the state language—Uzbek—and in the language of interethnic communication—Russian—the Kazakh broadcast "Zamandas" and the Tajik broadcast "Ranginkamon" go on the air regularly. Tatar, Crimean-Tatar, Turkish, Uighur, Korean, and German speech and music are heard on the Tashkent wave. Add to this the exchange of broadcasts with neighboring republics.

Next year our new editorial staff—"Druzhba" [Friendship]—will address viewers and listeners in their native tongues. Our plans are to maximally meet the needs of all nationalities living in Uzbekistan. This is the tradition and it will be strengthened. We have concrete plans for cooperation with all national cultural centers.

The further expansion in the sphere of reliable reception of television broadcasts and improvement in their quality will be attained in connection with the improvement in means of communication. Multiprogram cable television will increasingly become a fact of life and a satellite, which will undertake an exchange of broadcasts from fraternal republics, will appear on the sky of Central Asia. In connection with this I would like to mention another creative innovation: An editorial staff entrusted with the preparation of programs on Uzbekistan's life for Central Television has already been formed.

[Correspondent] These are "programs for all." However, how will our television and radio be able to meet the needs of individual population groups and, perhaps, even personal wishes?

[Gaibov] We are expanding the output of video films—for education, information, and entertainment. Gosteleradio has at its disposal extensive motion picture techniques and thousands of kilometers of literary and musical tapes. All this becomes common property. And if needed, any video film, including for advertisement, which is ordered by organizations, enterprises, and educational institutions, can be developed. It is also possible to order a "family film"—about a wedding, meeting of friends, and travel.

[Correspondent] Naim Yavkachevich, I listen to you and, involuntarily, I compare this story with the promises of the "second" television. In practice, the "first television" overlaps all of them.

[Gaibov] Yes, we have a big collective, have at our disposal powerful technical facilities, and carefully study the population's demands. And the chief thing, we have the desire and willingness to serve the people in a fitting manner. However, if someone wants to do all this better, more efficiently, and more cheaply than we, we are ready to compete. The chief thing is not to put commerciality in the forefront and to manifest genuine respect for the audience, which we are called upon to serve.

And so, what can the "second" television add to these real actions and plans? Is it now no more appropriate for enterprising people to turn to spheres, where a "vacuum" has really appeared? Incidentally, in the heading of our article about NIKA TV there was a question mark after the words "'Second' TV in Uzbekistan."

Officials Discuss Politics, Controversies Surrounding Leningrad TV

90US0460 *Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 9 Jan 90 p 3

[Dialogue between Yuriy Viktorovich Serov, secretary, Leningrad party committee for television and radio and O.K. Rudnov, instructor, Leningrad CPSU gorkom Ideological Department: "On the Other Side of the Screen"; time, place not given]

[Text] "Leave our television alone; thanks to it we are learning the truth."

"For how long is the TV screen going to remain a distorted mirror of our life?" (From the discussion)

Foreword to the dialogue

It is a little hard for our television viewer. From show to show they say that we have nothing, for example, no foodstuffs; the store shelves are empty. Journalists are in no hurry to visit the sovkhos farm or peasant farmstead where these products are "made," and to understand what the snag is there.

It is also a little tense for us with morality. And those who appear on television are somehow silent about where to look for it, at least where the people who for the time being are not going to church should look.

You cannot particularly envy the trusting viewers. Today one declares—let's strike! The people are in a commotion! Tomorrow, someone else says, retreat, well, they were a little hasty. Or suddenly they report that a serious department has its secret places not only abroad, but in the boxes at the Kirov Theater, and no one is allowed there. And tomorrow they will seem to flip-flop again—there were never any secret places in theaters. One says "up" and the other says "down." Like in the

Russian saying, "every man has his own truth." Whom to believe; where is the truth?

The screen is almost solidly big politics. Even the music editors and the newborn "Lira" have not resisted the temptation to have their say about the current situation. For example, in the "Pop-antenna" program, instead of bread they laugh at the utterances of people's deputies; they have there reporting from meat counters, naturally, with a slight political taint. If they sing, they do it somewhere in a psychiatric hospital or in garbage cans, also with a subtext. To be sure, "Pop-antenna" somehow betrayed me—for one newspaper article, true, I turned up in the general company of people's deputies, and that, of course, was pleasant. A pity that there is so little good music on such a show, especially the music of Leningrad composers. But apparently, music is not what it is about.

So what is our Leningrad television today.

In our newspaper today, O.K. Rudnov, an instructor of the Leningrad CPSU gorkom Ideological Department attempts to answer that complex question, so long worked on by the Committee for Television and Radio.

And how do the Leningrad workers themselves evaluate the situation? What forces are operating on the other side of the screen, that is, in the creative collective of the studio?

With these questions I came to the partkom of the Leningrad committee for television and radio. Its secretary, Yuriy Viktorovich Serov. Two educations in the humanities, 10 years in the party, a quarter-century in television, director, chief director of musical editing, a year ago, selected deputy secretary and for about 2 months heading a party organization numbering over 400 communists. Characteristically, in leading editorial collectives practically all the journalism personnel are CPSU members. These are the basic circumstances in the conversation which took place.

[Rudnov] The first question on the event which attracted the attention of many television viewers. Recently in the program of the creative center "Lira" dedicated to A.M. Kashpirovskiy, quite unexpected by anyone there rang out the acknowledgement that in that very same television, in the bowels of its collective, an acute political struggle is taking place between editorial boards.

[Serov] In the given case, the viewers were deluded by an incorrect announcement by those conducting this program. They were not speaking of a political struggle. This is normal, when different editorial boards are highlighting various events from different sides. Competitiveness, professional rivalry, the fight for the viewer, the radio audience, at times even a chase for sensational material exist, as they do in all mass information media. And the splashes of individual associates which create a hullabaloo in the viewing atmosphere were condemned within the collective.

[Rudnov] Although, in my opinion, "Lira" is not alone here. This is not the first case of such caustic remarks among editorial boards. One frequently hears the assertion that the television and radio existing in the oblast and city soviets of people's deputies are public and express the interests of all strata of society.

Yet will it be correct to reckon that in this way, the entire spectrum of citizens' sociopolitical, social, and cultural-esthetic requirements are taken into consideration in the broadcasting?

[Serov] There exists an analysis of public opinion based upon the letters which come to the committee; special sociological polls are conducted, and finally, a direct link with the viewers and listeners by telephone contact during the programs and after them. A multitude of voices in broadcasting is also provided by the various positions of journalists, who represent a reflection of the entire cross section of society. Let us say, we have working here active representatives of the People's Front. Here, we can give their personal non-conformism its due, although their stamped epithets, which they paste on their opponents, and their overall positions do not enjoy support within the collective. They tried to create a People's Front cell here, but they were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, they have the opportunity to carry their views to the TV screen.

[Rudnov] Today, it is hardly possible to call leftist-radical positions non-conformism, especially in the press. More likely, the opposite, but all the same we get a picture of who holds what views, and what organization he belongs to; he confesses those positions on the air. And if you had working there representatives of "Pamyat" or the "Democratic Union," would they have air time as well?

[Serov] That is impossible, since here opposition within the collective would be in effect. But in general, it can be agreed that there is not yet a precise mechanism for the interaction of the audience, publication, and individual journalists.

Essentially, we force the viewer to watch something that troubles the programs' creators themselves. After all, the television is not a book; you cannot put it down and pick up another, you can only turn it off. The monopoly of many authors is obvious. We are attempting to influence the editorial boards; this was one of the main reasons for creating the "Lira" association; it must take upon itself the function of relaxing, switching over the the viewer, restoring his emotional strength. There used to be in the committee a special editorial board to entertainment programs. Especially in the evening hours, creating stressful situations on the screen, the flaring of passions causes dissatisfaction among many Leningraders. The party committee is trying to change the situation; the critical edge of our editorial meetings has obviously intensified.

We feel that our primary organizations of the USSR Journalists' Union are not working actively enough; we

obviously do not have enough real creative discussion and professional contact. It seems to me that the level and artistic quality of broadcasting must not be matters of indifference to other creative unions.

[Rudnov] "Live programs," that is, programs immediately broadcast on the air, have become a daily phenomenon on both radio and television. This, of course, is a demand of the times, and evidence of the growing mastery of journalists, directors, and technicians. Yet the impression is being formed that the range of broadcast genres has been narrowed—it is limited primarily to interviews and discussions. There are few analytical shows steeped in the problems of the economy and social life. We do not see or hear programs about the processes in party and other public organizations, in labor collectives. After all, dramas worthy of journalistic investigation do not occur here only on the square at the SKK [union control commission].

To be brief, the impression is being formed that attention toward the average person, not a homeless person, not someone whose rights have been infringed, but toward the person about whom nothing is distinctive at first glance, is weakening. How is it going to be in this situation?

[Serov] In television in the near future, we will conduct a business game aimed at the creation of long-term concepts of broadcasting. Everything is ready for this; scholars have been involved. In general, we consider the work of the party organization directed toward the long term to be very important. We are developing comprehensive programs "Cadres," "Structure," "Rating," "Glasnost," and others basically defining our activity.

We feel it necessary to take the path of this same alternative system. It is necessary to create the opportunity for choice both among authors, and of ideas for new cycles, and individual screenplays. This is very complicated, but only under these conditions can competitiveness be developed and the broadcast quality raised.

[Rudnov] Recently, one of the Baltic newspapers published under the rubric "Through the Eyes of the West" an article from the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE devoted to the work of Leningrad television, in particular, the "Fifth Wheel." It quotes the following utterances of V. Pravdyuk, deputy editor in chief: "...Marxism-Leninism proved to be an absolute zero, and we are now seeking different orientation points to help us think and live." I also recall one of the programs of this same journalist in which his interlocutor expresses such opinions about Lenin as could only too mildly be called dishonest. And this elicits no reaction from our journalist in response.

[Serov] I did not read the article, and I did not see the program, although it is asserted that V. Pravdyuk's words were conveyed inaccurately.

[Rudnov] So it turns out that the foreign journalist did him a bad turn?

[Serov] Overall, V. Pravdyuk is the deputy secretary of the television party ideological bureau. In any event, such things must be evaluated from the party viewpoint. There is a party Program and Charter, which you either recognize and fulfill, and then you are a CPSU member, or you do not recognize them, and you are a member of another organization or another party. And it is particularly important for journalists to define themselves in their positions.

[Rudnov] And how do you assess the interrelations with the superior party organs?

[Serov] These relations obviously do not suit us today, nor do I think they suit the CPSU obkom and gorkom ideological departments. I will not go into detail about that situation which arose in light of the attempt to reshuffle cadres in the committee leadership, without the least consideration for the opinion of even the party organization. This caused an acutely negative reaction in the collective directed not against the party obkom as in its entirety, but against individual apparatus staffers using outmoded volitional methods, and excluding the collective approach in decisionmaking. Today, it is already impermissible to function by such methods, all the more so here, for despite being a heterogeneous collective, we are still a powerful one; a capable, for the most part, healthy party organization.

[Rudnov] For the most part?

[Serov] At the start of our conversation, you asked a question, what is our atmosphere—a destructive or constructive factor? Yes, at times these splashes of extremism occur; audience demands are not always taken into full consideration; tendentiousness occurs, and subjectivism in evaluations. But these are glitches; certain heads are spinning from the surplus of clean glasnost air. We, the party committee, the healthy forces of the collective are lacking decisiveness and consistency, yet we are capable of handling the problems about which we spoke earlier, even though they are quite complex. We need to trust each other more; mutual understanding and cooperation with party organs are necessary.

I emphasized that cooperation does not at all abolish the principle of party guidance of the press—through communists working on the editorial boards. Unfortunately, this guidance is now reduced primarily to making telephone calls in the order indicated, or appearances on this or that program, but with the shortage of trust in us as professionals, even the definition of forms for transmitting material and its place is in the air. And we must think together, especially about the long term.

Afterword to the dialogue

That is the kind of dialogue I had with the partkom secretary. It does not claim to be the full and final word, of course, yet certain conclusions may be drawn. In my view, Leningrad radio and television journalists had always been a bit ahead to their colleagues. Just recall

“Horizon” and the young “Neva wave.” Being prepared even in those times was the breakthrough of the “inappropriate” but undoubtedly timely: Tamara and Vladimir Maksimov, Lyudmila Medvedeva, Aleksandr Nevzorov, and Bella Kurkova.

Their work is far from irreproachable, but however partial the attitude toward them, it was they who make the weather; we are to a great extent obliged to them and their colleagues for the fact that step by step glasnost has migrated from wall slogans to our daily existence. Yet in spite of this, we are afraid that under the conditions when passions are suddenly boiling all around, when in a political polemic it has become normal to argue to the point of a “back-handed slap,” when the Philistine despairs of sorting out “who is from where and what he is fighting for,” the mass information media, in this case, television, are not adding any clarity.

And this was not the only problem designated in my talk with the Committee for Television and Radio partkom secretary.

In my opinion, radical changes are necessary. And they must begin with the committee’s legal and public status. It has today not three, but really five masters: Gostelradio, two soviets, the city and oblast, and two party organs, the obkom and gorkom. And as we know, with surplus nannies, the child grows up not entirely well. If we look at the draft Law on the Press, the prospects are optimistic. As the political credo of the state, pluralism must be inherent in broadcasting, since television and radio are state organs.

Is it quite logical that each social current formed, more precisely, each political organization operating within the framework of the Constitution, must have the opportunity to freely express itself on the air. Yet this opportunity must be proportional to or in any case correlated with the actual weight and prestige of the given formation in society. Then obviously, “allowing” political opponents on the air does not lessen or change the role of the city and oblast party organizations in the formation of political trends in broadcasting, or its content.

And how could it be otherwise? The time of the “telephoning right” has passed; the time of active, concerned cooperation has come, and that is wonderful. At the foundation of the new relations is political trust of journalists, leaders of the press, television, radio, the compilers of viewpoints and opinions. Party influence must be realized indirectly in the newspaper and on the air through the pen and word. If we assess the total volume of radio and television broadcasting, then of course, the CPSU line has the quantitative advantage, but this will not be taken in a “barrage.” We have an obvious lack of acuity, passion, and argumentiveness, especially in the speeches of our leaders.

Unlike in the newspaper, here you cannot hide behind the text, or behind what was written by assistants. The TV camera, the microphone instantaneously “decipher” a person by eyes, voice, and gestures. I am afraid of

offending someone, but I will say that communication with the television audience must be the norm, and not an event. And who today, other than the obkom first secretary and two or three leaders, have set for themselves the completely normal goal, for their positions, of becoming a political "TV star"? Incidentally, it seems to me that it is not worth making these people particularly comfortable in the studios, making sure not to offer them the unexpected, or conditions. This is a disservice to those sitting before the camera.

The party organization of the Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio plans several important and needed programs: "Glasnost," "Cybernetics," "Owner," and others, but not perhaps the most topical one entitled "Ideology." And in my view, without it, all the other principles will not yield the necessary effect.

More than 15 million citizens watch our television; at the Congress of People's Deputies they appeal to its programs; some of its commentators have become idols, and many viewers consider it an honor to be personally acquainted with them and seek their patronage, while other viewers threaten them with repression.

Television can do a great deal—unravel an intricate criminal situation, send the man on the street into shock with a piece of news that will knock him off his feet, ruin a candidate in the elections, or show the entire city something that not everyone would be bold enough to relate in the presence of ladies.

But is this all that we expect? Perhaps, the readers will object, but in truly modern journalism, in addition to sensations, disclosures, and baiting there always lives suffering for one's people, a support for it, a difficult, sometimes agonizing path to the truth, and a hope for the better.

Workers Cite Imported Technology in Minsk Pollution Problem

90US0482A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 1 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by special correspondents M. Baranovskiy and V. Roshchin: "Poison by Import: 'New' Foreign Technology Sometimes Also Brings New Ecological Problems"]

[Text]For several months now, passions have been running high in the suburbs of Minsk. The mutually exclusive interests of production and of the people who live nearby have become intertwined in a tight knot here. Who will come out on top this time—the individual or the plan? This is still unclear. But let us take everything in order.

About six years ago, under a contract between Vneshstroyimport and the Italian Concice Cogolo [Konchike Kogolo] firm, construction work began on the Bolshevik leather plant in the little place of Gatovo, near Minsk. Its annual capacity is 500 million square decimeters of the indicated material for footwear and clothing and 200 million square decimeters of split leather. A necessary matter, of course; things are tight where good leather is concerned. And here is how things stand. It will cost, at the cheapest—150 million foreign exchange rubles but, to make up for it, this will be repaid a hundredfold. And, mind you, we will also gain entry for our products into the world market there.

And so, work went into full swing. Construction went its course and excellent facilities went up that would be the envy of any director of a super-new factory. All that remained to be done were the "small" things—the cleaning-treatment facilities.

We will note that the waste products from the plant are by no means harmless: After the leather has been processed a so-called sludge is left over, which contains various kinds of toxic substances. Incidentally, up until now, nobody here in our country has been seriously interested in how harmful these are. They decided that this sludge could be taken to the usual industrial dump. In other countries, special areas are constructed for the storage of sludge, where they seal it up, as in cans for canned food.

Alas, it turned out that we have neither materials to isolate it nor a suitable place for such operations. Where then to put the waste? Indeed, the leather plant puts out, like past from a, up to 70 tons of this dangerous sludge every day. They thought and they thought, and they came to the decision that the best thing would be to burn it. The ashes that result take up seven-fold less space.

The idea was liked. And therefore they thought of building a special oven. But then a problem arose: The Italians, as if in passing, noted that some kind of new product would be formed in the ashes—Isochromium [izokhrom]. The specialists did not know what kind of stuff this was and what they should eat with it. They

began to dig through the dictionaries and handbooks and they discovered that this six-valence chromium is an extremely dangerous substance and that the requirements for its storage are many times more stringent. Then somebody proposed what at first glance seemed to be a saving idea—to use the ash as an additive in the production of reinforced concrete. But a kind that will not come into contact with water... But where, indeed, is there none of this "cursed" stuff?

In brief, there was something here to cause a headache, and here also there was a firm that had the potential of going bankrupt. It was not only the oven that remained among the "unfinished items"; there was also biological purification of the waste products. Incidentally, in this regard, no sooner had the plant gone into operation than the workers at neighboring enterprises, the residents of the village of Gatovo, and dacha owners noted a strong odor of rotten eggs in the air. Still another by-product of leather production is hydrogen sulfide, which not only makes people feel ill, but also produces a sharp discomfort.

Unsubstantiated rumors circulated through the city: Unexplained things were allegedly happening to the people in Gatovo—their skin was being covered with sores, with abscesses, and people were beginning to be short of breath and to suffer from dizziness, especially children. The public was aroused, collective complaints poured in at various official levels. The rotation of paper merry-go-round picked up speed and the plant, the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Light Industry, the sanitary and epidemiological station, the republic's state committee for the protection of nature, the oblast executive committee, and all-union organs were drawn into it.

And the plant continued to smoke. In the end, the workers of the neighboring Vtorchermet enterprise went on strike; indeed, things had reached the point that to work was impossible there without gas masks. It became clear that the problems would not be solved by conversation and studies alone. Two stone walls were standing face to face.

In the office of A. Isachenko, the chief of the labor hygiene section at the local sanitary and epidemiological station, the atmosphere became extremely heated.

"Just imagine what it will mean to shut down the plant?"—stressed Bolshevik's deputy chief engineer for protection of labor and the environment, N. Matyukhin, having turned red with excitement. "More than 2000 people will be out of work. The footwear associations in Grodno, Mogilev, Vitebsk, Minsk, and many enterprises in other republics that are connected with us, will die. What do you want, for them to go barefoot? Isn't it easier to find a compromise solution?"

"Excuse me," the chief sanitary doctor of the city of Minsk, V. Chelnov, breaks into the conversation. "The area where you have been dumping your wastes is overloaded 15-fold... And how long will a new one last for? If things keep going as they are, you will turn all of

Belorussia into a gigantic dump. The situation is a dead end: You are hoping for a miracle furnace, which will supposedly do away with all your problems. But we still don't know which is more harmful—the sludge or the ashes. And it will hardly be possible to avoid the hydrogen sulfide. Moreover, sewage quality does not meet established requirements of the Minsk City executive committee."

Really! What kind of highly touted foreign technology is this that, upon checking, turns out to be "dirtier" than our own? Is this what we have bought imported equipment for? Or, for the sake of longed-for leather, should we not count the cost? And indeed, we will have to pay not only with money, but with the health of our people, with the health of our native environment.

"And this is a serious danger," continues V. Chelnov. "No sooner had leather from the Bolshevik plant begun to go to the Luch footwear association that we were forced to issue a resolution halting deliveries of it. About 30 workers of the enterprise complained of skin disease. It turned out that the products that the leather workers putting out contains carbolic acid and formaldehyde. And indeed, this material will be used to make clothing and footwear, for our children as well. Who will guarantee that nothing will happen to them?"

"Yes, this worries me too," N. Matyukhin has not calmed down. "Indeed I am one such Soviet person. And we have already closed the main shops. Only the dyeing and decoration-work shops are working..."

It is better to see something once than to hear about it a hundred times. It's a half hour's ride—and we are at Bolshevik.

"No shops are shut," chief engineer Vyacheslav Dmitriyevich Tsokolenko flabbergasts us. "In fact, beginning on 1 January they prohibited us from sending sludge to the dump. The settling tanks are almost overfull and the plant's days are numbered. With the help of the city sanitary and epidemiological station they have succeeded in bringing us to our knees. And indeed this is a state matter and they are taking a departmental approach to it.

"All the time, they are harping—the plant, the plant! Wherever you look, all around, we are guilty," says Tsokolenko bitterly. And where was everybody when the contract was signed with the firm owners? When the decision was made about construction of an oven? And if it had not been for the Italians, nobody would have known that there is this six-valence chromium in these damned ashes. They would have been taking them to the regular dumps, and there would not have been any talk. But once we got into the situation, it was necessary to get out of it. We cannot stop such production, we cannot leave the factories without raw materials and the people without work!"

...So, such is the story of what has happened. As they say, if the thunder doesn't roar, the peasant doesn't cross

himself. How many years has this folk saying been around, and it is still valid today. We commit follies, we plunk in millions, and then we start to beat the cat, and to rack our brains about what to do next.

And here is what. Yes, people may be left without work and plants without raw materials. A tough position to take. But otherwise we never will never conquer our profound ecological ignorance and will not stop before it is too late. And what are we going to need elegant boots and a fine leather jacket for then?

Incentives for Ecologically Clean Industrial Production Proposed

904A0184A Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN* in Russian No 4, Jan 90 p 11

[Article by general director of the NPO Medbioekonomika F. Lobanov, department head M. Shapiro, and NPO associate Ye. Gromova: "In Harmony with Nature"]

[Text] The decree by the USSR Supreme Soviet, "On Pressing Measures towards Ecological Improvement in the Nation," provides for discussion at the spring session of the draft for the long-range State Program on the Protection of the Environment and Rational Use of Natural Resources in the USSR for the thirteenth five-year plan and for the period up to the year 2005. In the opinion of specialists from the research and production association Medbioekonomika, in connection with this document it is also necessary to devise a new mechanism of economic incentives for environmental protection activities among industrial enterprises.

Tax abatement and disincentives

Ecological safety should, without a doubt, be directly linked to the economic interests of worker collectives. Otherwise one can hardly count upon the desired results. In our view, these ties should be realized through a flexible policy of ecological taxes, price-formation, and fees for the use of natural and other resources. To some degree these controls are already in effect today. But owing to half-way policies and contradictory regulatory documents, they are not having the needed effect.

According to the system now in effect, for example, enterprises are not financially responsible for the fixed capital for special cleaning installations on the condition that no marketable products are being salvaged from wastes. If this condition does not hold, then the full fee is charged. Is that not a paradox? This condition acts as a disincentive for measures towards the utilization of recyclable wastes.

Logically speaking, it is necessary to introduce differentiated fees for all productive capital, depending on the degree to which the technological profile of the equipment being used conforms to the requirements of ecological safety. Enterprises with outdated equipment should pay more, since this causes more damage to the

environment for which society must pay. In order to establish the rates of ecological fees for these assets it is necessary to evaluate the equipment in question from the point of view of utilization of raw materials and fuel and energy resources as well as volume and composition of pollutants. On this basis fixed productive capital can be classified according to how ecologically sound it is.

A rule making money which is moved from funds for the development of production to environmental protection measures tax-free could also serve as an important element in the system of economic incentives for environmental protection activities among enterprises.

The present system of price-formation for output produced should also be subject to serious restructuring. Precisely through the improvement of this system we could create a favorable economic climate and orient enterprises towards the economical use of natural resources and towards expanded reproduction of natural resource potential. The improvements would also create equal economic conditions for those enterprises using natural resources of varying quality and from various locations.

Prices for raw materials and fuel should be set at the level of outlays for production, taking into account the possibility of recycling them from wastes. Along with the transition of means of production to wholesale trade, there should be an increasing role for ecological taxes which would stimulate production and applications such as low-toxicity pesticides, biological means for protecting plants, and agricultural techniques which prevent the degradation of the soil. Without using a centralized price-setting mechanism, i.e., without disrupting the market mechanism for price-formation, these taxes should provide a means of making it economically disadvantageous to put ecologically unsound products on the market. Mechanically raising the prices of environmentally dangerous products without introducing the corresponding taxes would only make them more lucrative for producers, and that, of course, would be unacceptable.

Another form of encouragement for enterprises with regard to socio-ecologic requirements could be mandatory centrally established price allowances for the most ecologically beneficial output ("clean" fuels, closed technology machine complexes) as compared against the prices of analogous output with the worst ecological profiles. These allowances should be financed not by the consumer, but by regional bodies which control and regulate the use of natural resources. The means should come from regional funds for the protection of nature. This will provide an economic incentive for the production and application of ecologically improved equipment.

The environmental fund

The system of payment for natural resources requires improvement as well. The newly introduced Procedure for Determining and Applying Standard Fees for the

Disposal of Pollutants into the Natural Environment stipulates two types of payment: one for permissible waste levels (within the established limits) and one for levels beyond that. In the first instance local soviets of people's deputies set the norms on the basis of the outlays which are necessary in order to carry out, according to the provisions of the plan, measures for lowering environmental pollution levels. Here deductions in republic and state funds for the protection of nature are taken into account. In this instance payment will come out of the enterprise's profits.

In cases which exceed the maximum norms permitted, the rates for deductions are determined on a small scale in relation to the standard fee for permissible concentrations. This is paid for out of the collective's *khozraschet* [economic accountability] income.

But the provisions that have been introduced are only half-measures. The most important prerequisite for using the payments in a way that more effectively exploits natural resources is their application in the formation of specialized regional and branch environmental protection funds. The enterprises themselves should also create their own environmental protection funds. Standardized rates of deduction can be set for these funds based upon a unit of pollutants discharged, taking into account how hazardous they are and their environmental impact. The means to these goals should be paid for from profits until they can be directed to economic incentive funds. An enterprise uses its own environmental protection fund to compensate for expenses incurred for the sake of environmental measures. Together with deductions from profits, amortization deductions for environmental protection installations and units on the enterprise's balance sheet can serve as financial sources. Additional outlays for environmental protection should be covered by credit or sources of centralized financing, i.e., regional and branch environmental protection funds.

The right to pollute?

The method of accelerated amortization, which is used to expedite the formation of special environmental protection funds at enterprises, can act as a rather effective economic incentive for introducing clean-up equipment at environmentally hazardous works. This method is widely used abroad. Thus in Canada a two-year amortization period is provided for clean-up equipment; in France and Japan 50 percent of clean-up equipment is amortized for one year. In Great Britain, FRG and the USA, the amortization period for all clean-up equipment is five years.

A number of other economic controls exist as well which stimulate ecologically stabilizing behavior and are effective in the presence of developed market relations and clear regional standards of environmental quality. In effect, regional environmental protection bodies sell enterprises the so-called right to pollute within the limits of established pollution level allowances for the region.

Another way in which this right to pollute can be realized is a differentiated approach to organizing environmental protection activities which eschews standard units and permits a choice of clean-up technology. Such an approach assures the conservation of material resources as a result of the different necessary expenditures on environmental protection, depending on the characteristics of a particular branch of production. The essence of this method lies in the fact that clean-up systems are installed in those production sectors where they have the greatest impact and cost the least. Any reduction in pollutants below the established level will result in the right to expand production capacity. In some cases it is more advantageous for an enterprise to compensate its neighbors for their environmental protection outlays in order to be allowed to create additional wastes while keeping within regional allowances.

The policy of compensation for pollution has become widespread in various countries. For this purpose "ecological banks" are created. If an enterprise has managed to lower pollution levels to below the established norms, then it can deposit the "surplus" in the "bank" and receive monetary compensation. As a rule, regional environmental protection bodies act as brokers who regulate the use of "accounts," and in particular the issuance of quotas for additional pollution.

The application of market methods for regulating the protection of the environment in combination with other measures which act as incentives, including the transition of environmental protection services to *khozraschet*, can truly increase the effectiveness of enterprises' ecological activities.

Members Explain Goals of People's Deputies Ecological Group

90US0471A Moscow *LESNAYA PROMYSHLENNOST* in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by parliamentary correspondents V. Markov and V. Raskin: "The Aral Sea, Suffering a Disaster"]

[Text] In his speech, people's deputy T. Kaipbergenov characterized the situation of one of the largest inland seas, the Aral, thus: Age, according to the writer, 35,000 years. Just 20 years have been enough to destroy the Aral. And it is not alone in its calamity. "A grave, in places catastrophic, ecological situation has come about in the country"—with these words begins the appeal of the deputies' ecological group to their colleagues. In the last issue of the newspaper's reporting from the Kremlin Palace, we promised the readers that we would tell in more detail, as far as the space in the newspaper allocated to us will allow, about the goals and ideas of this group.

The question may arise for the reader: Why is this group needed, when after all, the USSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the Immediate Measures for the Country's Ecological Recovery" was published quite recently, in early December. And it directly states that control for the

implementation of this document is entrusted to the USSR Supreme Soviet committee for issues of the ecology and the rational utilization of natural resources. Will not the newly created deputies' group duplicate the committee's work?

We cite the opinion of Deputy A. Yablokov, a scientist. It was he whom USSR Supreme Soviet member Professor V. Antanaytis, the leader of the "greens" in the Baltics, named to us as the chief organizer of the deputies' ecological group. Aleksey Vladimirovich feels that both the 1st Congress and the 2nd Congress revealed a great desire on the part of the deputies to concern themselves with ecological problems. Every second or third speaker brought them up. This is the potential which must be realized in the group being newly created.

But what do the other deputies think? During the recesses, we managed to converse with some of those who had signed the appeal.

USSR Academy of Sciences Vice President Ye. Velikhov told us that he is prepared to join the group being created, since the ecology today is a social movement which he fully supports, and that he even created here in our country conditions for the existence of "Greenpeace USSR."

"I feel," says the academician, "That the social movement can do a great deal. But today, unfortunately, it is strongly politicized. What do I see as negative here? It is enough for a person to say that he is against nuclear power, and having expressed such a viewpoint he is immediately "plus" 50 percent. For certain people, this turns into playing to the audience, a sad phenomenon. We have global problems and local problems. Take the problem of the forest. After all, they are the planet's lungs. And we must treat the forest carefully. If we destroy the forest, it is going to affect not only our country, but will infringe upon many countries and continents. The consequences? This could bring man to the threshold of self-destruction. What conclusion to draw? We must instill ecological responsibility."

"Why did I sign the appeal? There are almost 4 million voters behind me," Deputy Ye. Gayer told us. "For us, the native inhabitants of the Far East, the question is now this: Are we to be or not to be. And issues of the ecology play a most important role here. I have established good relations with the newspaper *LESNAYA PROMYSHLENNOST*. You can read many interesting things in it. We have to get the Amur to become an ecologically clean zone (just recall how many problems the Amur pulp and paper combine generated), we must resolve the fate of many tree farms, and allocate our natural resources in a businesslike manner."

People's Deputy Yu. Chemodanov was not next to us when we interviewed Ye. Gayer. But it was as if he had heard her thoughts:

"Can we really dispose, in such a barbaric way, of what nature has given us. I am a resident of the Mari ASSR. A

locality once rich in forests is turning into a steppe with stumps. And how much of the forest disappeared because of the Cheboksary GES..."

And here again we want to quote those who signed the appeal of the deputies' ecological group: "The policy being implemented in the area of protecting nature has been failing for a prolonged period: Six party-Government resolutions were adopted on saving the Volga-Caspian Sea basin; four on Baykal, and three on the Sea of Azov-Black Sea basin, yet the ecological situation in these regions has not improved, but worsened. The infant mortality rate is high; the life expectancy, low; morbidity is growing, and all of this is linked to the poor ecological situation in many regions, and the saturation of the living environment and foodstuffs with all sorts of pollutants. Natural resources are being squandered..."

And here is the initiators' concrete proposal: "We, USSR people's deputies disturbed by the country's ecological condition, and desirous of increasing the efficacy of our work, are organizing in accordance with the regulations of the Congress the deputies' ecological group."

But whom can the group realistically count upon? The "Soyuz" data-processing computer system set up in the foyer of the Kremlin Palace helped us get an answer. At our request, engineer Olga Danchenkova asked the computer, and it issued a print-out list of all those who raised at the Congress of USSR people's deputies and at the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions questions on the topic of the "Law on the Protection of Nature and Utilization of Nature." For the readers' information, we cite the names of those the computer told us—V. Vidiker, M. Mongo, V. Murashov, Yu. Sharipov...

Soviet Peace Committee's Ecological Group 'Eyes of the Earth' Issues Manifesto

90US0471B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian, No 2, 10 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed commentary: "Eyes of the Earth"; Text of manifesto signed by I. Shklyarevskiy et al.: "Ecological Manifesto"]

[Text] "Eyes of the Earth"

"We cannot expect any favors from nature..." the optimists would begin in their day. "...After what we have done to her," complete the skeptics today. Indeed, the ecological situation threatens almost the very existence of mankind. Perhaps the International Ecological Forum will make a contribution to the defense of nature. But many organizations have already proposed urgent measures for saving the environment. One of them, the "Eyes of the Earth" movement under the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace [SKZM], declared for itself an unusual, decisive action a few days ago. It established control over the Belorussian city of Mogilev.

"We feel," says movement Chairman Igor Shklyarevskiy, "that nature is in such a prostrate condition that it is no longer enough to protest its pollution. Not papers, not conferences, not meetings, but real, constructive help is needed—to turn it green, to clean, to wash away, to save... In our country, associations to defend nature have sprung up like mushrooms on a stump. But they exist in and of themselves, and nature exists in and of itself. And it has not gotten any easier for nature. The immature forests covered with dust (there remain no mature ones) and the waters tortured with poisons and filth have no suspicions about who their defenders are."

In the meantime, S. Zalygin alone did more than all the new associations when he began an unequal battle with the monstrous plan to reverse the flow of northern rivers.

The "Eyes of the Earth" movement also decided to begin with a practical action—the recovery to the ecological situation in Mogilev, hazy from chemical plants and located on the edge of the Chernobyl radiation funnel. The program could be called, "returning butterflies to the city"; after all, these fluttering "flowers" are the first to fold their petals in polluted air. Where there are butterflies, we may still raise our children.

The Ecological Committee was created on the initiative of SKZM and the local leadership in Mogilev. We want to involve representatives of the "greens" parties from abroad in saving the city. Then we can do the same job in one of the cities of Western Europe. And today, we publish our ecological manifesto—with hope...

The Ecological Manifesto

The air is our father. The water is our mother. The Earth is our home.

The dew is a national treasure.

The time has come for each to recognize that we live in an ozone dandelion, that our Earth is a lone heavenly flower situated at a felicitous distance from the Sun.

And we detonate bombs in the dandelion! We gnaw through its wounded capsule, brush away the pollen, flick away the delicate stamens of the forests.

The birds and beasts, the flowers and trees appeal to man: Protect, preserve the place where you stand, where you live, within your sight and voice, at least to the length of your outstretched arm! And your personal active space, multiplied by millions, will become the fatherland's protected space of peace.

On the threshold of the third millennium, we have piercingly realized that it is already impossible to save ourselves and save life on Earth in one individual country, even in the most successful one.

It is necessary to create a Worldwide Ecological Council with the right to veto any poisonous production, with compensation from the universal funds of the Worldwide Council.

The idea of beautifying, healing, greening, and cleaning the Earth must become the principal state idea, the reason for existence and the national pride of each people.

In the 21st century we do not want people to cry in their cups at wakes and funeral feasts, that there should be water purifiers in alleyways... A field of grain may grow from a single kernel, yet you cannot grow a sea from a single drop of water. While still in this century, we must declare water to be sacred.

We must introduce into our lives concepts such as ecological labor, ecological worker, ecological engineer, and create forestry and water schools, departments of ecological labor in professional-technical colleges, technical schools, and institutes. And all this in order that millions of ecological workers labor night and day in our cities and villages, on the rivers, seas, and lakes just as the harvesters, fishermen, construction workers, and engineers labor: They should water, clean, and make green the courtyards, roads, parks, and river banks; every rural and urban enterprise should in legal order be responsible for the air, water, and land within its territory, within the boundaries of their effects; that no industrial plans suppress nature, dictate conditions to it, or dominate it.

The time has come to develop a new category of rights—the rights of animals, birds, trees, and flowers. The rights of nature.

Ecological services with paid temporary labor must be created in all our country's cities and villages—1- or 2-day labor so that our youth may really participate in ecological works (during the breaks between school and the army, between school and VUZ, during student vacations). This is millions of working hands of which we had too few because of the sluggish system of payment for labor.

With common efforts, all of Europe and worldwide, we must reanimate the cities which have fallen onto the ecological black list. A labor army, ecological, green (forest) regiments, blue (river and sea) flotillas cleansing the water's surface of oil slicks, and divers to free the bottoms of water bodies from flooded trees must emerge as an alternative service in the army.

The new ecological thinking is the little boy of the 21st century who has seen oil spots on the river, and not having observed people nearby, catches the spots with his white shirt. Only such a recognition of nature can save us, restore our blue sky, green meadows and forests, wash the clouds, return forgotten freshness to our cities, and generate the joyous scents of grasses and living water.

We believe that the hour will come when the country will take pride not in its factories, not in the smoky horizons, but in its fresh leaves, dew, and night chill, in the scents of its fogs and freshening marshes.

We believe that schoolchildren will write out syllable by syllable: The air is our father. The water is our mother. The Earth is our home. The dew is a national treasure.

Igor Shklyarevskiy, chairman, ecological movement "Eyes of the Earth";

D.S. Likhachev, academician, chairman of the board, Soviet Cultural Foundation;

Genrikh Borovik, chairman, Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace;

Boris Oleynik, deputy chairman, Soviet of Nationalities, USSR Supreme Soviet

Omsk People's Deputy Comments on Environmental Regulation Structure

90US0472A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 16 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Aleksey Kazannik, USSR people's deputy, by TASS correspondent A. Petrov: "Nature Needs Guarantees"; Omsk, date not given]

[Text] One section of the pre-election program of A. Kazannik, USSR people's deputy for the Omsk National-Territorial Okrug, which includes Tyumen Oblast, was dedicated to a most acute problem of modern times—the ecology. And it is not by accident that A. Kazannik, a lawyer by education, and a docent at Omsk University, is today a member of the parliamentary committee for issues of the ecology and the rational utilization of natural resources.

A TASS correspondent asked Aleksey Ivanovich to comment upon the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree, in whose preparation he participated, "On Immediate Measures for the Country's Ecological Recovery."

[Correspondent] I seem to recall that there were more than a few decisions on environmental protection taken previously, yet the ecological situation in the country has grown catastrophically worse. Can we count on the efficacy of the new document?

[Kazannik] The problem's stormy discussion at the Supreme Soviet session testifies to the deputies' understanding of the extremity of the situation. But unfortunately, the decree says nothing about the organizational-legal mechanism for protecting nature. And without such a mechanism, the legislative acts will continue to be ignored. In January 1988, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution "On the Radical Restructuring of the Matter of Preserving Nature in the Country." Its main idea is the creation of a state committee for the protection of nature and an end to the arbitrary rule of departments. Yet what came of this? Having achieved the adoption of the USSR Council of Ministers resolution on the regulation of water resources utilization, the Ministry of Water Resources Construction [Minvodstroy] reserved for itself the major portion of water management, and on

this basis simply refused to transfer to the USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature [Goskompriroda] the hydrochemical laboratories, water supervision inspection, and staff of associates. The country's Ministry of the Fishing Industry [Minrybkhov] "reeled in its line" on internal bodies of water in short order, and retreated to the maritime expanses. The ponds, streams, and lakes were transferred to the USSR State Agro-industrial Committee [Gosagroprom] (which departed this life), while at the same time, the supervision of fish remained with its previous masters, USSR Minrybkhov. Under the slogan of perestroika, the State Committee for Hydrometeorology [Goskomgidromet], and the State Committee for the Timber Industry [Gosleskhov] made an immediate move. With its conciliatory policy, the latter brought the country's forest fund into hand, and compromised itself as a forest protection organ. A change in signage—the State Committee for Forestry [Goskomles] appeared to replace Gosleskhov—laid a foundation for retaining the previous function and staff. But who is going to take control over the protection of the lands?

[Correspondent] And what about the new organ protecting nature?

[Kazannik] Departmental egotism expanded on such a scale that USSR Goskompriroda cannot present its statute to the Government for confirmation without the consent of these ministries and committees. Organization of efficacious control is blocked. In the situation which has come about, the question reasonably arises, is this control committee at all necessary if it only duplicates, and on a low technological level at that, the functions of these "nature protecting" monsters?

[Correspondent] Does it seem to you, Aleksey Ivanovich, that the ecology has become the object of an acute political struggle, in which the advocates of protecting nature, and those who support their policy are for the time being unsuccessfully attempting to achieve not half-measures, but decisive measures?

[Kazannik] I would not call them entirely unsuccessful. Just take the example of the rejection of the transfer of Northern and Siberian stocks of fish. Life itself is shifting toward an understanding of the impossibility of living by the old rules. Until quite recently, we rejoiced at the smokes of factory smokestacks, which was visible dozens of kilometers away—they symbolized our growing might. This psychology saturated our consciousness, literature, and art.

The authoritative conclusion of Academician Vernadskiy had been forgotten: Nature is a complex, self-managing system in which all components are interrelated and interconditioned. It is impermissible to protect the living environment with branched acts, through preserving its individual resources. Principally new forms are necessary, which encompass the entire range of problems. Such may become the long-term concepts of location of production forces for a term of 100-150 years, with their development

on the basis of ecological predictions for 20-25 years, which determine the possible consequences of the planned large-scale actions.

[Correspondent] Aleksey Ivanovich, do you have concrete proposals for the creation of a harmonious system of the country's nature protection affairs? If so, what is their essence?

[Kazannik] On the basis of long-range ecological prognoses, it is necessary to develop a master system of regional plannings, general city plans, and enterprise construction projects, and to achieve strict compliance with the norms and technological regulations applied to all spheres and branches of management. A most important problem is that of territorial macro-zoning, that is, allocation of the total land reserve with consideration for the land's functional designation. The recently published draft principles of legislation on land, agricultural lands, lands with other designations, and reserve lands are divided into separate sections. Those lands completely unsuited to any sort of need should be set aside from the reserved territories, and as a compulsory measure, enterprises posing a heightened danger for nature should be situated on them, with a watch method of service.

[Correspondent] As a resident of Omsk, you know that this is one of the country's most polluted cities in the ecological sense. The situation reached the extraordinary last year: Use of private automobiles was prohibited; enterprise capacities were reduced, or even shut down... In several indices, the PDK [maximum concentration limits] were exceeded 50-fold. Yet another misfortune has recently been added to these: People found out that crushed radioactive rock from the Makinsk strip mine, Tselinograd Oblast, has been used for many years in the construction of housing and social-cultural sites. Apartment walls are saturated with radium, and the air, with radon. The situation is heating up before our eyes. What is the way out of this situation?

[Kazannik] I addressed to USSR Minister of Health Ye.I. Chazov a deputy's inquiry on the measures for providing radiation safety for Omsk residents. The answer proved surprisingly superficial, based upon the conclusion of the commission created by the oblipolkom: There is no threat to people's health. After all, it is the local authorities who are to blame for using a dangerous construction material! The conclusion of independent, authoritative expertise and the adoption of decisive measures is needed.

[Correspondent] As we see, the effectiveness of the acts now being taken is scanty. Why is that?

[Kazannik] Karl Marx formulated the answer to that question: The law cannot be above the economy and the culture conditioned by it. Guarantees are needed to apply legislation, first and foremost, economic ones. We have it quite bad with these: There is no monetary assessment of natural resources, of paid utilization of nature. The aforementioned CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution speaks of

such payment. But the development of scientifically based norms of raw material consumption per production unit has been given to Gosstab and the ministries. For better or worse, about 25 million types of products are turned out in the country. So, we should develop as many scientifically based norms for consumption of raw materials? Would it not be simpler to introduce a monetary assessment of resources?

Academician Velikhov Views Results of Moscow Global Forum

90US0472B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 24 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Ye.P. Velikhov, USSR Academy of Sciences vice president; USSR Supreme Soviet member, by TASS correspondent S. Turanov for *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*: "The Ecology is a Moral Category"; date, place not given]

[Text] The Global Forum on problems of the ecology and development for the sake of survival has completed its work in Moscow. Ye.P. Velikhov, USSR Academy of Sciences vice president and USSR Supreme Soviet member, shares his impressions of this event in a discussion with a TASS correspondent.

[Correspondent] The concluding statement of the Global Forum of spiritual and parliamentary leaders for the survival of mankind, held in Oxford in 1988 states, in particular: "We were united by a common concern for the survival of mankind, and we entered into a new dialogue about our common future..." Yevgeniy Pavlovich, how did the current dialogue proceed?

[Velikhov] The Moscow meeting was more representative than the previous one. The forum elicited enormous interest from the world public—for the first time in history, two world-wide broadcast telecommunications companies, "Intersat" and "Intersputnik"—conducted a joint program for 2 billion viewers and listeners in 129 countries. But of course this is only the external side of the forum. Its internal "breathing" was determined by the fact that recently, the residents of many countries seem to have sensed that it is within their powers to change the world for the better, that there is a single path toward this, through communication, through an inventory of common interests.

[Correspondent] What phenomena associated with the degradation of the environment alarm the public most of all?

[Velikhov] Unfortunately, there is an entire "bouquet" of them. I would note first and foremost the problems associated with the demographic "explosion" taking place lately. Interesting information was cited at the forum: While it took 10,000 generations for the number of people on the Earth to reach 2 billion, it may now grow from 2 to 10 billion in one or two generations. And objectively, after all, a certain amount of energy, agricultural products, and things which in the final analysis are

derived from natural raw materials is necessary for each person's existence. And raw materials are not infinite. Moreover, broad utilization of certain forms of raw materials may lead to extremely undesirable effects. One of these, the so-called "greenhouse effect," is already being felt.

The status of the ozone layer causes no less fear, the formation of "ozone holes" as the consequence of the use of certain gases, primarily freon. Ecologically clean technology with a closed cycle has been rare in enterprises until now. Unfortunately, the "Black list" of ecological disasters can be continued.

[Correspondent] Outlining the circle of problems is, as they say, only half the matter. What have the forum's participants proposed for nature's recovery?

[Velikhov] It has historically come about that countries (this particularly concerns Africa) which are poorly developed in an industrial sense have become overpopulated. This double pressure affects nature; after all, in the given case, ecologically unclean technology is used with the increased demand for resources. But surely all peoples, including minor peoples, have the right to their own share of water, air, heat, and material wealth. In the opinion of many, it is therefore advisable that measures to control population growth be combined with the broad dissemination of new ecological technologies. Since the industrially developed countries have to "answer" for the greater part of the pollution of the planet, the proposal of former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland is logical; according to this proposal, the developed countries must allocate 0.1 percent of their gross national product to a special climatic fund.

Enormous resources for the defense of nature may be obtained as the result of the conversion of military production; after all, for example, a single linear inch of submarine costs about a million dollars.

A search for new sources of energy is necessary. It may be substantially accelerated as the result of the close cooperation of the scientists of many countries. There already are such examples—in the FRG with the participation of scientists from the USSR; the United States, Japan, and many European countries are completing work on a unique design of a thermonuclear reactor, in which great hopes are invested.

[Correspondent] Speaking of nuclear power, it could be noted that the issue of a possible influence of an AES accident's consequences upon man and nature was practically not raised at the forum's plenary sessions. Does this testify to the disappearance of the "radiation phobia syndrome"?

[Velikhov] Unfortunately, it still remains. And a great deal remains to be accomplished in order for it to disappear completely. For example, in our country, the consequences of the Chernobyl accident must be eliminated first and foremost. We must also prove that at the

current stage, it is safe to utilize the existing type of nuclear reactors. At the same time, we must continue with the development of a new type of reactor, which would be limited in any accident to a level of leakage acceptable by the environment. I hope that this will be the joint work of several countries.

[Correspondent] Is there a guarantee that representatives of all countries will accept the forum's recommendations?

[Velikhov] Such a guarantee cannot be given, of course. But we do have powerful levers of influence. This is first and foremost the support of the press, which in many ways forms public opinion. The popular parliamentary and religious figures who participated in the forum's work exert no less influence upon the inhabitants of many countries. Its composition at this meeting was highly representative; suffice it to say that UN Secretary General Xavier Perez de Cuellar addressed the forum.

In addition, there already exists definite experience with "ecological" interaction of international public organizations with the parliaments of certain countries.

Nor can we fail to mention that youth, pupils and students, are also being invited as participants in such forums. For the time being, we are indebted to them, and I consider topical the thought that we have not inherited the Earth from our forebears; we have borrowed it from our children. Thus, our task is to raise the growing generation to be cultured, not just in the usual, but in the ecological sense of the word.

[Correspondent] You spoke of this in detail in a speech at the forum. The readers would also probably be interested in learning what is being done to accomplish this complicated task.

[Velikhov] Many joint children's projects are now being realized. For example, the organization, "Children, Creators of the 21st Century" implemented 37 projects in our country last year with American schoolchildren alone, including projects connected with environmental protection in one way or another. Within the framework of the "Children of Chernobyl" project, 25 children from the regions of Belorussia which suffered from the accident at the Chernobyl AES visited India, and 50 visited Israel. The "Gandhi Foundation" and the "Greenpeace Foundation" assisted us in this.

...I feel it advisable to declare this year the year of the young environmental defender. And the next step can be the creation of international centers for schoolchildren's "ecological education." And finally, I hope that this will bear fruit.

Kirovgrad Ecological Group Demands Action on Local Pollution Problems

90US0473A Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 1

[Text of open letter from N. Logunova, L. Stuchalova, M. Zolotareva, Ye. Rudimova and other members of the

ecological initiative group, Kirovgrad, Sverdlovsk Oblast, to USSR Minister of Metallurgy S.V. Kolpakov: "Real Help is Needed"]

[Text] Esteemed Serafim Vasiliyevich!

All our letters and telegrams addressed to various departments, ministries, and you personally frequently go unanswered, so we decided to appeal to you through the newspaper. We will speak of the the most grave ecological situation which has come about in our city.

The copper smelting combine and the solid alloys plant spew out at our city approximately 87,000 metric tons of harmful substances annually. Taking into consideration the "prevailing winds," that is one ton per resident. These are substances such as sulfur dioxide, sulfuric acid vapors, aerosol lead, etc.

Added to this "bouquet" on a periodical basis are 20 more highly toxic substances yielded during the production of copper from secondary raw materials, so-called thermo-utilization. This consists of their burning finished cable that comes to the combine. The insulation casing is burned, and the copper remains. During this procedure, phenol and hydrogen chloride are released into the air. The resultant levels by which this exceeds maximum concentration limits are simply fantastic—from 20 to 750 fold!

All these chemicals get into our lungs. They also penetrate the soil. According to the examination results, the soil in our gardens and collective orchards contains arsenic, zinc, copper, and other substances. The fruit and vegetables grown there simply cannot be eaten.

As a result, according to the testimony of N. Basyrova, the deputy chief doctor for the central city hospital, of 11 newborns who died in 1989, 9 died from diseases of the respiratory organs. Over the years of the 11th and 12th 5-year plans, the morbidity of malignant growths increased 50 percent. Professional morbidity has not been lowered here in many years; it remains higher than the average even for the ill-fated Sverdlovsk Oblast.

The new shop in which the thermo-utilization of secondary material must take place was designed long ago. It is not enough that the building has been constructed. But there is still not a line which would allow the secondary material to be processed without polluting the atmosphere. It would seem that the previous ministry had resolved the matter of purchasing such a line abroad, but it is still not here to this day.

On orders from above, the chemical production line included at the combine produces chlorsulfonic acid, one of the components of various medical preparations. This had preciously been an independent enterprise subordinate to its own ministry. Later it was just mechanically merged with the combine; the chemical production does not participate in the production of copper in any way.

But it has now become the "stepchild" of both the combine and the Ministry of Metallurgy. It has been

many years since either the shop, or the capacity producing the acid has been reconstructed. And that is an aggressive environment. Not only the equipment has corroded. The buildings themselves are on the verge of crumbling. The masonry is being destroyed, as is even the metallic weight-bearing frame of the building.

The oblast public health inspection, the gorispolkom, and other departments have decided on more than one occasion to close the chemical production. But under the ministry's pressure, none of these decisions was implemented. Last time, the doors to the chlorsulfonic acid department were even sealed. But on 3 October, combine Director V. Mazanik himself broke the seal and started up the department's work.

And on 25 October, for the umpteenth time, a ton of hydrogen chloride was discharged; workers were poisoned, and had to be taken away from the gaseous zone. On 27 October we were all dumbfounded to hear the text of V. Mazanik's telegram, sent to Sverdlovsk television and read on the air. It asserted that the chlorsulfonic acid department presented no ecological danger, hence the city committee for the protection of nature was sounding an alarm in vain.

Such "games" only irritate people. Once again, just as during the years of stagnation, an attempt to deceive the public instead of practical actions. But even if the residents of the oblast's other cities can still believe the director's telegram, we cannot be deceived...

Approximately 90 hectares of forest perished from a single discharge in July. The damage done to orchards and truck gardens has reached R300,000. And no one can calculate to what extent the health of the people poisoned by this discharge has been undermined. No amount of money can compensate for this.

Esteemed comrade minister, the city's inhabitants anxiously await your response to this letter. Yet a response alone is very little. We have had it up to here with promises and appeals to "be a little more patient." The problem must be solved in the briefest possible period, for the ecological situation which has come about in our city is dangerous to the health and the very life of thousands of people. It is no longer permissible to regard it apathetically, all the more so, criminally.

'Ekologiya i Mir' Group Demands Halt to Volga-Don Canal Project

90US0473B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by V. Kovda, corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences; N. Minashina, doctor of agricultural sciences; S. Chernyshev, doctor of geological-mineralogical sciences; V. Dubinina, candidate of geographic sciences; and Ye. Podolskiy, candidate of technological sciences, members of the board of the Soviet association "Ekologiya i Mir": "Destruction by Irrigation: Why is a Prohibited Canal Being Built?"]

[Text] The construction of the second Volga-Don canal is in its fourth year. The first has long been in service and lets vessels pass. The new one has exclusively hydro-irrigational significance. We recall that it was a component of the diversion of waters to the Volga from the North. But after the adoption of the well-known 1986 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution on rescinding the diversion, the decision to include this structure in the current 5-year plan in fact lost its judicial effect.

The canal project was originally developed for the diversion of 5.5 cubic meters of water, providing for irrigation of a one-million hectare area. And the Rostov-Krasnodar canal was designed to supplement the Volga-Don II canal. Along with the assimilation of new irrigated lands, the overall expenditures were preliminarily assessed at R6.5 billion(!), and the annual expenses would be no less than R500 million. The project's capital investment in a single irrigated hectare (and that is without drainage work) is R8,000, and the expenses for the supplemental feed and grain received converted to 1 kilogram of meat is 20 rubles! And these are only the land reclamation expenses, without calculation of labor for plowing, sowing, and harvesting, for maintenance of livestock, etc.

However, the wave of public indignation at the wasteful and earth-damaging activity of the land reclamation engineers forced the leaders of the Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources] Construction] to shelve their Rostov-Krasnodar canal project. The Volga-Don II canal, it seemed, was "up in the air".

But after all, the construction was already in full swing—what would become of it? It was quite simple. Minvodkhoz is rapidly "restructuring itself" and is designating a so-called "actuating complex" of structures with volume of diverted water reduced to 1.9 cubic kilometers (read: with the possibility of an increase to 5.5 in the future) and of the irrigated area from 800,000 to 274,000 hectares in southwestern Volgograd and eastern Rostov oblasts, and the oblasts of the Central Chernozem Region.

The cost of the "truncated" Volga-Don II canal project is estimated at R313 million, and together with the irrigation systems, R2.3 billion. According to the designers' calculations, the irrigation of 274,000 hectares will yield an additional 1,170,000 metric tons of feed, allowing a gain of about 60,000 metric tons of meat. In their opinion, the expenses will be recovered in 10 years.

However, these assertions of high irrigation efficacy, are unfounded, to put it mildly. And proving this poses no great difficulty. First of all, rather than including in the calculation only the added harvest to be gotten at the expense of irrigation, the designers are entering on the credit side the harvest currently yielded without watering. Secondly, they are not considering the annual expenditures on the irrigation systems. And finally, the

open forgery: The agro-economic effect of irrigation is being doubled. The cost of the meat, milk and other products received on their basis is being added to the cost of the feed yielded. All of this exceeds the genuine effect of irrigation by a factor of 3-4.

We are thinking about building a canal, but in the meantime, the condition of agricultural lands is most unsatisfactory. Approximately one-third of all arable land is subject to water and wind erosion; only 2 metric tons of organic fertilizers are used per hectare (while the norm is 11-14 tons). This is what should trouble us first and foremost. But alas, anti-erosion measures are conducted on a completely inadequate scale. Thus, for example, Volgograd Oblast requires a doubling of the area of protective forest plantations, the fortification of sands and ravines, the construction of thousands of runoff canals, and the creation of "green umbrellas" at watering holes in pasture land.

No more than R11-12 billion may be allocated for the development of all branches of the zone's AKP [Agro-industrial Complex] in the upcoming 5-year plan, and it is absolutely impermissible to waste them on ineffective water reclamation goals.

Incidentally, it is not only a matter of ruinous economics. The irrigation of these lands is extraordinarily dangerous (the majority of the territory here constitutes chernozem and similar soils). And under the current Minvodkhoz norms, it is simply destructive, since the deposits underlying the chernozems are salt, and the ground waters are mineralized. Soil salinization and degradation frequently occurs upon moistening. Thus, for example, the chernozems in the Azov irrigation system lost 20-30 percent of their fertility because of irrigation, and 2,000 hectares currently simply out of production.

Is there an alternative to building the canal? There is! It could be a system for improving the soil water status, the basis for which was developed by V. Dokuchayev. This system includes, among other things, combatting soil erosion, recovery and utilization of snow and rain water in the open steppe, the development of norms defining the optimal correlation of tilled land, meadows, and forests, a choice of methods for soil cultivation, and better adaptation to the local soil and climatic conditions of the types of plants cultivated.

The enormous negative changes which occurred in the Caspian Sea basin as the result of water project construction, the development of industry and agriculture have been described over and over again. In particular, that water project construction cut off a major portion of the spawning grounds of migratory fish (the sturgeon family, herring, and white salmon), and radically altered the hydrological regime of the Volga. Along with the pollution, this has created an ecological situation of crisis in the Volga-Caspian area. That is why further blocking of Volga water is impermissible. Incidentally, in late 1988, a USSR Gosplan examination ascertained the water

management balance of the Volga. The experts arrived at the unanimous opinion: There are no spare resources in the Volga.

Independent USSR Gosplan experts, permanent members of the USSR Gosplan GEK [state examining commission], as well as the USSR Gosstroy State Examining commission have spoken in favor of halting the canal's construction. The struggle with the department has dragged out for almost 2 years, yet there has not yet been any final decision. The canal is a new source of financing for the USSR Minvodstroy [Ministry of Water Resource Construction], ensuring once again the activity of a mechanism for expenditures.

Minvodkhoz Environmental Policies Seen Unchanged After Reorganization

90US0515A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by USSR People's Deputies S. Zalygin, A. Kazannik, V. Tikhonov, A. Yablokov, and A. Yanshin: "Water in the Nets of Minvodkhoz"]

[Text] The country's public breathed easier when the "project of the century," the diversion of northern rivers into the Caspian and Aral Seas was stopped. The further along it got, the more adventurous this project seemed to many, many scientists, scholars, specialists, and participants in the ecological movement. Afterwards, projects for other diversions were rejected: the Danube-Dnepr, the reservoir construction on the Belaya river in Bashkiria, the Volga-Chogray, and each time, our amazement knew no bounds: By what means was Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Water Resources Construction] managing all the same to dig and dig, to invest tens and hundreds of millions of rubles of the people's money in projects which had not yet finally been confirmed? And not only invest it—to finish billions worth of construction on projects the advisability of which had never, anywhere, in any way, shape, or form, been proven. An example of this is the Volga-Don-2 canal, the brainchild of comrade V.I. Kalashnikov.

Minvodkhoz is currently reorganizing itself. This is now no longer the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. They let the big one get away: Previously, Minvodkhoz, even though unwillingly, with loathing, had to concern itself with land reclamation. Now it is free of that "load." Know thyself; dig and delve. After all, it is well known that earthmoving work is the most advantageous and the most "padded," and now the ministry is not even formally concerned with improving the lands as such.

And it should not take long to find a minister. There he is, right on the spot. P.A. Polad-Zade—the right hand and first deputy of the long-term stagnation minister, who has departed for a (the tongue cannot be twisted to say the usual—"well-earned") rest. He is full of creative intentions, energy. Well, a real newborn work superintendent of perestroika!

The Government believes him. Otherwise, why would he have twice been presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet as a claimant to the post of minister? Yet it was with these two occasions that there occurred an unprecedented oddity. Deputies usually heed second requests of Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov; after all, it happens that emotions predominate the first time around. But here, the candidacy did not get through the second time. And it is not a matter of emotions, but of the precise knowledge of the fact that P.A. Polad-Zade has been and remains one of the chief ideologists and practitioners of the diversion concept so unpopular among the people.

Let us attempt to "compute" how Minvodkhoz-Minvodstroy is supposed to act, according to its internal logic, after such an impressive double defeat. Show up for a third going-over by the Supreme Soviet? Well, anything can happen, and pushing P.A. Polad-Zade through to the Government by hook or by crook is not to be excluded. But not very likely. Most likely, this could end up with the same version as in the Ministry of Culture: A totally "unprogrammed," totally new person, but one respected by the country, comes to the leadership.

According to our information, the main committees of Minvodstroy are being reorganized into associations. The latter, in turn, are uniting into a concern, which is being confirmed in place of Minvodstroy. And all of this, "at the initiative from below." In such a case, a leader with ministerial power factually in hand will not need to go through parliamentary confirmation. And it strikes all the major chords of the new economic spirit of the times!

If we were speaking of a genuine transition to economic accountability, to the track of economic reform... If the bitter experience of replacing Minvodkhoz with Minvodstroy had not shown that we are speaking only of repainting a facade under the guise of perestroyka, and changing the sign... This is reminiscent of an army fated to utter defeat that is catastrophically losing both territory and vital strength, yet it all the same continues its senseless reformations.

Has the trend of Minvodkhoz-Minvodstroy activity changed? We assert that there are no principle changes.

Some 5 or 6 years ago, Minvodkhoz promised to immediately introduce a cost for water: It was going to purchase water from the state, and resell it to water consumers, charging for the expense of its transportation from the source to the user. What has been done in that direction? Absolutely nothing. Minvodkhoz promised not to start construction on projects not yet confirmed—we have already seen that such construction is in full swing even now.

Minvodkhoz artificially increases the efficacy of its jobs, determining the profit and achievement without consideration for the ecological damage, without the operations expenses, and also padding to its account the agricultural production that had been cultivated on the land before

their irrigation or drainage. And now it is calculating exactly the same way, perhaps even more adept at this terrifying arithmetic.

A review of the RSFSR Ministry of Finance established incidents in Vologda Oblast of the transition of substantial parcels of drained land into undrained land, and then came the repeat drainage of these parcels. For getting non-functioning land improvement systems into operation, the construction workers received bonuses, but the correction of the defect was done at the expense of the budget. Over 8,000 hectares brought into use between 1981 and 1986 are in need of major repair and reconstruction (this was reported by SELSKAYA ZHIZN).

More important: If anyone thinks that the time of the Minvodkhoz "projects of the century" has passed, he is seriously mistaken. The specialists and organizations of Minvodkhoz (let us say, SANIIRI [Central Asian Scientific Research Institute of Irrigation], in the person of its director, V.A. Dukhovnyy), which have wasted billions in order to ruin the Aral Sea, are now receiving the same money for its "restoration," by the same exclusively hydrotechnology methods, that is, by lining the new canals. Yet land reclamation methods, and not hydrotechnology jobs, are what is need here to restore the losses. Moreover, it is impermissible to entrust this work to the same people who bear the responsibility for the catastrophe that took place, whose result can only be compared with Chernobyl.

Photos from space persuade that the canals made by Minvodkhoz, including the main ones, "leak": Colossal filtration of water into the ground it taking place. Only 20-30 percent of the water reaches the plants; the rest goes into the sand. This leads to swamp formation and salinization of the land both in the irrigation zone and beyond its bounds. On a country-wide scale, no fewer than 25 million hectares of agricultural lands beyond the bounds of the irrigated territories have been subjected to secondary salinization, flooding, and swamping, that is, more land than has been irrigated. A concrete agro-ecological concept for the restoration of soils in the region of Central Asia was developed by scientists, but is was not called upon. And of what use is it to the Minvodstroy leaders when the projects and construction jobs of the century were carried out, and are still carried out by the ministry in all their undisguised outrageousness. Only now they are situated somewhat further from the public, which has, in recent years, one way or another gained experience in fighting such adventurism.

The Danube-Dnepr or Volga-Chogray diversions have been shut down? No tragedy. We will push through the South-Omsk irrigation system and the Ob-Chany canal in Novosibirsk Oblast... Yet what can be said about the first project at a cost of 3.8 billion rubles, if the designers themselves determine the construction period to be...35 years, plus a 15-year "assimilation period"? This means that none of them will even be in his post when the time comes to ask, "Well, what kind of mess have you made?"

And that question will inevitably arise. After all, the project is being done on soils for which, according to the conclusions of authoritative specialists, irrigation is simply counterindicated.

Here is one more tried and true Minvodkhoz method: Promising to fix the Omsk water supply system, thus trying to get public opinion over to its side. This has also taken place (and is taking place) in the project of restoring the Aral Sea: You give us the money for irrigation canals, and we will not forget the community water supply! But surely this is no more than a lure. The problem of the community water supply must be resolved on a completely independent basis, with the utilization, where possible, of ground water, and in the South, with the assistance of desalinization installations and other means. Yet it is advantageous for Minvodkhoz to combine these two problems into one: So to say, if there are to be no irrigation canals, there will be no drinking water.

The Ob-Chany diversion project can lead to the most dramatic consequences in Novosibirsk Oblast, where Minvodkhoz long-term construction projects have already devoured hundreds of millions of rubles. All the deadlines have long since passed, yet there is no end to the jobs in sight. And now, instead of somehow bringing to a close a job that has already begun, the Ministry begins a new billion-ruble project, assuring us that it will restore the fish resources of lake Chany. The specialists did their calculations and shrugged: Considering the construction expense, each fish in the lake will be golden. And if the long-term construction expenses of the previous years are taken into the calculations...

We would also like to note the duality of the position of the local leadership and the newspapers OMSKAYA PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA SIBIR. Neither print organ can avoid any longer the discussions on these construction projects—it is, after all, the “people’s” construction—and great projects at that. So materials “for” and “against” these projects are published. Everything would seem to be democratic. Yet if just one side of the scale starts to tip against the projects of the century, the final word is granted to someone from Minvodkhoz, and the discussion is declared closed. Under the strict control of the local leadership, the newspapers cannot give the projects an objective evaluation.

As the result of the Minvodkhoz activity, in the country approximately 4 million hectares of previously irrigated land and over 1 million hectares of previously drained land have been officially written off; more than 9 million require reconstruction, and 30 million hectares have noticeably lost their fertility. The ecological damage totals hundreds of billions of rubles.

When Minvodkhoz-Minvodstroy is subjected to withering criticism, not somewhere among the “militant intelligentsia,” but literally throughout all strata of the population, the idea is expressed of closing this department, since the fruits of its anti-popular mismanagement

are literally in front of everyone’s eyes, the justification is dragged out into the open: Those who are against Minvodkhoz are proposing the elimination of water management. This is the age-old self-defense of obsolete structures—to equate their own end with the end of the world.

But no! We are not against water management! No one is planning to make any attempts against this most ancient, most respected form of human activity. Exactly the opposite: We are in favor of finally regenerating it in the country, after the decades of the expenditure bacchanalia of the ministry of water mismanagement, as Chairman of USSR Goskomprirroda [State Committee for the Protection of Nature] N. Vorontsov christened Minvodkhoz in a new year’s interview with IZVESTIYA.

Minvodstroy assumes that it can restructure itself, re-educate itself, “come clean.” We do not. The new anti-expenditure concept of water utilization in the country demands a revolutionary break with the old structures organically incapable of solving the problems that have arisen; it demands the creation of new ministry of water resources organizations, alternative in spirit.

And no positive moves will happen here if the salvation of the Aral Sea is handed over to the control of those who ruined it. True, any organization has the right to correct its mistakes. But not at the expense of the people’s millions and the people’s health! Minvodkhoz has already scattered about the country too many such “corrective polygons.”

And finally, in addition to the right to correct mistakes, there is the responsibility for them. But that is somehow not really too evident when the subject turns to Minvodkhoz-Minvodstroy; there is solid clemency (which was somehow lacking on its part toward the residents of the Aral area and many other regions).

Yet today, we hardly expect any such repentance from the current Minvodkhoz-Minvodstroy. Therefore, a great deal more sense is seen in the proposals which resounded in IZVESTIYA, in the article of Professor B. Vinogradov, “First We Cut, Then We Measure?” (No. 219, 1989). The USSR Supreme Soviet committees on construction issues and on ecological issues, in conjunction with the USSR people’s control committee, must conduct a country-wide audit of all the water resources structures and irrigation systems, and a review of the financial expenditures and their correspondence to the technological and economic requirements. The USSR Council of Ministers state committee for extraordinary situations must head up this work, since, as B. Vinogradov justly noted, “in every unfounded water resources project there is programmed both a future extraordinary situation, and an ecological-economic catastrophe.” Finally, the USSR Procuracy must determine the personal and collective criminal responsibility for the damage inflicted upon the country.

New irrigation construction should be halted for at least 5 years, and only the reconstruction of existing hydromelioration systems should be undertaken. The funds and material resources thus freed should be directed toward the socioeconomic development of the village. After all, we are speaking about tens of billions of rubles: Certainly this money could be used for all the articles of our pinched budget?!

In our view—and this has long been established, confirmed by numerous facts and materials—Minvodkhoz has become an unnecessary spendthrift mechanism that is doing more harm than good. In recognizing this, Minvodkhoz is attempting to give itself a different, “associative” face, as well as to assimilate the functions of agricultural and road construction, supplying natural gas to the countryside, and other functions.

Thus, on its own it whispers the solution: It is necessary to eliminate Minvodkhoz in any of its forms, as has been done with an entire range of other departments. There must be created in the republics universal ministries of rural construction in which no one branch may crush any other.

State of River Pollution in Uzbekistan Summarized

90US0515B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
5 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by G.A. Balayants, Uzbek SSR Goskompriroda Department for Water Resource Protection, recorded by R. Kasymov: “Man and the Biosphere: What is Ailing the Rivers”]

[Text] G.A. Balayants, Uzbek SSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for the Protection of Nature] Department for Water Resource Protection, describes the result of the “Ekologiya-89” expedition’s work investigating the rivers of Uzbekistan.

Six ecological expeditions set out for the republic’s rivers in the summer of this year. They worked under the guidance of specialists from the Uzbek SSR Goskompriroda, with the participation of deputy groups from the republic’s Supreme Soviet, representatives of the Ministry of Health, Uzbek Goskomvodkhoz [State Committee for Water Resources Construction], public formations, and the mass information media. The expeditions investigated the rivers Akhangaran, Chirik, Zeravshan, Kashka-Darya, and Surkhan-Darya; in Tashkent, the rivers and canals of the Salar, Karasu, and Ankhov. Within the scope of their attention were the industrial enterprises, livestock complexes, community-use and other facilities situated in the riverside zone.

The ecological party revealed an extremely strained ecological and sanitary-epidemiological situation in the river basins. The causes for this—the unsatisfactory condition of construction and exploitation of environmental preservation installations, the lack of purification installations in the majority of the facilities of the former

Gosagroprom, [Uzbekbriyashu], and Ministry of Health, the uncontrolled use of pesticides, and the cluttering of shores with waste and household garbage. Processing of sand and gravel pits is conducted in the river channels, as a rule, without plans, just naturally. Situated in the flood plain and within the boundaries of the water protection zones of the rivers are livestock breeding complexes, feeding stations, private farms, dacha sectors, rice and other agricultural crops requiring cultivation with poisonous chemicals and application of chemical fertilizers.

Particular mention should be made of the strained ecological situation in the Zeravshan and Chirik basins.

The Zeravshan is polluted throughout its entire length. At the river’s mouth (Pervomayskaya dam), the water is polluted with phenols, pesticides, copper, and chromium in amounts exceeding the PDK [maximum permitted concentration]. Antimony levels in the water higher than sanitary norms—such is the result of the discharge into the Zeravshan of the untreated wastes of the Anzobskiy mining enrichment combine (Tajik SSR). But all the same, the rivers within the territory of Samarkand Oblast receive a significant dose of the poison. The river water quality is sharply decreasing as to content of organic substances; the value of the coliform index (bacterial contamination) is growing 240-fold during individual periods. The main reason is the inoperative status of the Kattakurgan treatment facility (under construction since 1976; to be introduced at the end of this year), and the insufficient capacity of the facilities in Samarkand.

Storage and processing of waste materials, the preparation of manure ground composting were not organized in a single one of the farms or stock breeding complexes investigated. The mass assimilation of river and canal embankment strips for agricultural crop cultivation is under way; mineral fertilizers and pesticides are being used, something which is categorically prohibited. Along the entire length of the river, farms and organizations extract construction materials from the river channel at will.

An unsuccessful ecological program has been established along practically the entire length of the Chirik from Charvakskeye reservoir to its confluence with the Syr-Darya.

The river water quality is affected by discharge waters coming from the enterprises of Chirik, Tashkent, Yangiyul, and Gazalkent; wastes from the farmlands, fiber processing factories, stock breeding farms, and health treatment facilities of Bostanlykskiy Rayon. An increase in pollution is observed in a direct line from the “Elektroprom” production association and the Uzbek combine of high-fusible and heat-resistant metals.

The Novomayskiy fiber processing factory discharges up to 1,000 cubic meters per day of insufficiently cleaned

wastes having a high concentration of organic and mineral compounds; this comprises a 4-fold excess of permissible norms of the substances measured, a 23-fold excess of the organic contaminants, and a 20-fold excess of nitrogenous ammonium. The discharge waters of the lead complex (unpurified) aggravate the general background as they flow into the drainage collectors, then into the Chirik. The levels exceeding the PDK for increased substances here are in general, 7-fold; for nitrogenous ammonium, 19-fold, and for organic substances, 34-fold. And that is with dilution of the discharge with ground water in the collector!

The Tashkent petroleum facility is situated in the river's flood plain. This is a gross violation of environmental protection legislation. As the result of major losses of petroleum products, there occurs soil contamination, pollution of the water table, as well as of the surface water flowing into the river.

The sanitary and ecological situation discovered on the shores of bodies of water in Bostanlykский Rayon, the canals of Tashkent, and the Akhangaran, Kashka-Darya, and Surkhan-Darya was most unsatisfactory.

The members of the "Ekologiya-89" expedition not only ascertained incidents of violation of environmental protection legislation, but took all measures for the recovery of the water preservation situation in the river basins. Of the 270 river bank and protected zone sites investigated, 155 had received mandatory court orders; 42 enterprise leaders had been fined; activity had been halted at 53 facilities; 2 cases had been transferred to the procuracy organs; 3 suits for compensation of damage done to the state by polluted bodies of water had been presented, and 20 facilities have been issued orders for being transferred.

The expedition's audit showed that the unfortunate state of the ecology along shore strips and in the protected zones of flowing water has been caused by the lack of a master of the rivers, by gross violations of water preservation legislation on the part of managers of enterprises, farms, construction organizations, stock breeding complexes and others. It is worth mentioning the illegal activities of the local soviets, which allocate parcels without the consent of the environmental protection organs.

The expedition's main conclusion is that it is necessary to develop plans for the water preservation zones and the judicial formation of their boundaries, and to eliminate from the territory of the shore zones all crops, stock breeding farms, and other facilities.

'Top Secret' Map on Radiation in RSFSR Oblasts Revealed

904E0067A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 27 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by E. Mokhorov, *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent: "Top Secret: Who Created the Secrecy Around the Bryansk Tragedy?"

[Text] At an emergency session of the Bureau of the Bryansk CPSU Obkom and the ispolkom of the oblast soviet, representatives of labor collectives, physicians, and journalists were presented for the first time a map of the radiation situation of Bryansk, Kaluga, Tula, and Orel oblasts.

This map was classified "Top Secret" for more than 3 years. Until last September, the very fact of the tragedy that befell a vast area of the Russian Non-Chernozem zone as a result of the Chernobyl accident was concealed from the public.

Nothing was written about the refugees, about the abandoned Bryansk villages, settlements, and factories, about the massive increase in serious illnesses, particularly among children, or about the hundreds of millions of rubles senselessly spent on work to remove contaminated soil, the effectiveness of which authoritative experts now compare to that of the former USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources to reverse the Siberian Rivers.

To whom belongs the honor of being the one who for almost four years created the secret around the misfortune that befell people? In Bryansk, Novozybkov, Starodub, Zlynka, Trubchevsk, and other towns and villages, they more and more often are citing the name of the first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, F. Tabayev, who until September 1989 headed the interdepartmental governmental commission. Accusations are also made against scientists of the Leningrad Scientific Research Institute of Radiation Hygiene.

At a meeting of the Bureau of the Bryansk Party Obkom, Yu. Tsaturov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology, publicly accused the RSFSR and USSR councils of ministers of concealing the truth about the disaster areas in Russia. The first information about the radiation situation in Bryansk and other oblasts of the RSFSR, as he stated, was presented to the governments of the republic and the union already on 29 April 1988, and it is not the scientists' fault that this information was not made public in a timely manner.

Almost four years after the Chernobyl accident, a board of directors has finally been created in Bryansk Oblast for building new communities for the evacuated refugees. A decision has been now been made on eliminating 44 populated areas in the so-called strict monitoring zone.

In the contaminated areas there is a catastrophic shortage of physicians and a lack of medicines, diagnostic equipment, and the simplest radiation monitoring instruments. As a rule, there is one dentist, one internist, and one surgeon for each rayon. This was discussed at the obkom bureau meeting. The government of Russia allocated for the disaster area one refrigerator and one washing machine for each 1,000 residents, although such goods in the strict monitoring zone are not a luxury but a matter of life and health. Only 30 percent of the need,

say, for canned milk for children is being met. Patients with a critical need for medicine have a six-month wait. At the same time, public health agencies rejected the offer of free assistance from the World Association of Physicians for Bryansk Oblast.

In answering workers' questions, Yu. Olkhovikov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Gosplan, who was present at the meeting, was forced to admit that he did not even suspect that things were so bad, that he was poorly informed, and that assistance was not requested vigorously enough.

And the final "Top Secret" report: The workers of Bryansk disaster area have grown tired of listening to the empty promises of the numerous commissions from the center. Now all hope is on the USSR Supreme Soviet, which in the next few weeks, it has become known, will consider and approve a unified all-union program of assistance to the republics that have suffered. This includes the deprived Russian oblasts—the outcasts.

Latvian Goskompriroda Official on Republic's Ecological Priorities

90US0477A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
1 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by G. Liyepa, deputy chairman of the Latvian Committee for Environmental Protection and chief state republic inspector for environmental protection: "Concern for Each and All"]

[Text] The thousands of blue lakes, streams and rivers, the magnificent pine forests and the unique sandy beaches are the pearls which decorate the Latvian landscape and comprise its invaluable heritage. But these riches which for decades have been unmercifully and shoddily exploited are disappearing before our very eyes, clearly demonstrating the murderous force of the notorious slogan: "We cannot expect any charity from nature...."

Our committee was also established to halt the senseless squandery of natural resources.

The scale of this process, I feel, can be gained from the following figures. In 1988, the organizations and enterprises paid over 2 million rubles in fines in order to compensate for the ecological damage caused. Over the 9 months of 1989, already 710,000 rubles have been sought, 443 leaders of various levels have been fined and the procurators have handed on 8 cases involving the worst offenders.

During this same period, the operations of 15 industrial enterprises were halted in order to put them in order. As an example, this was the smoke shop at the Riga Fish Processing Combine, two piers at the Ventspils enterprise for delivering oil and oil products for export and so forth. They have also finally shut down (with the disassembly of the equipment) the asphalt cement shop at the Riga Spetsdetal [Special Part] Plant.

But repressive measures are only one of the functions of the committee and, we feel, not the most important one. The success of our work will depend primarily upon determining a strategic line in protecting the republic's nature. This was also the prime focus in the committee's activities in 1989.

But it is essential to prepare the legal support for protecting nature as rapidly as possible, as in our actions we should be guided solely by the law.

All of these and certain other documents should come into legal force in 1990.

The committee must also make a major effort to consolidate the various movements and organizations of the Greens. The culmination of this was the conference "Green Logic" held in the summer.

But certainly it is impossible to get along without a good physical plant. Significant amounts must be spent to purchase computers to establish a data bank. The RAF [acronym unknown] has already provided the first minibus equipped for monitoring the atmospheric air. We need at least 10 such vehicles including one for each regional committee.

The 14th Session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet on the last days of 1989 adopted a very important decision for all the defenders of nature: under the republic Supreme Soviet the Latvian Committee for Environmental Protection was established. Consequently, our status has been changed. Now I am hopeful that we will experience less pressure from the various ministries and departments and hence it will be easier to be concerned with nature.

In looking back at 1989, I would like to endeavor to sum up certain results:

Water: While in previous years there was a certain constant increase in discharge of poorly treated waste water, at present the situation has been stabilized and there has been no deterioration, although also there is no improvement.

Air: One can trace a trend for a decline in pollution.

Soil: Unfortunately, as yet there are no data on the pollution level as a whole for the republic. The same can be said about the state of the flora and fauna.

We are very hopeful that in 1990 environmental protection will become a component part in the economic policy of the republic government. I believe that the local soviets will be fully understanding of our problems.

I would like to take this occasion to congratulate all the republic inhabitants on the New Year and wish them optimism, health and happiness. I am confident that if we all make the effort undoubtedly we will protect the land which is called Latvia.

Estonian Law on Exploitation of Natural Resources, Environment*90US0477B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 28 Dec 89 p 3*

[Law of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic on the Procedure for Using the Environment and Natural Resources]

[Text] I. General Provisions

Article 1. The procedure for the use of the environment and natural resources

(1) The procedure for the use of the environment (land, bodies of water and so forth) and natural resources is established in the aim of ensuring the following:

- 1) Protecting the environment and natural resources;
 - 2) The careful and sparing use of the environment and natural resources;
 - 3) Accounting for, control and supervision over the use of the environment and natural resources.
- (2) The current law regulates relations arising in providing for use and using the environment and natural resources between the user and the corresponding state body or local self-governing body.

Article 2. The right to use the environment and natural resources

The right to use the environment and natural resources occurs for enterprises, institutions, organizations and citizens of Estonia as well as troop units stationed on Estonian territory in the event of providing them with the territory required for use, the concluding of a use contract and the granting of permission to use.

Article 3. The use of the environment and natural resources by enterprises, institutions, organizations and citizens of other Union republics and foreign states

(1) The use of the environment and natural resources by enterprises, institutions, organizations or citizens of other Union republics or foreign states as well as their transporting of the natural resources outside the republic are to be carried out under the procedure established by the Estonian government.

(2) The use of the waters and natural resources of the Baltic Sea, including the catching of fish and aquatic invertebrates and marine mammals are to be carried out on the basis of international treaties as well as treaties concluded between the Union republics. Questions arising over the joint use of the waters and natural resources of Lake Chudo, including fishing, are to be regulated on the basis of the treaty between Estonia and the RSFSR.

II. Providing the Environment and Natural Resources for Utilization**Article 4.** Granting territory for use

Lands and waters are to be provided for use by the local self-administrative bodies if no other provision is made by the international treaties and the treaties concluded between the Union republics or by the procedure set by the Estonian government.

Article 5. The granting of the environment and natural resources for use

(1) The providing of the environment and natural resources for use is to be drawn up in a treaty of use between the corresponding local self-administrative body and the user.

(2) The right to use the environment and natural resources arises for the user after the use contract has come into effect on the day of the issuing of the permit or use and ends on the day indicated in the use permit or in line with the cancelling of the use contract.

Article 6. The use contract

(1) A use contract is concluded between the local self-administrative body at the location of the natural resources and by the enterprise or citizen expressing a desire to use the environment or natural resources.

(2) The use contract indicates:

- 1) The environment and the natural resources to be provided for use;
- 2) The volume of use for the natural resources;
- 3) The requirement to observe the established conservation conditions;
- 4) The demand of the economic use of the natural resources;
- 5) The basic requirements for the production methods to be employed;
- 6) The procedure for protecting ancillary natural resources and the conditions for the recultivation of the lands;
- 7) The taxation bases for using the environment and natural resources, the rates and procedure for paying taxes;
- 8) The volume and procedure for placing or removing production wastes in the environment, the principles of taxation, the rates and methods of paying taxes;
- 9) The amounts and procedure for paying compensatory payments related to the withdrawal of natural resources from public use;
- 10) The maximum acceptable load factors on the environment;

- 11) The period the contract is to be in effect;
- 12) Responsibility of the parties in the event of violating the requirements stipulated in the contract and the use permits as well as the legal consequences of this;
- 13) The use contract can also contain other conditions which are essential in the opinion of the parties.

Article 7. A use permit

(1) A use permit is issued in the procedure set by the Estonian government.

(2) A use permit should state:

- 1) The period for which the environment and natural resources are to be made available;
- 2) The technical conditions for ensuring the protection of the territories and natural resources granted for use;
- 3) The specific use standards;
- 4) The maximum rates of production losses and wastes.

Article 8. Halting the use of the environment and natural resources.

In the event of violating the conditions indicated in the use permit, the body which has issued the use permit may halt the use of the environment or natural resources until the shortcomings indicated in the corresponding order have been eliminated and the user has provided compensation for the caused harm.

Article 9. Cancelling a use contract and revoking a use permit

Violating the conditions indicated in the contract for the use of the environment and natural resources entails the cancelling of the use contract while making the violator responsible for covering the damage caused and putting the territory in its use in order. In the event of the cancelling of the use contract, the use permit also automatically is invalidated.

Article 10. Special methods for the use of the environment and natural resources

(1) The Estonian government establishes the following:

- 1) The procedure for the use of natural resources in general use;
- 2) The procedure for providing lands and waters for use for establishing conservation conditions;
- 3) The procedure for placing species of plants and animals under state protection.

(2) On the basis of a decision by the local self-administrative body, the population of animals can be controlled:

- 1) In the interests of protecting public health;

2) In the aim of preventing illnesses in livestock and domestic animals.

(3) Only upon agreement with the local self-administration and on the grounds of a permit granted by it in each individual instance is it possible:

1) To locate underground, on the earth's surface, in a body of water or discharge into the atmosphere harmful substances and production wastes on territory which has been specially assigned and prepared for this or in the water under the condition of thereby meeting all the particular conditions for protecting the environment;

2) The carrying out of work which effects the appearance of the landscape or the ecological state of the environment, including reclamation work and work related to the regulating of bodies of water.

III. Guarantees for the Use of the Environment and Natural Resources

Article 11. Legal regulation of the use of the environment and natural resources

(1) Relations between the state bodies and the local self-administrative bodies in the area of the use of the environment and natural resources are regulated by Estonian legislation.

(2) The relations between the local self-administrative bodies and the users are to be regulated by Estonian legislation and by contracts.

Article 12. Resolution of disputes

(1) Disputes arising in the concluding, amending or abrogating of a contract governing the providing of the environment and natural resources for use as well as in allocating lands and bodies of water are to be settled by the local self-administration of the second level. Those desiring to conclude a use contract have the right to appeal this decision to the Estonian Supreme Soviet.

(2) Disputes arising in the issuing of a use permit are to be resolved in the procedure set by the Estonian government.

(3) Disputes arising between the user and the local self-administrative body or a state control body in the course of controlling the use of the environment and natural resources are to be settled by the court.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet A. Ryuytel Secretary of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet A. Almann Tallinn, 15 December 1989

Goskompriroda Official On Interrepublic Tajik Aluminum Plant Controversy

90US0474A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 5 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with V. Ye. Ziberov, head of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection's Chief Monitoring and Inspection Directorate, by TASS Correspondent S. Morozov: "Let's Look At The Situation Without Emotion"]

[Text] Moscow—The deteriorating environmental situation in the vicinity of the Tajik Aluminum Plant has recently led to demands that the plant be converted to other uses or even closed. The site was recently visited by an interdepartmental commission of the USSR Council of Ministers. A TASS correspondent asked V. Ye. Ziberov, head of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection's Chief Monitoring and Inspection Directorate, to tell about the results of the commission's work.

[Morozov] Valentin Yevgenyevich, perhaps you could begin with a few words about the makeup of the commission you chaired.

[Ziberov] In addition to our experts, the commission included specialists from the USSR Ministry of Health, the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology, and a number of other concerned organizations, as well as representatives of the Uzbek SSR and Tajik SSR Councils of Ministers.

[Morozov] And what was the commission's assessment of the environmental situation in the vicinity of the plant?

[Ziberov] The enterprise is for the most part implementing measures to reduce emissions of atmospheric pollutants to the maximum allowable concentrations (MACs), and concentrations per unit of output in the area are among the lowest in the branch. For example, from January to May 1989, the level of air pollution from hydrogen fluoride did not exceed the MAC. However, in June through August of 1989, a failure to supply to the plant with sufficient quantities of aluminum oxide led to a violation of production procedures and an increase in emissions of fluoride compounds into the atmosphere. According to the national monitoring service, average monthly concentrations of these compounds in Tursunzad in July exceeded the MAC by 140 percent. In Sariassiykiy Rayon, Uzbek SSR, to which the emissions mostly pertain, the figure reached 380 percent. This caused public concern. Some of the plant's electrolysis tanks were shut down, and fines were levied on those responsible.

[Morozov] As it turned out, however, that didn't solve the problem.

[Zebirov] Unfortunately, we discovered that child morbidity in Sariassiykiy Rayon exceeds the control level [kontrolnom] by 180 percent. For adults, the index was

120 percent above the norm. People were found to have depressed immunological response. The incidence of baby teeth caries was double the norm, and the incidence of mild fluorosis was 720 percent above the norm.

A comparison of Tursunzadevskiy Rayon with the control data shows an 12-percent increase in child morbidity, a 40-percent increase in respiratory ailments, and an 800-percent increase in congenital developmental defects.

The studies conducted also attest to the adverse effect of plant emissions containing hydrogen fluoride on vineyards and stone fruit crops and on the productivity of mulberry silkworms.

[Morozov] Now I understand what motivates the people who are calling for the plant to be closed.

[Zebirov] I wouldn't be so categorical here. We mustn't forget about the effect of pesticides and fertilizer. The water that people drink in those rayons is of very poor quality, and medical care is at a low level. All these problems must be solved in a comprehensive fashion. As for the plant, an analysis of environmental measures that are being carried out and are planned enables one to speak of the possibility of reducing emissions to normative levels in 1990. True, the plant has yet to fully implement environmental-protection agencies' directives, and measures have not been devised to prevent volley [zalpovykh] emissions in the event of disruptions in the supply of raw materials or electric power.

[Morozov] What, then, is the commission calling for?

[Zebirov] We are proposing strict compliance with the norms for allowable emissions. The Tajik SSR and Uzbek SSR State Committees for Environmental Protection and the republics' state health monitoring services will strictly monitor this. In the event the norms are exceeded, appropriate measures will be taken, up to and including restrictions on aluminum production at the plant.

The USSR Ministry of Metallurgy and the USSR State Planning Committee must ensure regular supplies of aluminum oxide. However, it is also necessary to devise and reach agreement, by April 1, 1990, on measures to prevent volley [zalpovykh] emissions in the event of a supply breakdown.

We have recommended that the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy and the plant build two dispensaries and a total of 12 schools, kindergartens, and surgery and obstetrical facilities, and put 26 drinking water wells in operation in 1990-1991. This will require nearly 8 million rubles, including almost 3.5 million to construct facilities in Sariassiykiy Rayon, Uzbek SSR.

The USSR Ministry of Health, in conjunction with the Uzbek SSR and Tajik SSR Ministries of Health, must improve public health care in Sariassiykiy and Tursunzadevskiy Rayons. The Tajik SSR State Committee for

Environmental Protection should build an interpublic laboratory for the purpose of on-site monitoring of polluting emissions.

It is proposed that the USSR Ministry of Health and the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection, in conjunction with specialized organizations, conduct a medical and environmental expert analysis of research data on the state of the environment and public health within 90 days of the conclusion of such research. It is also necessary to speed efforts to establish ecological normatives pertaining to the effect of pollutants on flora and fauna, above all for the Gissar Valley area.

[Morozov] Do you have any fears that all these proposals might remain on paper only?

[Zebirov] We are taking them to the USSR Council of Ministers and we expect that, given the attention that the government is devoting to the ecological situation in the vicinity of the Tajik Aluminum Plant, they will be adopted.

Cherkassy Official Scores Ministerial Inaction On Pollution Priorities

90US0474B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
31 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by G. Sasko, chairman of the Cherkasskiy City Soviet of People's Deputies Executive Committee: "Lessons In Democracy: Verbal Promissory Notes"]

[Text] Our bureau in Cherkassy continues to receive concerned letters and telephone inquiries. The ecological situation in the city is strained, but to all indications, many years of departmental promises—in particular promises from the Ministry of the Chemical Industry—are empty verbal promissory notes. What will the city do in its defense, and when? Isn't it time for the authorities and the law to speak up?

The editors asked G. T. Sasko, Chairman of the Cherkasskiy City Soviet of People's Deputies Executive Committee, to respond to these anxious questions.

A brief description of what has happened. The city used to be a resort. Nature had given it everything. And the problem is not that several sprawling chemical plants were built here. The trouble is that their departments built and operated them as if they were next to a desert, and not a living city. They gave no thought to either people's health or the short-term outlook.

Last year showed that of the country's 115 cities that have unfavorable environmental conditions and are monitored by the USSR Ministry of Health, our city jumped dangerously ahead in terms of overall morbidity and certain ailments. Doctors are sounding the alarm: Morbidity among Cherkassy residents exceeds the average republic level by 50 percent to 60 percent. Children get sick especially often.

More than two years ago, the city Soviet of People's Deputies adopted a decision and has stuck to it steadfastly: There will be no expansion of hazardous production facilities! This forceful document has given a flat refusal to several new shops and enterprises. And it has done so without respect of persons, authorities and connections. The law applies equally to all.

The result? Hazardous emissions have been reduced by several thousand tons. Unfortunately, however, this has not particularly affected the overall ecological weather. As a result, People's Deputies, the public, and the environmental-protection services have been joined by law-enforcement agencies—specifically the oblast procuracy.

Procuracy officials have conducted a thorough investigation into air pollution from industrial waste products hazardous to human health. Expert medical testimony has been taken from the most authoritative and competent agencies—the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection's Ukrainian Research Institute and the republic Ministry of Health, with input from specialists at a number of institutes. The primary conclusion is that one of the causes of higher morbidity in the city is an increased content in the air of carbon disulfide, ammonia, and nitrogen and hydrogen sulfides, whose constant excessive levels are compounded by the fact that the city, by virtue of its location, finds itself in unfavorable meteorological conditions during most days of the year—such as calm or light winds.

We are not whitewashing other enterprises that are to blame for the city's woes—such as the Azot [Nitrogen] Association, the chemical reagent plant, and others, but the truth remains that half of the total toxicity comes from the emissions of the Khimvolokno [Chemical Fiber] Association. The same association that, in its ministry's conviction, is one of the "safest" in the country and that, along with the ministry, has for years fed us promises that it will bring emissions to within norms.

I'm not going to recount the levels at which we have sounded the alarm and for how long. I won't even trouble readers with a review of the responses from former Minister Yu. A. Bespalov and Deputy Minister V. P. Semenov, who assured us since 1988 that "by agreement, the Ministry of Chemical Industry is processing documentation for the allocation of a polypropylene film production unit"—in other words, that the cellophane production that is poisoning us will be converted to the manufacture of polypropylene.

Some may find the details boring, but for our 300,000-population city, this is a real drama. The ministry's new leadership has disavowed its predecessor's promises and is issuing new, even more ambiguous and longer-term promissory notes.

And now the time has come to let the law have its say. The oblast procuracy has charged Yu. T. Turchanenko,

General Director of the Khimvolokno Production Association, with the crime specified in Article No. 228, part one, of the UkSSR Criminal Code (air pollution with industrial production wastes hazardous to human health).

But will it become easier to breathe if the comrade director goes on trial? That is not our objective, and we have decided to be in no hurry as yet to deprive Yu. T. Turchanenko of his Deputy immunity. We need him to carry out the next practical step. It has been decided to reduce cellophane production by 40 percent as of the start of the year. And should the ministry and association fail to present, by the end of January, a specific plan for reducing emissions to the maximum allowable level, cellophane production will be shut down altogether as of February 1.

What a departmental storm we have caused by our decision! "Do you want to cause another shortage?" they've reproached us, in an attempt at intimidation. "After all, cellophane is used to wrap sausage!"

We ask people not to believe that disinformation. Food-processing enterprises' needs will be met fully. But now our esteemed director Yu. T. Turchanenko will tell the work collective the truth and be held accountable before it, instead of unduly increasing, in its name, cellophane production over and above established plans at the cost of committing a crime against the city. All the other questions are for the ministry to answer.

I am among the officials who signed a telegram to the ministry, as well as to the Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, regarding the 40-percent reduction in cellophane production and proposed subsequent actions. I signed it not only as chairman of the executive committee, but also as a communist who voted for the oblast party committee's program for the elections of People's Deputies, which calls for drastic action to improve the environment.

Our voters and your readers can rest assured: No departmental storms will push us off our charted course.

From the Editors. In presenting the position of the Cherkassy City Soviet of People's Deputies, we consider not out of place to recall that on March 16, 1988, the article "How to Atone For Departmental Sins: Three Ministries Versus One City Soviet—Who Will Come Out On Top?" pointedly raised this very problem. The article was reviewed and endorsed at a session of the Cherkassy Oblast Party Committee Bureau that was attended by representatives of the ministries, in particular the Ministry of the Chemical Industry. A resolution notes, among other things, statements by V. P. Semenov, head of the Soyuzkhimvolokno [Union Chemical Fiber] All-Union Production Association, to the effect that the cellophane production facility will be converted in the next few years to the manufacture of output that does not entail hazardous emissions.

Can it be that this decision too will prove a mere verbal promissory note?

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